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Abstract: 
The thesis proceeds on the supposition that there is an underlying theoretical unity 
between the three parts of philosophy and that the principle of coherence presupposes 
an element of continuity from one Stoic head to another. As such, whilst a fully-
fledged theory of pneuma can only be attributed to Chrysippus, the third head of the 
school, the character of the theory is seen to be determined from much earlier with 
Zeno, who is the cause for the emergence of a pneuma with such unique characteristics 
in Chrysippus. Although the thesis does not pretend to be a comprehensive study of 
the concept of pneuma in Stoic thought, in order to trace the key characteristics of the 
Chrysippean concept in the earliest stages of the school and to reconstruct an outline 
of the underlying theory, I chart the evidence describing the mechanical processes 
involved in the pneuma’s variations in tension, its contraction and expansion, its 
growth and nourishment and the relation between the hegemonikon and the soul. These 
themes are discussed in chapters which are related to specific theories of the Stoics 
like cosmogony and cognitive process. The nature of the methodological approach 
means that I often use evidence from seemingly disparate parts of the Stoic system in 
order to better understand the processes involved and I also consider evidence from 
the doxographical records and extant commentaries which is largely ignored in the 
modern literature or is absent from von Arnim’s collection. 
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Introduction 
The integration of theory is an idea which captivates the greatest of minds. When faced 
with diverse mechanisms and seemingly opposing explanatory approaches we may 
observe in ourselves an underlying intuition or proclivity which compels us to try to 
make sense of this diversity in a unified way. This is true of the Stoics as it is true of 
much of contemporary theoretical physics which seeks to integrate the laws of the 
fundamental physical forces with those of elementary particles. To what extent 
integration of theory may be expected to be a reflection of reality and to what extent 
it is imposed by our own intuitions is a matter that has been and remains to be up for 
debate. In this thesis I take the hard-line view that, for the Stoics, the integration of 
reality is not only contingent but it is a precondition that applies to their whole system 
of thought and I treat it as necessary in the study of our sources.  This view, that reality 
and our speculation about it should be treated as coherent, has recently been 
challenged in relation to both Stoicism1 and also modern physics.2 The basic challenge 
is premised on the belief that it is an impoverished and irresponsible methodological 
approach that tries to impose subjective notions of beauty, elegance and simplicity on 
otherwise complex and varied ideas, rather than basing them on empirical data or 
evidence. To my mind this challenge is formulated not necessarily to deny the 
presence of a natural aesthetic in the universe and our understanding of it but rather 
to caution against stubborn adherence to and careless application of individual 
notions of beauty when dealing with our evidence. In my view, our natural intuition 
to maintain an aesthetic approach with regards to how the Stoics describe the 
universe, its parts and philosophy as harmonious and integrated, is, at its core, a 
correct one. This is moreover part of the great appeal of Stoicism. 
                                                            
1 Brad Inwood, “How Unified Is Stoicism Anyway?,” in Virtue and Happiness: Essays in Honour of Julia 
Annas (OSAP Supplementary Volume), ed. Rachana Kamtekar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 
223–44. 
2 George Ellis and Joe Silk, “Scientific Method: Defend the Integrity of Physics,” Nature 516, no. 7531 
(2014). 
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It is the aim of this thesis to offer a reconstruction of Stoic philosophy from the 
perspective of the coherence and methodological integration of the theories 
implemented by the early Stoics. This study does not constitute a full treatment of 
Stoic philosophy, after a first chapter on ancient and modern views of the tri-partite 
division of philosophy, the main body of the thesis focuses on how aspects of the 
notion of pneuma are integrated into wider Stoic theory both theoretically and 
diachronically between the first three heads of the school. In the main I explore how 
the idea emerged in Zeno and Cleanthes and only touch upon the Chrysippean theory 
in so far as his version of the notion of pneuma involved appropriating ideas from his 
predecessors.  
Why a study of pneuma is necesssary 
There have been numerous discussions of pneuma in Stoicism in the modern literature. 
In a seminal work dedicated to the subject Verbeke3 offers an erudite historical account 
in which he describes how the notion emerged in Zeno purely as a material breath 
and gradually undergoes a “spiritualisation” by the time it reaches Chrysippus and 
later St. Augustine. He conceives that Zeno had no philosophical conception of pneuma 
and that with Cleanthes the notion starts to shed its empirical and medical origins 
under the influence of Plato. The idea of a universe pervaded by pneuma is for Verbeke 
developed out of Stoic psychology and argued for from the part to the whole. That is 
to say that the Stoics extrapolated their understanding of the cosmos from their 
understanding of human beings, rather than conceiving of the human being as a 
micro-cosmic expression of the cosmos or offering a two-way description of reality 
from whole to part and vice versa. The state of our evidence has meant that most 
studies which consider pneuma in Stoicism begin with an elucidation of the scala 
naturae and the different degrees of pneumatic tension determining the type of pneuma 
that exists within the bodies. Pneuma is called ἕξις in inanimate bodies like stones and 
bones, φύσις in things like plants which have the capacities for nourishment and 
                                                            
3 Gerard Verbeke, L’évolution de La Doctrine Du Pneuma, Du Stoicisme à s. Augustin : Étude Philosophique 
(Paris: D. de Brouwer, 1945). 
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growth and ψυχή in animals which also have the capacities for sensation and impulse; 
the human pneuma has the added capacity for reason. From this description it is a 
natural step to take a particular interest in the role of pneuma in rational beings, which 
often takes the form of an examination of its role in sensation, for which we have 
explicit evidence. In this way the more recent scholarship follows a similar model to 
that of Verbeke in presenting the evidence for pneuma as a theory which is first and 
foremost psychological.4  
Other studies present the purely physical side of our extant sources and these studies 
take the form of a discussion of the physical composition of pneuma as also its role as 
a pervasive and vitalising force in the cosmos.5 As far as I know, there is but one study 
which is explicitly devoted to bridging the physical and psychological descriptions of 
pneuma.6 The available examinations of pneuma are more often than not discussed 
within articles or book chapters which are focused on other aspects of Stoic theory and 
are not specifically directed towards the role of pneuma in Stoicism. A consequence of 
this is that we do not have any clear notion of the inner-workings of pneuma, let alone 
how well integrated it is with the rest of Stoic theory. Thus we encounter many 
                                                            
4 Cf. esp. J. B. Gould, The Philosophy of Chrysippus (Leiden: Brill, 1970), 51–66; R. B. Todd, “Συνέντασις 
and the Stoic Theory of Perception,” Grazer Beiträge : Zeitschrift Für Die Klassische Altertumswissenschaft 
2 (1974): 251–61; Julia Annas, “Stoic Epistemology,” in Epistemology, ed. Stephen Everson (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ. Pr., 1990), 186–87; Julia Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind (Berkeley: Univ. of 
California Pr., 1992), 65–68; Jean-Baptiste Gourinat, Οι Στωϊκοί για την ψυχή [Les stoiciens et l’ame], 
trans. Κωνσταντίνος Ν. Πετρόπουλος (Athens: Kardamitsa [P.U.F.], 1999), 51–109. 
5 Cf. F. Solmsen, Cleanthes or Posidonius ? The Basis of Stoic Physics (Amsterdam: Noord-Holl. Uitg. 
Maats., 1961); S. Sambursky, Physics of the Stoics (London: Routledge, 1959), 1–7 & 21–48; Michael 
Lapidge, “Ἀρχαί and Στοιχεῖα: A Problem in Stoic Cosmology,” Phronesis 18, no. 3 (1973): 274–77; 
David E. Hahm, The Origins of Stoic Cosmology (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1976), 61–71 & 
157–74; Paul Hager, “Chrysippus’ Theory of Pneuma,” Prudentia 14, no. 2 (1982): 97–108; David N. 
Sedley, “Hellenistic Physics and Metaphysics,” in The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, ed. 
Keimpe A. Algra et al. (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Pr., 1999), 387–89; David Furley, 
“Cosmology,” in The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, ed. Keimpe A. Algra et al. (Cambridge ; 
New York: Cambridge University Pr., 1999), 440–41; Michael J. White, “Stoic Natural Philosophy 
(Physics and Cosmology),” in Cambridge Companion to the Stoics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Pr., 
2003), 134–36; Dorothea Frede, “Stoic Determinism,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics, ed. Brad 
Inwood (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Pr., 2003), 185–87. 
6 David N. Sedley, “Chrysippus on Psychophysical Causality,” in Passions and Perceptions, ed. Jacques 
Brunschwig and Martha C. Nussbaum (Cambridge: Cambridge University Pr., 1993), 313–31. 
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references to the obscurity present in our understanding of the inner workings of the 
pneuma both on a cosmological and psychological level. A few examples of this are to 
be found in Solmsen who says: “There being no fuller accounts, we must admit our 
ignorance regarding the details of the doctrine”;7 Hankinson who claims with regards 
pneumatic tension: “The actual mechanics of this are obscure”;8 Long who argues: 
“The Stoics have left us little to show what this means and how it is possible”;9 Scade 
who says: “However, exactly how this mechanism would act at either the higher or 
lower level remains obscure”.10 Other scholars, recognising the obscurity choose not 
to deviate their focus from their current topic of examination. For example Todd, 
considering that pneuma be studied in relation to the principles, says: “A more positive 
characterisation of the Stoic principles, which I do not attempt to offer here, would 
have to be based on such material”.11 Sedley, considering the Stoic theory of pneuma 
in relation to Platonic psychology, is more concerned with its causal aspect and says: 
“Leaving aside many issues associated with this doctrine, I shall turn directly to its 
causal implications.”12 There are of course many more examples but these comments 
should suffice to illustrate that we clearly have a severe gap in our understanding of 
the Stoic theory of pneuma. This state of affairs is in large part due to the state of our 
evidence but it also may be attributed to the absence of a more specialised study on 
the topic. Whilst my thesis presented here aims to explore what is to be found inside 
this gap, I do not claim to fill it but only to set the necessary groundwork for further 
examination. 
                                                            
7 Solmsen, Cleanthes or Posidonius ?, 19. 
8 Robert James Hankinson, “Explanation and Causation,” in The Cambridge History of Hellenistic 
Philosophy, ed. Keimpe A. Algra et al. (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Pr., 1999), 482. 
9 Anthony A. Long, “Stoic Psychology,” in The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, ed. Keimpe A. 
Algra et al. (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Pr., 1999), 561. 
10 Paul Scade, “Stoic Cosmological Limits and Their Platonic Background,” in Aristotle & the Stoics 
Reading Plato (Institute of Classical Studies, University of London, 2010), 157. 
11 R. B. Todd, Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics. A Study of the De Mixtione with Preliminary Essays, 
Text, Translation and Commentary (Leiden: Brill, 1976), 34 n. 65. 
12 Sedley, “Chrysippus on Psychophysical Causality,” 326. 
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The study of pneuma that I undertake is only secondarily aimed at describing the inner 
processes of pneuma and its emergence in Stoic theory. Its primary, and arguably more 
challenging, aim is to explore the methodological possibility of tracing some form of 
integration in Stoic theory. The complexity of the study and of the material makes it 
even harder to lay claim to success in this latter aim than in the former. In spite of this, 
the evidence does reveal some clear lines of integration both diachronically between 
heads of the school as also doctrinally within the Stoic system itself. The former 
pattern emerges most clearly in chapters two and six, whilst the integration of doctrine 
is more evident in chapters four and five. Chapter three details some of the problems 
in Stoic cosmology in relation primarily to fire and the cosmic hegemonikon. This sets 
the scene for understanding how the Stoics, pace Verbeke, extrapolated aspects of their 
psychological doctrine from cosmological processes and for showing that it is possible 
to talk of a bi-directional macrocosm-microcosm relation.  
Methodological Caution 
At this point a few remarks on what I am not doing in this thesis are appropriate so as 
to remove certain expectations at the outset. In setting out on this project I initially 
planned on using the Stoic theory of time to explore the integration of Stoic theory. In 
the course of my research I began to realise that the theory of time, despite being very 
interesting, was not ideal for my methodological approach of exploring said 
integration. This is because, partly due to our fragmentary evidence, the idea is not as 
pervasive in the Stoic system as I had at first thought. I therefore switched my focus 
to the theory of pneuma, which I had noticed in my research on the theory of time was 
a notion that was more fundamental for the Stoics and also more diverse. It was only 
with starting to research the Stoic theory of pneuma that I began to become acutely 
aware of differences between heads in the school. One scholar I encountered even 
emphasised the lack of a formalised Stoic school commensurate with that of the 
Academy for Academics, the Lyceum for Peripatetics or the Garden of the 
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Epicureans.13 This brought into relief the individuality of each Stoic figure even 
further. I gradually became more conscious of the prevalence of Chrysippus in our 
approach to Stoicism. In modern scholarship we have a strong conviction that 
Chrysippus was the systematiser and most brilliant exponent of Stoicism, a so called 
“Pan-Chrysippeanism” trend.14 The roots of this view runs back to contemporaries of 
Chrysippus who claimed that without him there would be no Stoa. Moreover, 
Carneades, the Academic, even claimed that without Chrysippus there would be no 
Carneades15. Having learned to admire Chrysippus’ genius it comes naturally to 
downplay the role of earlier Stoics; this is partly due to the ancient commentators and 
partly to von Arnim’s selection of Stoic sources which began with volume II 
attributing the sources to Chrysippus only later to regurgitate many of these for vol. I 
which was also actually the last to be published.16  
The dominance of Chrysippus in areas of logic is paralleled with the dominance of 
Posidonius in areas of physics.  Until the latter half of the 20th Century Posidonius had 
been credited with vitalising the Stoic cosmos, extending Cleanthes description of the 
inner heat in living organisms to the Cosmos itself. In the English literature this late 
attribution first started to be demolished with a paper by F. Solmsen,17 which 
demonstrated that sections of Book II of Cicero’s De natura deorum must be attributed 
to Cleanthes and not Posidonius as other scholars had claimed.18 The idea that we 
                                                            
13 Ivor Ludlam, “Two Long-Running Stoic Myths : A Central Orthodox Stoic School and Stoic 
Scholarchs,” Elenchos 24, no. 1 (2003): 33–55. 
14 A term coined by John Glucker, “Stoics, Para-Stoics and Anti-Stoics: Methods and Sensibilities,” 
Philosophia 31, no. 1–2 (2003): 221–324. 
15 D.L. 7. 183 and for Carneades 4. 62 
16 For shortcomings of SVF and a brilliant overview of scholarship on Stoicism cf. Glucker, “Stoics, Para-
Stoics and Anti-Stoics” esp. 242-7.). See also Keimpe A. Algra, “Zeno of Citium and Stoic Cosmology: 
Some Notes and Two Case Studies,” Elenchos: Rivista di studi sul pensiero antico 24, no. 1 (2003): 9–32. 
and Teun Tieleman, Galen and Chrysippus on the Soul : Argument and Refutation in the « De Placitis » Books 
II-III (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 136.  
17 Solmsen, Cleanthes or Posidonius ? 
18 A forthcoming and much-awaited volume on the philosophy of Cleanthes (the result of a workshop 
in Vienna organised by G. Karamanolis in 2015) will hopefully clarify and elaborate the progressiveness 
of this early Stoic head. Whilst Solmsen was reclaiming these arguments for Cleanthes pace scholars 
who had argued for a Poseidonian origin, Mansfeld responded by arguing that Solmsen was too liberal 
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might take much of earlier Stoicism for granted and attribute the greatest parts of it to 
Chrysippus was engraved on my mind, and I began to be cautious with giving credit 
to Chrysippus for the developments in Stoic theory. I started to pay closer attention to 
the attributions present in our evidence and gradually noticed that much of what 
Chrysippus expounded was already present in different form with the earliest Stoics 
back to the founder, Zeno. As a consequence I started to focus more on Cleanthes and 
Zeno and thus in this thesis I do not give a primary focus to Chrysippus. 
At the same time I started to better comprehend how deeply and intricately the 
doxographical difficulties are involved in any study of Stoicism. I have tried, as far as 
I am able, to be extremely careful when using the source material and have avoided 
taking seemingly obvious things for granted. It is only after appropriating this caution 
that I divested myself of the initial fascination I had with the apparent connections 
that exist between Stoicism and Platonic and, particularly, Aristotelian theory. I now 
see these connections as being fraught with difficulties of their own and as far as 
possible in this thesis I have avoided making such connections. As I currently see it, it 
is near impossible to know how detailed was the Stoic study and understanding of 
Aristotelian and Platonic philosophy on specific points. My personal view is that the 
Stoics were both very influenced by their predecessors and themselves influential on 
the intellectual environment of the time. They clearly were philosophically well 
educated and had a high regard for all schools of thought. However, trying to prove 
direct points of contact for individual doctrines, without having explicit evidence, is a 
project in itself. Such things can be traced to an extent and much scholarly work, too 
                                                            
with his selections and specifies which passages can be attributed to Cleanthes with certainty Jaap 
Mansfeld, The Pseudo-Hippocratic Tract [Peri Hebdomadōn.] : Ch. 1-11 and Greek Philosophy (Assen: Van 
Gorcum, 1971), 86 ff. The latest argument regarding the extent to which the arguments should be 
derived from Cleanthes is to be found in A. J. Kleywegt, “Cleanthes and the ‘Vital Heat,’” Mnemosyne 
37, no. 1/2 (1984): 94–102.. Cf. also Jaap Mansfeld, “The Cleanthes Fragment in Cicero, De Natura 
Deorum II,24,” in Actus. Studies in Honour of H. L. W. Nelson (Utrecht: Inst. voor Klass. Talen, 1982), 203–
10, for a more focused account of the Cleanthean attribution than the in depth and elaborate one present 
in Jaap Mansfeld, The Pseudo-Hippocratic Tract [Peri Hebdomadōn.] : Ch. 1-11 and Greek Philosophy (Assen: 
Van Gorcum, 1971). 
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voluminous to list, has been done to bring out these connections.19 The only works of 
which I am aware which specifically try to disenchant us regarding some of these 
connections are Sandbach’s important monograph on Aristotle and the Stoics and a 
recent paper by Sellars which cautions against taking Plato’s Sophist as influential in 
the Stoics’ formation of their ontology.20 Rejecting these influences on Stoicism is not 
so agreeable to many scholars and a direct riposte to Sandbach’s sobering study is 
provided in Hahm.21  
Arguably, attempting to understand Stoic theory based on such tentative connections 
acts as a diversion from the reconstruction of specifically Stoic theories, unless a clear 
dialogue between schools of thought is shown to have taken place.22 These dialogic 
reconstructions work especially well for the development of a doctrine within the school 
but may fall short in so far as focus is removed from the doctrine itself in relation to 
the Stoic project, viz. the integration of ideas in their system. The result of this 
regarding my own approach is that I have focused primarily on what the Stoics have 
to say as also on the more isolated difficulties of our extant evidence. I have tried to 
see through Stoic, rather than Peripatetic or Academic, eyes and so I have not 
approached the material with the predisposition of seeing Aristotle or Plato there. 
There are of course weaknesses in this approach also, for there are clearly connections 
to be made with Plato and Aristotle which may very well elucidate and inform Stoic 
theory. As such, there is very little speculation or argument in this thesis regarding 
the influences of other traditions of thought on the Stoic philosophers. The first 
chapter on the division of philosophy is the only exception to this approach. 
                                                            
19 For Aristotle see esp. Hahm, The Origins of Stoic Cosmology.; for Plato cf. A.G. Long, Plato and the Stoics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
20 F. H. Sandbach, Aristotle and the Stoics (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Pr., 1985); John Sellars, “Stoic 
Ontology and Plato’s Sophist,” in Aristotle & the Stoics Reading Plato, ed. Verity Harte et al. (London: 
Institute of Classical Studies, University of London, 2010), 185–203. 
21 David E. Hahm, “Aristotle and the Stoics : A Methodological Crux,” Archiv Für Geschichte Der 
Philosophie 73 (1991): 297–311. 
22 cf. esp. Mauro Bonazzi and Christoph Helmig, Platonic Stoicism, Stoic Platonism : The Dialogue between 
Platonism and Stoicism in Antiquity (Leuven: Leuven University Pr., 2007). 
15 
 
Methodology and Approach 
In facing the challenges of our extant fragmentary material I have allowed the 
evidence to largely determine the direction which the thesis has taken. The evidence 
has prevented me from imposing a structure that explores the concept of pneuma in 
the three parts of philosophy (logic, physics and ethics). Instead I have explored 
certain themes as they appear in the evidence which roughly deal with aspects of the 
three parts of philosophy, but the corporeal nature of pneuma has meant that the 
examination has always occurred from the perspective of physics. As will be shown, 
there is a dearth of evidence for the term pneuma for Zeno and Cleanthes. However, 
we may clearly observe the processes which would later be appropriated into a theory 
of pneuma by Chrysippus. It is largely these processes, in the early school, on which I 
try to shed some light.  
I have been examining Stoic doctrines often from sources which may not seem to be 
the obvious ones from which to begin a study of each relevant theory. Sometimes I 
may not even include a study of some of the well-weathered sources at all so as to 
avoid a creative re-expression of what has already been said; instead I refer the reader 
to the relevant sources and where discussion of these can be found in the modern 
secondary literature. My concern is with the aspects of the Stoic theory which are at 
the borders of what we already know or has been previously expressed. I have tried 
to show whenever I am aware of it if other similar discussions have taken place by 
other scholars.  
My approach in handling the fragmentary material has been to treat the evidence 
contextually within the works in which they are to be found, so as not only to avoid 
(as far as possible) misrepresenting the evidence but also to try to observe the way the 
commentators chose to record and present Stoic theory. In this way certain trends 
emerge which I have recorded throughout the thesis: the chapter on nourishment in 
particular developed out of this approach when I was dealing with Stoic cosmology. 
In the course of examining the sources I have tried to disentangle terminology related 
16 
 
to pneuma which recurs in various forms and in mistaken usages across diverse works: 
the chapter on cognitive process largely grew out of this approach. In my study of the 
evidence, rather than actively trying to integrate Stoic theory I have allowed the 
integration to emerge naturally out of the exploration of the inner workings of pneuma 
in the evidence itself. In this way I hope to have offered an account that is not based 
on the “easy generalisations” of coherence (that Inwood’s critique of this approach is 
aimed at) but rather on detailed evidence of how the Stoics integrated their 
philosophical system. 
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1. The Division of Philosophy 
Introduction  
Zeno the founder of Stoicism hailed from the Phoenician town of Citium on the South 
East coast of Cyprus. Being uniquely positioned between eastern and western 
civilisations and the son of a merchant, as a young man Zeno travelled the trade routes 
and no doubt experienced the cultural diversity of the Hellenistic world first hand. He 
was 11 years old when Alexander the Great, who had tried to unify the disparate 
cultures and traditions of the then known world, died. These early years of Zeno’s life 
may be seen as formative with regards to his peculiar (to the philosophical tradition 
of the time) proclivities to advance a philosophy which was driven by a desire for 
systematicity, unity in diversity and harmony between doctrines. 
Zeno arrived in Athens at the age of twenty two.1 At this time the dominating 
philosophical schools of thought were the Academy, the Lyceum, the Cynosarges, and 
the Megarian school. The Cynics, being concerned primarily with living 
philosophically, did not impart much by way of written works, whilst only fragments 
survive from the Megarian school. Therefore, the works of Plato and Aristotle are 
probably the best place to start in order to establish some background to the division 
of philosophy in Stoicism. Zeno arrived on the philosophical scene at Athens two 
generations apart from Plato and one generation apart from Aristotle. The Lyceum 
and the Academy had become established institutions or centres for philosophical 
exploration. Within the Aristotelian and Platonic world view there is no elaborate 
evidence highlighting an interest or concern to study the relations that exist between 
diverse theories and philosophical doctrines. Instead we find a clear division, 
hierarchical in character, in which separate domains of philosophical enquiry are 
explored with dialectic and first philosophy being regarded as the epitome of 
                                                            
1 According to Persaeus (D.L. 7.28). Diogenes Laertius (7.2) makes him thirty years old on his arrival. 
For more on Zeno’s chronology and complications cf. n. 4 below. 
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philosophical thought.2 Aristotle acutely observed that each science must develop its 
arguments from its own principles, taking into account the unique aspects of the object 
it considers and thus rules of precision cannot be expected in the domain of ethics in 
the same way as they can be for biology, due to the nature of the subject matter.3 The 
apparently irreproachable assertion of Aristotle concerning different types of 
knowledge did not deter the Stoics from introducing a radically different 
methodology. Their methodological ingenuity springs forth from their innovations in 
metaphysical and ontological theorising; for no longer does the ‘essence of things’ 
dominate in the understanding of reality as in Plato and Aristotle. Instead, they focus 
on the reciprocity that exists between things, making the individual corporeal item 
central. This philosophical manoeuvre strategically adopts Plato’s definition of ‘being’ 
in the Sophist. Plato (using the Eleatic visitor as mouthpiece) defines being as ‘that 
which acts and is acted upon’. This definition is part of Plato’s polemic against the 
materialists who deny the existence of things like soul, justice, mind etc.; in defining 
‘being’ thus he shows not only that incorporeal entities must exist but also that these 
are the entities which are permanent, which persist unchangeable through time, for 
they are not part of the immersed reality of material becoming that is doomed to 
generation and destruction (cf. Sophist 246a-248b). Zeno, then, happily accepts Plato’s 
definition of being but expands the horizons of the material making Plato’s 
incorporeal mind, soul and justice into corporeal things and thus redefining the 
philosophical framework that is essentially attached to such a notion. That is to say 
that there is a shift from viewing being and becoming as essentially different realities 
of the same world (even if the latter is ontologically dependent on the former), to 
viewing the world as pure becoming or process. The Stoics are often regarded as 
followers of Heraclitus for this reason, whilst in turn Alfred North Whitehead’s 
process philosophy has sometimes been compared to Stoicism. However, the Stoic 
bend on this theme is determined by their definition of body as acting or being acted 
                                                            
2 This is discussed in more detail further down: p.21-24. 
3 Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1094b11-26 
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upon; for in this way all becoming is mutual interaction, with the two principles of the 
active and passive cause underlying all things. 
This brief excursus on the radical shift implemented by the Stoics on the philosophical 
tradition divulges a key towards understanding the Stoic description of both the 
cosmos and philosophy as living organism. A gateway is thus opened which leads 
onto the fields of the Stoic philosophical project as well as their methodology which 
lies at the heart of this. The infinite diversity that exists in a reality of becoming is part 
of the appeal of Stoicism. Yet, true to the Hellenic spirit and tradition there is a certain 
aesthetic that lies behind the Stoic view; for they are not willing to accept entropic 
states of disorder that are generally considered to invariably arise out of ever 
increasing difference. It follows that the Stoics do not accept a disparity or conflict to 
exist between the parts that make up the whole and thus their philosophical project is 
one in which coherency of doctrine adopts a role of primacy. So, to return to the shift 
the Stoics implemented from Aristotle’s approach, not only is coherency within a 
specific field a measure for its effectiveness and accuracy, but, unless a theory is found 
that can claim coherency within and between diverse fields, then the system of 
thought is flawed. It is in this way that the notion of a philosophical system is 
introduced by the Stoics and their division of philosophy is to be understood along 
these lines. 
Origins and Development of the Tri-partite Division of Philosophy 
The tri-partite division of philosophy into the three sciences of logic, physics and 
ethics permeates the history of philosophy; it is widely accepted as the most generic 
and exhaustive division of philosophy. Kant in the preface to his Groundwork for the 
Metaphysics of Morals appropriates this division adding that “one cannot improve 
upon it”.4 Whilst Kant views the division as being characteristic of Ancient Hellenic 
                                                            
4 cf. Kant in his introduction to Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. Allen W. Wood and Jerome. 
B. Schneewind (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), wherein he accepts the tripartite division as 
acceptably comprehensive. 
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philosophy, the biographer Diogenes Laertius (3rd century CE) claims that it is Zeno 
of Citium, the founder of Stoicism, who was the first to make this division (D.L. 7.39). 
Despite the fact that the Stoic school was certainly the greatest exponent of the tri-
partite division and is most likely responsible for initiating its historical impact, the 
tri-partite division seems to pre-date them. It is not always clear whether the division 
is imposed on earlier thinkers retrospectively or whether such a division may be 
explicitly extracted from the philosophical tradition that precedes the Stoics. 
Nevertheless, there is evidence to suggest that the origin of the division should be 
attributed to one of Zeno’s mentors from within the Academy.  
Sextus Empiricus the Pyrrhonian sceptic philosopher and physician (ca. 160-210 CE) 
claims that it was Xenocrates (396/5-314/3 BCE), the heir of Speusippus and third head 
of the Academy, who first divided philosophy into logic, physics and ethics. After 
studying with Crates the Cynic for 10 years Zeno turned to the teachings of Xenocrates 
for a further 10 years.5 It is clear that these decades were formative for Zeno’s own 
brand of philosophy and no doubt during his time with Xenocrates he was also 
developing into an independent thinker. It is, therefore, quite likely that it is during 
his time with Xenocrates that he developed the idea of a tri-partite division of 
philosophy.6 When Sextus speaks of the origins of the threefold division he claims in 
                                                            
5 During this time Zeno became acquainted with Polemo, Xenocrates’ successor, and also studied with 
Stilpo of the Megarian school. Cf. also Cicero De Finibus 4.2 
6 There is dispute about whether it is possible for Zeno to have attended any of Xenocrates’ lectures due 
to the chronological difficulty: see Hahm, The Origins of Stoic Cosmology, 223–26; Sandbach, Aristotle and 
the Stoics, 13.. For more on the chronology of Zeno see Alfred Chilton Pearson, The Fragments of Zeno 
and Cleanthes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1891), 1–3; C. B. Armstrong, “The Chronology 
of Zeno of Citium,” Hermathena : A Trinity College Dublin Review, 1930; Tiziano Dorandi, “Chronology,” 
in The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, ed. Keimpe A. Algra et al. (Cambridge ; New York: 
Cambridge University Pr., 1999), 31–54. It is not always easy to corroborate the evidence in Diogenes 
Laertius with regards to chronological events. Diogenes does not give us a date of birth for Zeno but 
only that he came to Athens at thirty years of age (D.L. 7.2), and that he was ninety-eight when he died. 
Neither is the date of Zeno’s birth expressed in the evidence outside of Diogenes Laertius. Instead, it 
has been calculated at around 334/3 BCE based upon the account of his age at his death, which 
according to Philodemus (Phld. Stoic. Hist., cols. 28–9; Phld. De Stoic., cols. 1–8) is said to have occurred 
during the archonship of Arrheneides (262/1). Diogenes Laertius makes Zeno ninety-eight when he 
died, Persaeus in Diogenes Laertius makes him seventy-two, others in Phld. De Stoic., col. 5.9 make 
Zeno live to be one hundred and one. If the evidence for his death is correct this could make the possible 
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the same passage that it exists implicitly (ἐν δυνάμει) already in Plato (M VII.16). This 
may be corroborated with a passage from Diogenes Laertius (3.56) who describes a 
development in philosophy similar to that which existed in tragic theatre. 
 Just as long ago in tragedy the chorus was the only actor, and 
afterwards, in order to give the chorus breathing space, Thespis 
devised a single actor, Aeschylus a second and Sophocles a third, so 
too with philosophy in early times it discoursed on one subject only, 
namely physics, then Socrates added the second subject, ethics, and 
Plato the third, dialectics7, and so brought philosophy to perfection. 
It is clear that the interpretation in this passage is imposed by the later tradition in an 
attempt to show the tri-partite division as one which was led up to. It is arguable 
whether Plato himself ever took an interest in organising the structure of philosophy. 
The works of Plato and Aristotle, through their historical journey, have been 
organised in multiple ways by commentators, translators and pedagogues. The 
divisions that have resulted from these organisational efforts are often claimed to be 
inherent within the works themselves, yet the divisions are mostly developed out of 
                                                            
date of Zeno’s birth 360 or 334 or 363 BCE. The widely accepted date for Zeno’s birth is 334 BCE based 
upon the evidence of Persaeus corroborated with that of Philodemus. If we are to accept Diogenes’ 
remark that Zeno studied under Xenocrates for ten years then the date of his birth at 334 BCE must be 
inaccurate. Scholars who have rejected any meeting occurring between Zeno and Xenocrates have done 
so because of accepting the standard date of Zeno’s birth, which would make him arrive in Athens 
either at 312 BCE (if we corroborate the evidence from Persaeus) or 304 BCE (if we follow Diogenes 
Laertius), that is to say that Xenocrates who died in 312BCE would have barely had any opportunity to 
meet Zeno. We should not readily accept Zeno’s birth date as 334BCE. If we corroborate the other 
evidence, Apollonius (D.L. 7.28) says Zeno presided over the school for 58 years, which means he must 
have set the school up in 320 BCE; if we add the 20 years of study under Crates, Xenocrates, Polemo 
and the Megarians and his being 22 years of age on his arrival at Athens, this would make his date of 
birth to be 363 BCE, which would correspond with the account that Zeno lived to be one hundred and 
one. The main reason I can see for accepting the less plausible date of 334BCE is that it seems like one 
hundred and one is a very old age even for contemporary life expectancies. Yet, the majority of the 
evidence points to an earlier birth and a death at an older age. It should be noted that living to one 
hundred was not so rare for many of the philosophers according to our testimonies, which need not be 
enumerated in this footnote. It is well to remember that Socrates was put to death at the age of seventy, 
part of the tragedy being that his time came too soon.  
7 Hadot makes the salient observation that logic is not used as a part of philosophy in any Platonic or 
Aristotelian book. The use of the word logic (τὸ λογικὸν μέρος) in later terminologies just goes to show 
the influence of Stoic vocabulary “Les Divisions Des Parties de La Philosophie Dans l’Antiquité,” 
Museum Helveticum 36, no. 4 (1979): 201–23. 
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a desire to form an ordered philosophical curriculum out of the works of the great 
philosophers.8 Therefore, for chronological accuracy regarding the development of 
ideas that would later influence much of western philosophy, we would do well to 
ask the following questions. What can be said about Plato and Aristotle’s own 
attempts to organise their works? Did they view philosophy as having an inherent 
structure or as requiring certain organisational divisions?  
It appears that both Plato and Aristotle held some idea on how they would have 
divided philosophy. The Platonic system, as examined within its temporal and 
philosophical context embraces a limited bipartition into (a) physics and (b) ethics. 
The reason why this bipartition may be thought to exhaust the subject matter of 
philosophy becomes clear only when related to the philosophical thought of Plato. 
This typology excludes the division of works into “logical” parts as it is discerned that 
these are integrally tied to ethics, considered as virtues and studied as a part of ethical 
education.9 In Plato’s Statesman we encounter a bi-partite division of knowledge into 
the practical and the theoretical.10 Within this division there is a clear hierarchy; the 
theoretical, which deals with knowledge in itself, is higher than the practical, which is 
knowledge of technical expertise, for example in manual tasks like manufacturing and 
carpentry. In the Republic it is only those who are of a dialectical nature that have the 
capacity to achieve a unified vision.11 Such a capacity is described, in the Timaeus (29b-
d) as one which is attached to a second type of logos. One type of logos is concerned 
with the sensible world, which, due to its impermanence, yields only opinion (doxa). 
It is only by relinquishing the senses that one may reach an understanding of the 
second type of logos, that is to say of the intelligible world and thus obtain knowledge 
                                                            
8 For a detailed discussion of this see Ilsetraut Hadot, “L’organisation de l’enseignement Philosophique 
à l’époque Impériale,” in Arts Libéraux et Philosophie Dans La Pensée Antique (Paris: Vrin, 2005), 411–29. 
9 David N. Sedley, “Plato’s Theaetetus as an Ethical Dialogue,” in Ancient Models of Mind : Studies in 
Human and Divine Rationality, ed. Andrea Wilson Nightingale and David N. Sedley (Cambridge ; New 
York: Cambridge University Pr., 2010), 64–66. 
10 Plato Statesman 258e 
11 Plato Republic 537c 
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(epistêmê).12 Although this bi-partition dominates Plato’s work, in the Cratylus one may 
discern an embryonic tri-partition into physics, ethics and logic, which gives credence 
to Sextus’ claim that the tri-partition exists already in Plato implicitly. Such a division 
may only be said to be implicit as Plato speaks of cosmology (physics)13 on the one 
hand and ethics (411a–c) on the other; logic (or rather dialectic), being an intellectual 
virtue, appears only as a sub-division of ethics.14 
The Aristotelian classifications of knowledge correspond to essentially Platonic 
methods of division and to typically Academic conceptual structures. The Aristotelian 
division of the sciences is conceived as threefold, consisting of the theoretical, practical 
and productive sciences with their sub-divisions. Aristotle’s originality lies in 
replacing Platonic dialectic with the supreme or First science. For Aristotle the 
practical and productive sciences are inferior to the theoretical sciences because they 
refer to a contingent object viz. human action, while First science relates to being 
(οὐσία).15 In a famous passage in the Topics (105b19) Aristotle distinguishes between 
ethical, physical and logical propositions, yet this division does not correspond to his 
division of the sciences into practical, productive and theoretical (Metaph. 1025b25).16 
If the threefold division of philosophy be applied to Aristotle we encounter the 
problem that the sciences are separate, yet logic is utilised in both ethics and physics 
in a purely formal way and is thus not an independently designated discipline in itself. 
Indeed, this became a problem during late antiquity and particularly in the medieval 
period where a dispute was sparked between those who would only accept logic in 
                                                            
12 This bi-partition has exercised a lasting influence on philosophy with the development of the idea of 
pure reason. 
13 Plato Cratylus 397c-401c 
14 For a more detailed study of this in Plato’s Cratylus cf. David N. Sedley, Plato’s « Cratylus » 
(Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Pr., 2003) esp. ch.7 §5. 
15 Aristotle Metaphysics 982a26-982b10; cf. also 1025b-1026b32; Physics 193b22 ff.; De Partibus Animalium 
639a1 ff. 
16 It should be noted that the division in Aristotle’s Topics may reflect early Academic practice and 
predates Aristotle’s own later division as found in Metaphysics (I am grateful to Teun Tieleman for this 
point). For more on why this division should not be understood as applying to philosophy see Hadot, 
“Divisions,” 207–8; Katerina Ierodiakonou, “The Stoic Division of Philosophy,” Phronesis 38, no. 1 
(1993): 57–74 n.3. 
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Aristotle as an instrument of philosophy and those, presumably following Stoic 
influence, who viewed it as a part. The prevalence of logic as an instrument of 
philosophy is emphasised by the fact that the Aristotelian division into theoretical, 
practical and productive sciences would later be extended by the commentators to 
include the propaedeutic part or “Organon” (a study of the Categories, de 
Interpretatione, Topics and the Prior and Posterior Analytics). Moreover the clearly 
hierarchical nature of the Aristotelian division is perhaps one of the greatest 
contributing factors for the survival of many of Aristotle’s works from antiquity. This 
is because the hierarchy proved itself useful in succeeding centuries for relating the 
science of philosophy to the doctrines of theology.17 We cannot know with certainty 
how Aristotle and Plato would have chosen to organise their work for this project was 
one that occurred mainly after their deaths by commentators and other philosophers 
who were driven by the need to organise the large body of work which they inherited. 
Yet, as we have seen it is possible to form an understanding of the character of the 
conceptual structure they developed, which is essentially hierarchical. 
The Stoic division of philosophy is unlike the divisions we find in Plato and Aristotle. 
Though it is tripartite into physics, ethics and logic, the character of this division and 
its relation to philosophy is fundamentally different. The Stoics are set apart from their 
predecessors due to their innovations in metaphysics and in how philosophy itself is 
understood as having an inherent structure. It is clear that the tri-partite division of 
philosophy takes on a more significant countenance with Stoicism.18 More than this 
                                                            
17 This also played an integral part in the bifurcation of philosophy and science. The theoretical sciences 
of physics (the objects of which are material) and metaphysics (the objects of which are immaterial) 
became segregated from one another in perceiving that they do not even utilize the same cognitive 
faculties. This epistemology evolved into an independent exposition of the sciences creating an 
unbridgeable gap between sensation and intellection. In understanding the conceptual relations 
between the philosophies and the sciences we can already perceive one of the possible origins of the 
separation. The “epistemic gap” between the various knowledge structures came to define 
fundamentally disassociated methodologies, which cannot be integrated.  
18 By Sextus’ time (2nd Century C.E.) the tripartite division of philosophy into physics, ethics, logic was 
a given cf. Outlines of Pyrrhonism 1.18 also Ps. Galen, On the History of Philosophy, 6, 603 2-14 (Diels.). It 
was also a division that was presumably followed by commentators in the doxographical tradition see 
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though, it also exercised a certain charm on the history of philosophy. This may very 
well be due to some imaginative analogies, which help to embed the division in our 
minds: 
Philosophy, they say, is like an animal, Logic corresponding to the 
bones and sinews, Ethics to the fleshy parts, Physics to the soul. 
Another simile they use is that of an egg: the shell is Logic, next comes 
the white, Ethics, and the yolk in the centre is Physics. Or, again, they 
liken Philosophy to a fertile field: Logic being the encircling fence, 
Ethics the crop, Physics the soil or the trees. Or, again, to a city strongly 
walled and governed by reason.19  
Here Diogenes does not distinguish the analogies as belonging to certain Stoics but 
speaks of them as being generically Stoic. Further down we will see that certain Stoics 
did prefer certain analogies over others.20 In our descriptions of these analogies Logic 
is always described as the fortification or structure which supports the orchard, the 
egg, the animal or the city. When it comes to Physics and Ethics, however, depending 
on the Sextus passage or the Diogenes Laertius passage, they are interchangeable. It 
may be that the analogy reflects the type of way each part was viewed to be connected 
to the other, according to each Stoic. Individual Stoics must have placed different 
emphasis on Physics and Ethics or at least viewed their roles as different or 
interchangeable. It would be a mistake to assume that this would also imply a greater 
significance or priority being applied to one part over another, for it is self-evident in 
the analogies that each part is a necessary condition for the existence and functioning 
of the whole.  
                                                            
Jaap Mansfeld, “Sources,” in The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, ed. Keimpe A. Algra et al. 
(Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Pr., 1999), 21. 
19 Diogenes Laertius 7. 40 
20 The garden simile may well pre-date the Stoics cf. SVF 2. 39 and 2. 40. Ierodiakonou claims that “the 
most important argument in favour of the view that the garden simile is not specifically Stoic comes 
from the analysis of the simile itself. For according to the garden simile… the interrelation of the parts 
of the garden, and consequently, that of the three classes of philosophical theorems seems to be 
extremely loose”, “The Stoic Division of Philosophy,” 72. 
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This is emphasised when we distinguish what sets Stoic metaphysics apart from Plato 
and Aristotle. Concision rather than elaborate argument will be more useful at this 
point in order to form an idea of the basic differences. Plato’s ontology of being and 
becoming, otherwise expressed as a distinction between Forms and particulars 
corresponds to an epistemological distinction between knowledge and belief. On a 
practical level this dual ontology and epistemology accounts for Plato’s tri-partite soul 
(the reasoning part, the spirited and the appetitive); for only the logical part may 
comprehend the intelligible world of Forms, the appetitive part is immersed in the 
world of particulars whilst the spirited acts as a mediator between the two. In a just 
system there is a proper order of progression or subordination with the appetitive at 
the bottom and the logical at the top. In a similar fashion Aristotle’s metaphysics is 
concerned with the essence of things which cannot be known using inferior sciences 
like the practical and productive, but only with the theoretical. Stoic psychology 
asserts that the substance of the soul is unitary, single.21 In congruity with this unitary 
schema, the groundwork of Stoic metaphysical beliefs depends on thinking of the 
world in terms of pure relations between things. That is to say, rather than focusing 
on an inherent hierarchy in their ontology they are more concerned with the simple 
interaction that exists in order to explain the harmony and unity that exists between 
bodies. Thus, their ontological genera (the so-called Stoic categories) are devised 
according to their capacity for interaction with and reception of the environment that 
surrounds them. With the Stoic innovations in metaphysics there exists a complete 
interpenetration of corporeal reality, which makes a hierarchical conception of the 
parts of philosophy, in Platonic or Aristotelian style, an impossibility. That is to say 
that there is a symmetry in the architectonic of their system, which is necessarily 
absent in Plato and Aristotle. 
                                                            
21 See e.g. Galen, PHP 4.1.6 
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Contemporary Literature 
The best way to understand the role of individual parts within the Stoic system is to 
have a strong grasp on the background of the Stoic concept of their philosophical 
system and its division into parts. In the English scholarship the role of and relation 
between the parts is a hotly debated topic, but when it comes specifically to the Stoic 
division of philosophy there is but one detailed study.  
In her paper on the Stoic division of philosophy Katerina Ierodiakonou clarifies some 
important features of how the Stoics divided philosophy and what this may have 
meant for the philosophical system. Diogenes Laertius (7.39) tells us that the parts of 
philosophy were treated in terminologically different ways by different Stoics. The 
traditional term μέρη was abandoned in favour of τόποι by Apollodorus and εἴδη by 
Chrysippus and Eudromos. Ierodiakonou gives a convincing analysis of how different 
terminological use corresponds to an alternative approach towards the unity of 
philosophical discourse. There is a distinction between διαίρεσις (division) and 
μερισμός (partition), which Ierodiakonou argues conforms to what is meant by the 
use of εἶδος and τόπος in the Stoic system. The table I have made below describes the 
character of these differences according to the sources.22 
διαίρεσις μερισμός 
εἶδος τόπος 
e.g. Chrysippus, Eudromos e.g. Apollodorus 
Division is definite in number and 
should not fail to list all species 
Partition is infinite and failure to 
enumerate all of them is acceptable if not 
unavoidable 
The number of the species belonging to a 
genus is well-determined 
The number of the parts may be 
indefinite 
                                                            
22It should be noted that although these characteristics are quite plausible from the source evidence, 
they are reconstructed from a general discussion of the Stoics regarding division and partition and not 
directed specifically to the Stoic division of philosophical discourse. In addition some of the features of 
εἶδος and τόπος can only speculatively be applied to the Stoics.  
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The species share the characteristics of 
the genus 
The parts do not share in the 
characteristics of the whole 
The species are not indispensable for the 
existence of a genus 
The parts are indispensable for the 
existence of the whole 
 
When these distinctions are applied to philosophical discourse Ierodiakonou 
concludes that: “the Stoics who used the term τόποι viewed philosophical discourse 
as a unitary discipline divided in parts which correspond to different areas of 
knowledge; on the other hand, the Stoics who used the term εἴδη stressed the fact that 
each part of philosophical discourse shares with the rest common theorems but from 
different perspectives. That is to say, that the term εἴδη represents a Stoic approach 
which views the philosophical discourse as a plurality of independent parts which are 
united as far as they all share the same theorems from different perspectives, whereas 
the use of the term τόποι implies another Stoic approach which views the 
philosophical discourse as a unitary whole divided into interdependent parts which 
deal separately with a portion of the philosophical theorems”.23 
The significance of Ierodiakonou’s study becomes clearer in the context of a heated 
debate that has developed in recent years about the relation between the parts in 
Stoicism. The debate is split into two camps with one side arguing for the contingency 
of the intellectual connection between the parts in Stoic philosophy and thus claiming 
that Stoic theses can be studied based on individual merit.24 Τhe other side argues that 
Stoic theses are necessarily linked with each other and as such are integral to 
elucidating and informing Stoic theory.25 The debate is well-established and subtly 
                                                            
23 Ierodiakonou, “The Stoic Division of Philosophy,” 67. 
24 Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, 160–65. and “Ethics in Stoic Philosophy,” Phronesis 52, no. 1 
(2007): 58–87.; T. Engberg-Pedersen, “Discovering the Good: Oikeiosis and Kathekonta,” in The Norms 
of Nature. Studies in Hellenistic Ethics, ed. M. Schofield and G. Striker (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Pr., 
1986), 149–50.; Terence Irwin, “Stoic Naturalism and Its Critics,” in The Cambridge Companion to the 
Stoics, ed. Brad Inwood (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Pr., 2003), 346. 
25 Anthony A. Long, “The Logical Basis of Stoic Ethics,” (135–47) and “Dialectic and the Stoic Sage,” 
(101-3) in Stoic Studies (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Pr., 1996); Gábor Betegh, 
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nuanced in its details but more generally we may cultivate an essential understanding 
of the central themes and the direction in which they lead. According to 
Ierodiakonou’s distinctions it would appear as though the modern debate can be set 
to represent the different Stoic approaches with the camp arguing for the intellectual 
contingency of the parts representing a division of the εἶδος type, whilst those arguing 
for the intellectual necessity of the parts agree with a partition of philosophy into 
τόποι. Interestingly, the exponents on either side of this debate rarely make reference 
to the details of the Stoic division of philosophy or the structure of their system. In 
neglecting this important aspect, their arguments, as they are developed in their 
studies, often prove to be insufficient to reach any persuasive conclusions. 
Ι turn now to a more detailed description of either side of this debate. Betegh’s paper 
on ‘Cosmological Ethics in the Timaeus and Early Stoicism’ (2003) is the most 
representative of the τόπος version in general. From the title it is clear that Betegh is 
concerned primarily with the relation between physics and ethics. Indeed, a 
characteristic in this debate is often that logic is altogether left out of the discussion. 
Betegh in this paper is responding to some of the arguments presented by Annas a 
decade earlier (1992). The goal of Betegh’s paper is twofold: (i) to show that Stoic 
Ethics is founded on their cosmological beliefs and (ii) to describe how they derived 
this relationship from arguments in the Timaeus. The thrust of his argument is 
grounded in the Stoic theory of the telos, according to which the fulfilment of human 
life is “to live according to one’s experience of what happens by nature” (D.L. 7. 87). 
This affirmation is taken as proof that in Stoicism knowledge of physical and 
cosmological processes is pre-requisite to understanding the causal structure of the 
cosmos and thus of ourselves. The value of such knowledge extends beyond scientific 
                                                            
“Cosmological Ethics in the « Timaeus » and Early Stoicism,” in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 
(OSAP), ed. David N. Sedley, vol. 24 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 273–302; Brad Inwood, 
Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism (Oxford : New York: Clarendon Press, 1985), 212–15.; John M. 
Cooper, “Eudaimonism, the Appeal to Nature, and ‘“Moral Duty”’ in Stoicism,” in Reason and Emotion : 
Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory (Princeton (N.J.): Princeton University Pr., 1999), 
439–44. 
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curiosity of knowledge for its own sake but has an ethical dimension in that the 
knower reflects the known and as such may attain the telos of harmonising oneself 
with nature. To this extent, according to Betegh, cognitive psychology is a sub-
discipline of Physics and not of Ethics as may also be gleaned from D.L. 7. 156-7 where 
the nature of the soul as pneuma comes after a discussion on meteorology and 
geography. There is a plethora of source evidence, which may be found in the studies 
of the exponents of this side of the debate. The explicit nature of the evidence is itself 
a compelling enough argument to support the view that physics is foundational for 
ethics in Stoicism. However, this evidence also is weak on the details, which may only 
be explored implicitly from what survives of Stoic theory. This is problematic and will 
attract the polemic of Julia Annas to whom we now turn. 
Annas is probably the most outspoken advocate of the εἶδος version and she 
dexterously supports this view in her paper Ethics in Stoic Philosophy (2007). She 
directly criticises the supporters of the opposing view that knowledge of one part is 
necessary to understand and utilise any other part of philosophy in Stoicism. Annas’ 
criticism is forceful and her own position is strongly defined. She is one of the few 
scholars who has taken into account Ierodiakonou’s paper on the division of 
philosophy and in so doing her presentation of the debate is more comprehensive in 
relation to the Stoic system as a whole. In her argument Annas wants to be clear that 
physics and ethics are distinctively different parts of philosophy. Those who are of the 
view that physics is a necessary condition for ethics use a gamut of sources to support 
their view. Amongst this evidence, along with the standard teleological argument 
discussed above, is the very general notion that an understanding of the providence 
of the cosmos offers a more holistic view with regards to any suffering one may 
experience. That is to say, to understand the causal and necessary link between events 
is to embrace one’s life and circumstances. Further evidence utilised is that 
Chrysippus is often said to have begun discussion on ethical issues with reference to 
physical doctrines as well as a passage which simply says that Stoic physics is 
31 
 
foundational for ethics (D.L. 7. 87-88). The evidence, compelling though it might be, 
is, according to Annas, inadequate for supporting a strong view that physics is 
foundational for ethics in Stoicism. She insightfully argues that this strategy is 
problematic in that it misapprehends an essential aspect of the Stoic system. That is, 
that if we regard physics as the foundation for ethics, we are introducing a hierarchy 
between the parts in Stoicism, which involves an important asymmetry in one part of 
the system and in one part only, which implies that the foundation is more important 
than what it grounds. Annas is convinced that a proper understanding of ethics can, 
from her point of view, be had purely from its own principles. Any explicit integration 
that exists between the parts in the Stoic texts is lacking in detail and offers only a 
synoptic perspectival standpoint from the side of the subject and therefore is ethical 
in nature. A necessary philosophical integration is thus absent from Stoicism. Annas’ 
strategy is aimed at removing the notion that there is any priority of parts in the Stoic 
system and arguably this is a necessary point to make. The way she hopes to achieve 
this is to give each part self-sufficiency. With a perspectival integration of the parts 
rather than a philosophical one, the system’s structure allows for a part to be whole in 
itself. The relations between the parts thus attain a reduced role in that they function 
only contingently to help to enrich and illumine our understanding of individual parts 
rather than to actually interact in such a way as to inform the other parts. 
 
In the early 90’s Hadot produced the most general overview of the Stoic system of 
philosophy in relation to its division into parts. The great strength of Hadot’s analysis 
is the insight he provides into the basic character of Stoicism. This study is contrary to 
much of the scholarship that has taken place in the Anglo-Saxon tradition which 
focuses primarily on the differences and distinctions amongst the Stoic heads and their 
theories across the school’s lifetime.26 Interestingly, it is a study which has also been 
                                                            
26 In relation to the succession within schools of thought, Mansfeld regards the emphasis on different 
historical periods as the prevailing model in modern scholarship, whilst the ancients more often than 
not emphasised continuity: Mansfeld, “Sources,” 24. 
32 
 
totally ignored in the heated debate of the relation of the parts in the English 
scholarship. Hadot accepts a strong reading of the coherence of the Stoic system, 
which by its nature follows a sort of fundamental intuition of the requirement for 
absolute coherence. This requirement is expressed as consistency across and within 
the philosophical division. A consistency of thought with itself, of the will with itself 
and of the universe with itself.27 Annas, in her study, persuasively argued against the 
foundationalist approach of those who would ground Stoic ethics in physics because 
of the inevitable asymmetry between the parts which arises and which is against the 
character of Stoicism. Likewise, Hadot claims that the Stoics refused to privilege a part 
of philosophy to the detriment of others; however, he extrapolates an entirely opposite 
view to Annas. That is to say that (i) no part is eminent over another, (ii) no part 
precedes another and (iii) all parts are mixed together. It is (iii) on which Annas and 
Hadot maintain polarised views. If we turn to the evidence there are only a few 
explicit claims for the blending of the parts of philosophy in Stoicism and maintaining 
such a position is made more difficult by the fact that we also have explicit claims for 
the opposite view, that is to say that the parts are separate entities.28 A consequence of 
this state of affairs is that, without a detailed analysis of the Stoic theories themselves, 
it is possible to argue effectively from both Annas’ and Hadot’s position, basing our 
interpretations solely on an implicit understanding of Stoic philosophy. 
For Hadot, since the explicit evidence regarding the blending or non-blending of the 
parts is to be found in relation to the educational curriculum of the Stoics, it should be 
understood as holding interpretive value only for the educational curriculum. Indeed, 
he argues that the evidence on the educational curriculum in Stoicism demonstrates 
that establishing an order between the parts was a topic of much discussion within 
the Stoic school in contrast to Plato and Aristotle who, themselves, never remark on 
                                                            
27 Pierre Hadot, “Philosophie, Discours Philosophique, et Divisions de La Philosophie Chez Les 
Stoïciens,” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 45, no. 178 (1991): 216. 
28 An example of this is the Stoic Ariston of Chios, who, despite focusing solely on ethics and rejecting 
both logic and physics, could still lay claim to the title of ‘Stoic’, albeit a renegade one. 
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the problem of whether it is better to study the ethical before the physical or vice versa. 
Hadot distinguishes two kinds of educational programmes, which affect the temporal 
ordering of study of the parts. These are: (i) the logical ordering; that is to say, the 
order to be put between the various concepts and (ii) the psychological ordering, 
necessary to convey the theories espoused to the listeners for them to be received in 
the most effective way.29 For Hadot when Plutarch accuses Chrysippus of putting both 
physics and ethics first at different times, this is because of the different sorts of 
educational programmes that can be chosen: in the logical order of exposition physics 
is taught before ethics; in the psychological exposition ethics is taught before physics. 
Hadot’s primary focus is on the Stoic division of philosophy as it appears in the 
analogies and in the evidence regarding the varied ordering of the parts. In this respect 
his study excludes some useful evidence regarding the systematicity of Stoic 
philosophy. Nevertheless, it is rather insightful and offers a refreshing perspective on 
Stoicism as a coherent school rather than as a disparate lineage of Stoic heads. He 
argues his case that Stoicism maintains a small number of fundamental principles, 
which act as theoretical principles serving as a starting point for what we call the Stoic 
system.30 The intuition for consistency that exists in Stoicism enables the system to be 
worked out with variations by different advocates of Stoicism. This can, according to 
Hadot, legitimately lead to a lack of unanimity in the school. So, although theoretical 
discourse is not totally absent from Stoicism, it will not question the fundamental 
dogma but will instead seek only the best methods of demonstration and of 
systematisation of dogma. It is worth quoting a small passage in which Hadot 
summarises the general unity that exists between logic, physics and ethics: 
We can say the systematisation of Stoic discourse is meant to first 
obtain a total and comprehensive explanation of all reality [physics], 
but with an unwavering small group of principles, strongly 
                                                            
29 Hadot, “Philosophie, Discours Philosophique, et Divisions de La Philosophie Chez Les Stoïciens,” 
210. 
30 Kidd argues for a very similar understanding of Posidonian Stoicism “Philosophy and Science in 
Posidonius,” Antike Und Abendland 24 (1978). 
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articulated together, which on the one hand give this systematisation 
greater persuasive force [logic] and on the other hand enables the 
philosopher to navigate the world [ethics].31 
There is of course a danger with Hadot’s reading, for detailed analyses of individual 
theses are simply absent in his study in favour of perceiving the general patterns 
within Stoicism. Arguably, there is a limit in a study of this size to offering such an 
analysis and in its general appraisal of Stoicism his case is a compelling one, which 
has regrettably been overlooked in the debate on the relations between the parts in 
Stoicism.  
Clearly there is no consensus regarding the nature of the Stoic philosophical system 
and thus also of the types of relations that exist between the parts. The natural 
intuition that one invariably develops when reading Stoic texts is that their system of 
philosophy is characterised by its coherence and integrity. Indeed, this is the claim 
that the Stoics themselves make, and the majority of scholars would accept the idea of 
the unity of Stoic philosophy on principle, albeit accepting the integrity to lesser or 
greater degrees. Yet, as some scholars argue and as Annas persuasively shows, this 
view is often taken for granted and the arguments in support of it are not adequately 
examined or supported in connection with the limited evidence. The question that 
remains then is whether the state of surviving evidence makes it possible to support 
a reading of Stoicism where coherence between theses is an integral part of their 
system or not. 
                               
The Stoic System 
It is my intention to show that it is possible to successfully argue for the integrity of 
the Stoic system and indeed even for a strong account of the said integrity based on 
the surviving evidence. I have already suggested that one of the deficiencies of the 
accounts hitherto has been a failure to take into consideration what the Stoics have to 
                                                            
31 Hadot, “Philosophie, Discours Philosophique, et Divisions de La Philosophie Chez Les Stoïciens,” 
216. 
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say about the division of philosophy and the nature of division more generally. The 
basic hypothesis is that along with a study of the division of philosophy we can 
corroborate what the Stoics say about philosophy itself to build a solid foundation on 
which to ground a more detailed examination of the integrity of the Stoic system in 
later chapters. What is important at this stage is to clarify a few points of what can be 
meant by a system of thought and what can be extrapolated from the sources in order 
to formulate an understanding of what is meant by the Stoic ‘system of thought’. 
In studying the philosophy of antiquity from the approach of history of philosophy 
we speak of ‘schools of thought’. Underlying this notion is the conception that there 
is something that can be said to be unitary in each school which makes it possible to 
speak of Academics, Peripatetics, Skeptics, Megarians, Epicureans, Stoics etc. as 
separate and distinctive. In this sense a school of thought is seen to have its own 
systematic world view and we can thus speak of a school of thought and a system of 
thought synonymously. A second way of viewing philosophy in antiquity as 
systematic is in the way it was used by later paedagogues to teach the thought of a 
certain philosopher and the way in which philosophy was later divided and organised 
into themes or sections for ease of transmission regarding philosophy as curriculum. 
These first two perspectives on ‘system of philosophy’ are the dominating ones and 
the ones which can readily be applied to most of philosophy in antiquity after Plato. 
A third view is one which is distinctive of the Hellenistic period and most clearly 
defined and elaborated within Stoicism. This is the view that philosophy itself has an 
inherent structure; that truth and reality are of necessity understood within a certain 
framework defined by our human and divine capacities and as such are developed 
architectonically to reflect this. Therefore, if reality is considered to be coherent and 
integrated so too must the philosophical system which describes it. Evidence will be 
gathered to show that, for the Stoics, this cognitive structure was to be developed in 
such a way as to reflect our own natures but also to represent the physical reality 
which was conceived by them as an integrated whole wherein nothing is wholly 
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isolated or disconnected; the structure of philosophy as such becomes an accurate 
representation of the way things are in the world.32  
The Stoics may be credited with the technicalisation of the term “systema”. In ancient 
Greek, σύστημα (from syn-histemi, “to [make to] stand together”) originally meant a 
composite whole made up of parts joined together. In Greek antiquity the term is used 
to describe a wide variety of composite bodies – military formations, flocks or herds 
of animals, organised governments, musical scales, metres in poetry, medications etc. 
The Stoics, however, applied the term to biological, physical, dynamic and conceptual 
structures such as art,33 life,34 scientific knowledge,35 reason,36 education37 and the 
physical universe.38 However, there is no source of which I am aware in which the 
Stoics describe philosophy itself using the word σύστημα. Yet, even if it happens to 
be the case that amidst the lost evidence the Stoics had not used the word σύστημα to 
describe philosophy itself, it is reasonable to suppose both that they view philosophy 
in the third sense of system above and that they developed their philosophy based on 
the notion that it is such a system.  
As we saw with both Plato and Aristotle, although their philosophies can be seen as 
systematic, they were only viewed as systems by later Academics and Peripatetics, 
who imposed an architectonic on their philosophy mainly, it would seem, for 
paedagogic purposes and always retrospectively.39 The Stoics, however, seem to have 
                                                            
32 Interesting later historical developments of such a view of ‘system of philosophy’ can be found in 
Nicholas Rescher, “Leibniz and the Concept of a System,” Studia Leibnitiana 13, no. 1 (1981): 114–22; and 
Leo Catana, The Historiographical Concept “System of Philosophy”: Its Origin, Nature, Influence and 
Legitimacy, Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History 165 (Brill, 2008), 19–20. Whilst Rescher acknowledges 
a debt to Stoicism, Catana oddly does not recognise any Stoic usage, but he gives a useful list of how 
the word ‘system’ and its cognates were used in ancient and medieval philosophy. 
33 Sextus M 2.10 
34 Clement Paed. 1, 13.102 (=SVF 3.293) 
35 Stobaeus Ecl. ΙΙ, 7. 5ιβ 
36 D.L. 7.45 
37 Sextus PH 3.269 
38 D.L. 7.138 
39   This is fundamental to understanding the nature of the Stoic division in contrast to Plato and 
Aristotle. I have found no awareness of this in contemporary literature, or at least it is nowhere clearly 
stated except in a work by Stephen Gersh, Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism. The Latin Tradition (Notre 
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presupposed the systematic structure of philosophy and proceeded to develop their 
philosophy at the first stage based upon this presupposition. This is evident most 
graphically from their well-known analogies wherein philosophy is likened to an egg, 
an animal, a garden and a city. We can readily assume from this that they had a clear 
idea of philosophy having an innate structure. It is pertinent to note that Posidonius 
expressed a preference for the analogy of the animal for its precision in describing the 
nature of the relationship between the parts as necessary as well as describing 
philosophy as a living organism. This preference of Posidonius has sometimes lead to 
the assumption in contemporary scholarship that the analogy of the animal must have 
also been introduced by Posidonius to better express how he viewed philosophy but 
is not necessarily a view shared by earlier Stoics. Yet, the analogy is only ascribed to 
Posidonius in one of our texts (Sextus M 7. 17-19); it also appears in Diogenes Laertius 
(7.40) without any ascription. On its own this would not be enough to support the 
claim that earlier Stoics may have also held the analogy of the animal but there is also 
a difference between Sextus and Diogenes Laertius as to which parts of the animal are 
ascribed to which parts of philosophy. This tells us two significant points. First, 
Posidonius was not the only Stoic to use the analogy of an animal to describe 
philosophy, and, second, it suggests that the analogies were used purely for 
illustrative purposes and that invariably some were more helpful, in terms of 
accurately representing the character of the Stoic system of philosophy, than others. 
The analogies are useful therefore primarily in understanding that the Stoics regarded 
philosophy as having an inherent, systematic structure and only secondarily in 
understanding the types of relations that exist between the parts. Although some 
analogies may be more representative of the Stoic position regarding the relation of 
the parts of philosophy and its systematic structure, any analogy is but an illustration 
which appeals to the imagination and perhaps our intuitions, but may fail to persuade 
or give a distinct account as to how these parts interact or even whether they do or are 
                                                            
Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1986), 75, who claims that the tripartition of philosophy in the 
early Academy “resulted essentially from an historical analysis”. 
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intended to. This is, moreover, as we have seen, one of the weaknesses in Hadot’s 
account, which did not leave such an impact in the academic literature perhaps 
because its primary focus was on these analogies and on the paedagogical aspect of 
Stoicism rather than the cognition of Stoicism as a conceptual structure. 
In conceiving of philosophy as a conceptual structure a few scholars have saliently 
observed that this structure is unified and yet somewhat paradoxically is subject to a 
division. This has proved to be problematic for the Stoics and evidence of this is 
observed from antiquity.40 No doubt it is a predilection of the rational mind to be 
disconcerted when we speak of the division of something unified and this may well 
be what in some interpretations drives the notion that the division only takes place for 
paedagogical purposes and is not an essential characteristic of philosophy in itself. On 
the opposite end of the debate the division of philosophy bolsters the idea that the 
parts are separate and can, perhaps even should, be studied separately. In both these 
instances the interpretations are founded on the notion of philosophy as curriculum. 
To my mind this notion of philosophy as curriculum is a retrospective development 
and not one that is immediately relevant to early Stoic thought, when the division was 
initially made. For this reason a distinction needs to be employed regarding 
philosophy as curriculum and philosophy as a conceptual structure. The former is 
concerned with how best to convey philosophical ideas and in what order they should 
be taught or learnt. The latter is the notion that philosophy itself has an inherent 
structure. That is to say that philosophy is not merely something created in order to 
best describe the world, reality or the human psyche. Rather, philosophy is itself a 
reflection or representation of these. To this extent it is important to study the Stoic 
position more precisely; for it is not philosophy which has this conceptual structure 
but rather the κατά φιλοσοφίαν λόγος or ‘the logos pertaining to philosophy’. As such 
it is not philosophy itself which is divided but the κατά φιλοσοφίαν λόγος which is 
                                                            
40 cf. Seneca Epistle 89: “I shall therefore comply with your demand, and shall divide philosophy into 
parts, but not into scraps. For it is useful that philosophy should be divided, but not chopped into bits.” 
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tripartite. In this way the κατά φιλοσοφίαν λόγος is also that which the analogies are 
to be applied to.41  
A few comments should be made regarding the ontological essence of philosophy and 
the logos pertaining to philosophy. It has been argued that the former is corporeal 
while the latter is incorporeal. The basis for this interpretation seems to be the way in 
which the term logos is understood and consequently translated from the phrase κατά 
φιλοσοφίαν λόγος. Supporters of the above idea (that the ‘κατά φιλοσφίαν λόγος’ 
is incorporeal) translate this as ‘philosophical discourse’, thus making it something 
sayable (λεκτόν) and so incorporeal.42  Though I have been unable to extract the 
significance of such a distinction from those who maintain it (beyond claiming that 
philosophy, as corporeal, is an internal disposition of the soul thus supporting the 
view that it is something lived), it seems to me that if this ontological distinction is 
valid it would suggest that the difference between philosophy and ‘philosophical 
discourse’ is that whilst the former is a disposition of the soul the latter is, in a way, 
independent of it. I thus translate κατά φιλοσοφίαν λόγος as the logos pertaining to 
philosophy, which could embrace the distinction or not but also as it seems to me 
maintains the wide spectrum of meaning that exists in the term logos. At this point I 
cannot see any good reason to maintain such an ontological distinction or not based 
on the evidence, I will as such refrain from maintaining one or the other. With the 
above in mind we can turn to an examination of what the Stoics say about philosophy 
rather than of the logos pertaining to philosophy. 
Stoic Definitions of Philosophy 
From the various accounts of Stoic descriptions of philosophy we may piece together 
certain central characteristics for what according to the Stoics is entailed in 
                                                            
41 With this distinction made clear at this point I will sometimes indiscriminately refer to the division 
of philosophy rather than to the division of the κατά φιλοσοφίαν λόγος. 
42 cf. Ierodiakonou, “The Stoic Division of Philosophy,” 60–61; and John Sellars, The Art of Living: The 
Stoics on the Nature and Function of Philosophy, Second Edition (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), 
82–83. 
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philosophy. Of the explicit evidence we have five independent sources which describe 
philosophy as understood by the Stoics. These definitions are often accompanied by a 
definition of wisdom alongside that of philosophy. Some scholars have remarked that 
the Stoics speak of wisdom and of philosophy interchangeably. This may simply be a 
matter of Latin authors using ‘sapientia’ for philosophy. Regardless, when it comes to 
formal descriptions of philosophy and of wisdom the Stoics make a clear-cut 
distinction. The difficulty arises over the way in which we consider the Stoics would 
have viewed the relation between philosophy and wisdom. In seeing what the sources 
have to say about philosophy we will be in a better position to understand not only 
the distinction between philosophy and wisdom, but also what is entailed in the 
practice of philosophy and so gain an insight into the Stoic division of philosophy into 
parts. Our purpose with this examination is to find the common features within the 
various sources to gain a clear picture of the Stoic view. 
In our first text (Ps. Galen, On the History of Philosophy, 5, 602.19-603.2 Diels)43 we have 
perhaps our most concise Stoic definition of philosophy and wisdom: 
Others defined philosophy as the practice of fitting art of the best life 
for human beings, saying that philosophy is exercise, and calling 
wisdom fitting art, which is also a cognitive grasp of human and divine 
matters.44 
So philosophy, simply put, is the practice of wisdom. This differs from the 
etymological sense in which philosophy is the love of wisdom or the Platonic sense 
where philosophy is the striving after wisdom. The practice aspect of philosophy is 
key.45 What is entailed in this practice of wisdom is not entirely clear. The first intuition 
is that it must be of a moral or ethical character in the same way as we speak of 
                                                            
43 Not in SVF or FDS 
44 τὴν φιλοσοφίαν . . . οἱ δὲ ἄσκησιν ἀνθρώποις ἀρίστης ζωῆς ἐπιτηδείας τέχνης ὡρίσαντο, ἄσκησιν 
μὲν τὴν φιλοσοφίαν εἴποντες, ἐπιτηδείαν δὲ τέχνην τὴν σοφίαν ὀνομάσαντες, ἥ τίς ἐστι κατάληψις 
θείων τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων. 
45 There are studies which focus solely on this particular aspect of Stoicism cf. for instance Sellars, The 
Art of Living: The Stoics on the Nature and Function of Philosophy; Pierre Hadot, La Citadelle Intérieure : 
Introduction Aux Pensées de Marc Aurèle (Paris: Fayard, 1992). 
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‘practical philosophy’, though when we look at the definition of wisdom we see that it 
seems to be more epistemological in nature; for the practice of philosophy involves a 
cognitive grasp of both human and divine things. The epistemological character of this 
practice becomes clearer in our next text. In a passage that can be found in the so-called 
Placita Philosophorum Preface 2 (SVF 2.35, LS 26A, FDS 15), a treatise that is now 
considered to be written by an otherwise unknown Aëtius and dated to around the 1st 
perhaps early 2nd c. CE,46 we encounter in the preface the following account of wisdom 
and philosophy and its division into parts: 
The Stoics said that [i] wisdom is knowledge (ἐπιστήμην) of human 
and divine matters, and [ii] philosophy practice of a fitting art; [iii] the 
single and supremely fitting art (ἐπιτήδειον) is excellence (ἀρετήν)47, 
[iv] and excellences at their most general are three: in nature, in 
behaviour, in reasoning. [v] For this reason philosophy is also divided 
into three parts: physical, ethical and logical. [vi] Physical is when we 
investigate the world and the matters in the world, ethical is that 
which is occupied with human life, logical is that concerned with 
reasoning – the last they also call dialectical.48 
Here we have what appears to be a more complete account of the Stoic position. In this 
text, philosophy emerges as the practice of the art of excellence. This seems to be at 
odds with the previous text, unless being excellent and being wise are equated. It is 
significant that wisdom is here described as ἐπιστήμη; for in other sources we also 
have excellence (ἀρετή) described as such. The sense in which philosophy derives its 
division into three parts from the division of excellence into three parts is one which 
                                                            
46 This dating of Aëtius is determined by the fact that in the work attributed to him no information of 
philosophers later than 1st c. BCE is provided. 
47 Translating ἀρετή throughout as excellence as this seems to me to better capture the meaning of the 
word in Stoicism. 
48 οἱ μὲν οὖν Στωικοὶ ἔφασαν [i] τὴν μὲν σοφίαν εἶναι θείων τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων ἐπιστήμην, [ii] τὴν 
δὲ φιλοσοφίαν ἄσκησιν ἐπιτηδείου τέχνης, [iii] ἐπιτήδειον δ’ εἶναι μίαν καὶ ἀνωτάτω τὴν ἀρετήν, 
[iv] ἀρετὰς δὲ τὰς γενικωτάτας τρεῖς, φυσικὴν ἠθικὴν λογικήν· [v] δι’ ἣν αἰτίαν καὶ τριμερής ἐστιν 
ἡ φιλοσοφία, ἧς τὸ μὲν φυσικὸν τὸ δ’ ἠθικὸν τὸ δὲ λογικόν· [vi] καὶ φυσικὸν μὲν ὅταν περὶ κόσμου 
ζητῶμεν καὶ τῶν ἐν κόσμῳ, ἠθικὸν δὲ τὸ κατησχολημένον περὶ τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον, λογικὸν δὲ 
τὸ περὶ τὸν λόγον, ὃ καὶ διαλεκτικὸν καλοῦσιν. 
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we shall return to later. Now we turn to some sources which differ slightly regarding 
the definition of philosophy: 
Philosophy is the cultivation of a habit of wisdom, and wisdom is the 
knowledge of things human and divine.49  
And: 
For philosophy is the cultivation of a habit of wisdom, and wisdom is 
the knowledge of all divine and human things, and of the respective 
causes of them.50 
In these two texts we encounter almost identical definitions for wisdom but the 
definition of philosophy is slightly altered. What dominates is a similar view to the 
first text above; that philosophy is directed to wisdom rather than to excellence as in 
the Aëtius text examined above. A further point is that these sources suggest a 
somewhat watered down version of our previous texts in that there is the nuanced 
notion that philosophy is no longer the practice of wisdom, which implies attainment, 
but it is instead a striving towards wisdom (i.e. in the Platonic sense) by a cultivation 
of habit or devoted study of wisdom. It is possible, even likely, that this is a later 
version of the orthodox Stoic definition of philosophy because as with most alterations 
to orthodox theorems it is a weaker and more flexible position to maintain and thus 
was probably developed after attacks from other thinkers, in particular Academics. If 
this is right it is an interesting instance of change of doctrine via change in 
terminology.51 The word that is used in both versions is almost identical but by using 
the noun (ἐπιτήδευσις) instead of the adjective (ἐπιτήδειος) the meaning is altered 
quite significantly from one wherein the philosopher is a practising sage to one 
                                                            
49 Sextus M 9.13 (=SVF 2.36): τὴν φιλοσοφίαν φασὶν ἐπιτήδευσιν εἶναι σοφίας, τὴν δὲ σοφίαν 
ἐπιστήμην θείων καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων. 
50 Philo Judaeus, Περί της προς τα προπαιδεύματα συνόδου (De congressu eruditionis gratia), 79: ἔστι 
γὰρ φιλοσοφία ἐπιτήδευσις σοφίας, σοφία δὲ ἐπιστήμη θείων καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων καὶ τῶν τούτων 
αἰτίων. 
51 Cf. René Brouwer, The Stoic Sage : The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (Cambridge ; New 
York: Cambridge University Pr., 2014) ch. 3, wherein he discusses changing attitudes towards the sage 
throughout the development of the school, though not making reference to the use of this term in the 
definitions. 
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wherein the philosopher must be a person progressing in the right way towards 
wisdom. The emphasis here seems to be that linguistically speaking by using 
ἐπιτήδευσις the alteration from the original (?) definition is slight, but further than this 
it is not simply a study of wisdom but a serious, attentive, devoted study. Translated 
as the ‘cultivation of a habit or character’ of wisdom we follow a more Platonic 
meaning but one also which may be positioned more harmoniously within the Stoic 
view of the practice of philosophy as a corporeal disposition of the soul both of which 
are determined by the tension prevalent in the pneuma. Presumably the study of 
wisdom will be done with a very high tension within the soul for it is only in this way 
that it can fulfil the requirements of the Stoic term usage with ἐπιτήδευσις. 
Ι turn now briefly to the use of the term ἐπιτηδείος. Philosophy is described as the 
practice (ἄσκησιν) of a fitting (ἐπιτηδείου) art (τέχνης). This brief definition has been 
translated variously as: ‘the practice of expertise in utility’ (LS: 1987), ‘the exercise of 
a fitting expertise’ (Brouwer: 2014), ‘the practice of an appropriate art’ (Sharples: 
2010)52. In the original language the expression is not common, some scholars have 
gone so far as to call it ‘awkward’53, this is primarily due to the use of the word 
ἐπιτηδείου. Long and Sedley’s translation offers perhaps the most philosophically 
specific translation, yet the translation of ἐπιτηδείου as ‘in utility’ can be deceptive; 
for in the Greek, whenever ἐπιτηδείος is used in the sense of useful it nevertheless 
retains connotations of being useful but in a conformable or appropriate way. The 
word is often used in poetry or in mythic story-telling to denote something, an object, 
a name or a person, being well-suited to a particular task. Alongside usefulness and 
appropriateness the word also has connotations of being necessary and being fit for a 
                                                            
52 Cf. also Brad Inwood and Lloyd P. Gerson, eds., The Stoics Reader : Selected Writings and Testimonia 
(Indianapolis (Ind.): Hackett, 2008), 9.: ‘suitable’; Jaap Mansfeld and David T. Runia, « Aëtiana » : The 
Method and Intellectual Context of a Doxographer. 2, The Compendium (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 63: ‘required ’.  
53 See A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, eds., The Hellenistic Philosophers. Vol. 2 Greek and Latin Texts with 
Notes and Bibliography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 163: “The expression is 
awkward. We interpret ἐπιτηδείου as shorthand for περὶ τοῦ ἐπιτηδείου.” 
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purpose.54 It is likely that the Stoics would have embraced the rich spectrum of 
meaning that may be applied to this word for they could easily have used many other 
words which more precisely refer to one of these qualities instead of a word which 
can mean all of them. Thus, it seems likely that their use of ἐπιτηδείος is intentional 
and that with this uncommon usage of ἐπιτηδείος they would like to say in as concise 
a way as possible that the practice of philosophy is not only appropriate but also 
purposeful, necessary and useful. I choose to translate it here using the word ‘fitting’ 
for this is the meaning which seems to dominate in the historical journey of the term 
up to the Stoics and the one which also guides or directs its other meanings as 
purposeful, useful and necessary. 
So now that we have a clear grasp of the various descriptions of philosophy it will be 
useful to look at what τέχνη means for the Stoics; for philosophy is the practice of a 
fitting art (τέχνη). As noted earlier we have no explicit evidence which describes 
philosophy itself as a system. However, this word is used quite specifically, from the 
very first stages of the school’s development, to define τέχνη: 
Zeno says that ‘art is a system of cognitions unified by training 
towards some useful end in life’.55 
In the definition of art, the utility aspect is clearly expressed by the use of εὔχρηστον, 
which provides a good contrast with the vague usage of ἐπιτηδείος in the definition 
of philosophy, supporting the notion that the vagueness is intentional, but also 
emphasises the usefulness of practicing a fitting art, as interpreted by Long and Sedley 
in their collection of sources. Perhaps what is more interesting in the Stoic definition 
                                                            
54 E.g. Herodotus Hist. 6.102: “Marathon was the place in Attica most suitable (ἐπιτηδεότατον) for 
riding horses”; Xenophon Ways and Means: “but if some parts were proceeded with and others 
postponed, the income realised would help to provide the amount still required (τὸ ἐπιτήδειον).” 
Lysias Against Nicomachus “And from whom amongst our citizens could it be more suitably 
(ἐπιτηδειότερος) exacted than from Nicomachus?” etc. 
55 Olympiodorus, Commentary on the Gorgias 12. 1 (= SVF 1.73, FDS 392, LS 42A): Ζήνων δέ φησιν ὅτι 
‘τέχνη ἐστὶ σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων συγγεγυμνασμένων πρός τι τέλος εὔχρηστον τῶν ἐν τῷ 
βίῳ’.Translation is Brouwer’s (2014); συγγεγυμνασμένων translated here as ‘unified by training’ 
captures the meaning well I think and is more comprehensible than ‘co-exercised’. 
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of art is that it is viewed as a system, but not one made up of habituated physical 
motions as one would expect in a craft such as carpentry or stone-masonry, rather an 
art is characterised by its cognitive structure and how this structure is unified by the 
effort of personal training. It emerges as essentially intellectual and, if it were to be 
applied to practice, ‘art’ in the Stoic sense refers not to the actions themselves but 
rather to the stage before any action takes place; for art is confined to thought in this 
definition. Moreover, we may observe that in the later definition of philosophy, that 
we looked at above,56 the term τέχνη is removed from the definition; nevertheless that 
‘art’ is defined here as including training is implied by the use of the noun 
ἐπιτήδευσις. If we collate this with the definition of τέχνη here we may observe that 
training or attentive study is in fact an essential characteristic of philosophy in both 
definitions regardless of changes. 
If we return to Aëtius text above we observe the tri-partite division of physics, ethics 
and logic implicitly in the definition of wisdom and explicitly in the descriptions of 
philosophy and excellence. More than this it is claimed that the philosophical division 
is in fact founded on the division of excellence. This passage as such has become a 
corner-stone in the debate regarding the unity of virtue in Stoicism.57 However, in 
relation to the architectonic of philosophy, the thesis that the tri-partite division of 
philosophy is based on the tri-partite division of excellence has been challenged by 
Inwood on the grounds that philosophy is a practice (ἄσκησις) whilst excellence 
(ἀρετή) is knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) and thus more needs to be said about how one leads 
or connects to the other.58 It seems to me that there are several assumptions which 
need to be dealt with here. First, it is not clear that this bridge would have concerned 
the Stoics. The problem of describing the link between askêsis and epistêmê appears to 
be based on a modern view that the two are essentially separate, one which the Stoics 
                                                            
56 Cf. the two passages quoted on p. 42 above  
57 See esp. M. Schofield, “Ariston of Chios and the Unity of Virtue,” Ancient Philosophy 4 (1984): 83–96. 
58 Brad Inwood, “Why Physics?,” in God and Cosmos in Stoicism, ed. Ricardo Salles (Oxford ; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), 203 n. 6. 
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did not necessarily concern themselves with; for they come from a philosophical 
tradition in which knowledge and the good are so intimately bound together. 
Moreover, this passage refers to the Stoics in general59 so we cannot know if this 
correlation is one which was developed later or earlier. We do know however that the 
Stoics from as early on as Zeno divided philosophy into three parts and the correlation 
we receive in this passage of the philosophical division being related to the division 
of the excellences is an interesting one even if it is a later development. It is also useful 
to remember that when the Stoics speak of a tripartite division of philosophy, they are 
referring to something more specific than philosophy itself or philosophy as askêsis 
per se. As discussed above, they qualify the division by saying that it is a division of 
the κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγος, “the logos pertaining to philosophy”. So it is in fact the 
logos and not philosophy that permits such a division. If we are to understand the 
division as being one of the logos pertaining to philosophy rather than of philosophy 
itself we are lead to a more epistemological study of the division rather than a practical 
one. This latter point seems to validate the connection between the division of the 
excellences and the division of philosophy because the askêsis/epistêmê distinction is 
removed altogether.  
Nevertheless, I think that something more can be said about the nature of askêsis which 
would connect it to epistêmê regardless of the above points, for from the sources 
examined so far it has become apparent that there is something distinctive about the 
practice of philosophy. From the definitions and from more elaborate discussion of 
aspects of the definitions, philosophical askêsis is conceived as something more 
composite than the traditional view of philosophy as spiritual practice or as ‘way of 
life’, that is to say we may observe that what is entailed in the practice of philosophy 
is something more than right actions in relation to ourselves, to other people and to 
our environment or some internal training of impulse and repulsion. No doubt these 
are involved in the progress (προκοπή) towards wisdom. But from the definitions we 
                                                            
59 Von Arnim attributes the passage to Chrysippus in the SVF. 
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discover that these are either absent, and thus only secondary characteristics of 
philosophy, or else they are extrapolated but from one part of the definition of 
wisdom, that is as ‘knowledge of human things’. In fact it seems that philosophy as 
askêsis is at the first stage not concerned with these actions, but rather that right actions 
are the result of philosophical practice and not part of the process as such. Invariably, 
the philosophers’ practice is, like wisdom and excellence, of a cognitive character. In 
concise terms, the philosophers’ practice is to train with awareness of the connections 
between things. This is how art or expertise is understood by the Stoics and moreover 
explains why the tri-partite division is prevalent not only in the logos pertaining to 
philosophy, but also in wisdom and in the excellences. This may be taken as a spiritual 
practice in itself but also offers itself as a more objective groundwork for the 
development of character for it takes into account the physical and the logical parts of 
philosophy.  
Such a reading corroborates the view that Stoicism is not a philosophy of 
foundationalism wherein ethics is founded in physics or vice versa implying that one 
is prior, or superior to another, but is instead a philosophy in which there exists a 
symmetry between the role of the parts.60 It seems that caution should be exercised 
with viewing philosophical practice in Stoicism solely from an ethical perspective. 
Certainly, it is the case that ethics dominates the later and imperial periods of Stoicism, 
the periods for which moreover we have the most complete evidence, but a detailed 
look at the definitions of philosophy shows that the dominance of ethics is not 
applicable to earlier Stoicism. Beyond there existing a symmetry between the parts, 
the definitions show that an essential characteristic of practising philosophy as an art 
is the combination of apparently disparate elements.61 That the integration of the parts 
                                                            
60 Both Annas and Hadot argue, albeit from opposite ends, that the Stoic division is not characterised 
by hierarchy but by symmetry. See discussion above: p.30-34 
61 Cf. Olympiodorus source above p. 44 
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is integral to the philosophers’ practice is moreover described in two neglected 
sources: 
In the first place, philosophy is either a striving after the correctness of 
logos, or the knowledge thereof, or more particularly the diligent study 
devoted to logos. For once we are thoroughly familiar with the parts of the 
logos and their combination, we shall use it the right way.62 By logos I mean 
the one all rational beings possess.63 
In this text we perceive that philosophy is described not only as the study of right 
reason (i.e. an aspect of askêsis) but also as an ἐπιστήμη suggesting that, pace Inwood, 
a bridging argument between the two is unnecessary. Moreover, the right use of 
reason is made dependent on internalising our grasp of the parts of the logos and on 
how they are arranged or combined in relation to each other. This cognitive 
harmonising of the parts is in Stoic philosophical practice temporally prior to our right 
or expert use of reason and actions. Thus if we follow Mansfeld’s translation of 
‘striving after the correctness of logos’ the Stoics’ training programme will necessarily 
be directed by coherence and integrity, that is to say by the relations and interactions 
between doctrines and the parts of philosophy. 
Likewise, in our second text attributed to Zeno we have a similar account as to the 
practice of the philosopher: 
Of what kind are his theorems? Are they those about the way in which 
the beard becomes great or the hair long? No, but rather what Zeno 
says, “to know the elements of reason, what kind of a thing each of 
                                                            
62 My Itallics 
63 Mansfeld’s translation. Pap. Herc. 1020, col. I. 11-24 (= FDS fr. 88): Πρῶτον μὲν γάρ ἐσ|τιν [ἡ] 
φιλοσοφία, εἴτ’ ἐ[πὶ|τήδευ[σις] λόγου ὀρ[θ]ότητος [εἴ]τ’ ἐπιστήμη | ἢ [μαλισ]τα περὶ λόγον 
π[ραγ]ματεία κα[ὶ γὰρ] ἐντὸς ὄντες τῶν το[ῦ] |λόγου μορίων καὶ τῆς |συν[τάξεως αὐ]τῶν 
χρ[η]|σόμεθα ἐμπ[ε]ίρως α[ὐ]|τῶι· λόγον δὲ [λέ]γω τὸν |κα[τὰ φύσ]ιν π[ᾶσ]ι τ[οῖς] | λογικοῖς 
ὑπάρχοντα. 
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them is, and how they are fitted to one another, and what things are 
consequent upon them”.64 
It is clear then that this view, which can be extrapolated from the definitions is also 
confirmed and elaborated on in other sources and moreover is a position held within 
the Stoa at its initial formation by the founder of the school.  
The picture that emerges from the sources thus far is that the practice of philosophy 
seems to be very much of an intellectual and epistemological nature rather than of a 
practical nature in the traditional sense of the word. It is well-known that in Stoicism 
our psychological well-being is within our control in so far as our own judgments are 
within our control. By looking at the definitions of philosophy we may discern, 
contrary to the vulgate view, that in Stoicism the practising philosopher takes a very 
active and positive stance rather than an impassive one; for the practice is not simply 
an altering of our stance towards external circumstances by simply rejecting our 
impassioned, impulsive reaction to things and the strength of character that goes with 
this. Rather it is an active process of cognitive unification which persuades the 
individual that certain passions are useless, unnecessary, futile and inappropriate. It 
seems as though this is the conclusion we are invariably led to when we combine Stoic 
accounts of philosophy and wisdom. As we saw, wisdom is an ἐπιστήμη, whilst 
philosophy is an ἀσκήσις of this ἐπιστήμη. Wisdom being the knowledge of human 
and divine things, along with their causes, fits the tripartite division of philosophy 
neatly. We may say that knowledge of human things is Ethics, of divine things Physics 
and of their causes Logic. There is a sense in which philosophy itself cannot be 
systematic within the Stoic framework in any fixed or objective way; for philosophy, 
being a practice, is chiefly dependent on the individual who practises it and the way 
in which this is done can vary to greater or lesser extents; hence sources which speak 
of disparity between paedagogic methods amongst the Stoics (D.L. 7. 40-41). Although 
                                                            
64 Epictetus’ Diss 4.8.12: ποῖα θεωρήματα; μή τι τὰ περὶ τοῦ πῶς πώγων μέγας γίνεται ἢ κόμη 
βαθεῖα; ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἃ Ζήνω(ν) λέγει· «γνῶναι τὰ τοῦ λόγου στοιχεῖα, ποῖόν τι ἕκαστον αὐτῶν 
ἐστι καὶ πῶς ἁρμόττεται πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ ὅσα τούτοις ἀκόλουθά ἐστιν». 
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philosophy as practice is not necessarily systematic the art which is practiced by 
philosophy, which is wisdom, is systematic65 and also an ἐπιστήμη which can be 
systematic.  
In Stoicism human logos is physically connected with the logos of the cosmos and 
though it may never be structurally identical unless the individual is a sage the 
architecture of philosophy is based on the architecture of the universe. If this is the 
case, as it seems to be, it is necessary to posit that the parts of philosophy are 
inextricably linked and are studied as such by the philosopher. The link between 
human wisdom and cosmic reality is moreover explicitly stated by Posidonius (DL 7. 
138): “Posidonius in his elementary treatise On Celestial Phenomena, (defines cosmos 
as) a system made up of heaven and earth and the natures in them, or, again, as a 
system constituted by gods and men and all things created for their sake”.66 The unity 
of the parts of philosophy is thus presupposed on Stoic principles for the dynamic 
unity of reality in Stoic philosophy. 
 
The debate regarding the relation of the parts in Stoic philosophy has been heated over 
recent years, with little agreement being reached. In basic terms one side argues for 
the importance of the relation between the parts and the other argues for the 
possibility of studying one part independent of the others. In the first part of this 
chapter the relevant literature was explored in detail and a critical account of the 
strengths and weaknesses set the groundwork for the next section on the definitions 
and descriptions of philosophy. From the study of the relevant sources on the 
definitions of philosophy it has been determined in this chapter that, at least for early 
                                                            
65 See text quoted on p. 40 (= Ps. Galen, On the History of Philosophy, 5, 602.19-603.2 Diels). 
66 «ὥς φησι Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῇ Μετεωρολογικῇ στοιχειώσει, σύστημα ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς καὶ τῶν 
ἐν τούτοις φύσεων ἤ σύστημα ἐκ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν ἕνεκα τούτων γεγονότων». See also 
Diogenes of Babylonia SVF 3. 117 and D.L. 7.87: “as Chrysippus says in the first book of his On Ends; 
‘for our individual natures are parts of the nature of the whole universe’.” «ὥς φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ 
πρώτῷ  Περἰ τελῶν· μέρη γάρ εἰσιν αἱ ἡμέτεραι φύσεις τῆς τοῦ ὅλου. διόπερ τέλος γίνεται τὸ 
ἀκολούθως τῇ φύσει ζῆν». 
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Stoicism, the combination and unity of the parts is essential for the correct study of 
Stoic philosophy. Moreover, beyond considerations of curriculum, it has been argued 
that the unity of philosophy describes an inherent structure with which Stoic 
philosophy was designed from the outset in such a way as to best reflect the 
architecture of the cosmos. The source evidence on the nature of philosophy guides 
us to an understanding of the practising philosopher as someone who is primarily 
concerned with the harmony that exists between the parts of philosophy in the same 
way as there exists a harmony between the parts of the cosmos. Only once the 
philosopher becomes aware of the way in which the parts are fitted together can the 
logos be used correctly and actions be made to cohere in the right way in an 
individual’s life and in relation to the cosmos. Whilst philosophical practise may begin 
with an extirpation of the passions or a control of impulse and repulsion or some other 
such technique, this is all preliminary work to bring oneself into closer concordance 
with nature. The final stage of practise, which may be viewed as theology, is the 
cognitive grasping of the connections and the perception of the patterns which 
account for the harmony between things. To this extent, and as far as we are able, we 
should try to see how the Stoics conceived of the integration of their philosophy in 
order to bring our selves closer to the harmony that exists in nature and achieve a 
good flow in life. In the following chapters we shall attempt to trace this integration 
of their philosophy by exploring the emergence of the theory of pneuma in their system 
and that this concept is fundamental to their overaching goal of making philosophy 
and philosophical practise harmonious with nature and god. 
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2. Pneuma and its Emergence in Stoic Thought 
Introduction 
Pneuma, breath or spirit, is certainly one of the more fundamental concepts of Stoicism. 
If the Stoic cosmos is alive, it is by virtue of the life-giving breath that is pneuma. If 
plants are able to grow and animals able to perceive, it is only because of the pneuma 
present within them. If bodies are individuated such that they cohere with themselves 
and are not manifest simply as amorphous lumps of matter, it is because of pneuma. If 
bodies, whilst individuated, are also connected and in constant interaction with each 
other it is the pervading pneuma which is responsible. All actions occur because of the 
internal workings of pneumatic motion. All passions, thoughts, memories and 
experience are determined by the state of our own pneuma, which is our internal spirit 
or breath. There is no doubt that pneuma plays a decisive role in all three parts of Stoic 
philosophy and it is well suited for a study of how the Stoics integrated their system 
of thought such that they could claim that it is a coherent whole. But what is this 
pneuma and how is it to be understood?  
Now, to understand the theory of pneuma and its significance for Stoicism it is most 
important to trace the ideas involved in its emergence. By this I mean that the interest 
lies not simply in extracting any reference to pneuma as it appears in the fragments. 
Instead, the robust and flexible character of the theory emerges only when its 
underlying physical processes are understood. This chapter will lay the foundation 
for what is to come but only in the sense that it will be shown that pneuma as an 
integrated theory in the Stoic system was not present at the earliest stages of the 
school. The theory was properly introduced by Chrysippus. However, the ideas which 
were integrated into the theory of pneuma were certainly present in Zeno and 
Cleanthes in the form of elaborate physical theory utilising similar concepts but 
without being unified under the heading of pneuma. This section will thus be a brief 
excursus charting the early references to pneuma. What this chapter does not do is to 
seek influences from outside of the Stoic school such as from medical or oriental 
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origins. It does not seek to elaborate on the theory of pneuma as present in Chrysippus. 
The purpose here is instead to show the lack of an integrated pneumatic theory in the 
philosophy of Zeno and Cleanthes, an aim which will help us later on to discern what 
can safely be attributed to these early heads of the school and what cannot. This will 
also be useful in other research to show which aspects of pneuma were appropriated 
by Chrysippus from earlier theories, what changes he made and also possibly why he 
made them. This is not to say that Chrysippus developed the theory of pneuma on his 
own, there is ample evidence to show that the framework for Chrysippus’ theory of 
pneuma was present already in Zeno and this will become evident in the course of the 
thesis. At this stage we will be charting only the evidence that directly refers to pneuma 
in Zeno and Cleanthes; no further connections to other doctrines will be made at this 
point so as to bring into relief the limitations of this evidence. 
Zeno of Citium 
Even though pneuma in Zeno does not fulfil all the functions of pneuma enumerated 
above, we can clearly distinguish what role the concept of pneuma played in his system 
from the sources available to us. By gathering all the evidence in one place it will be 
possible to formulate a clearer understanding as to what Zeno used pneuma for. A 
Pseudo-Galenic text preserves for us a brief description:  
Both Plato and Zeno said the soul was a mover; Plato however claimed 
that the substance of the soul was incorporeal, Zeno and his followers 
that it is corporeal because they considered that its substance is 
pneuma.1 
Some caution is warranted here for the Zenonian attribution as it is said to be the 
doctrine of Zeno “and his followers”; such formulations often indicate a retrospective 
attribution to Zeno based on doctrine of later Stoics.2 Nevertheless, Galen tells us that 
                                                            
1 Ps-Galen Hist Phil. 24. 10-15 (= SVF 1. 136). I follow Mansfeld’s emendation of the text “Some Stoics 
on the Soul (SVF I 136),” Mnemosyne 37 (1984): 443–45.: Τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν αὐτῆς [sc. τῆς ψυχῆς] οἱ μὲν 
ἀσώματον (sc. κινοῦν) ἔφασαν, ὡς Πλάτων, οἱ δὲ σωματικὸν κινοῦν, ως Ζήνων καὶ οἱ ἐξ αὐτοῦ· 
πνεῦμα γὰρ εἶναι ταύτην ὑπενόησαν καὶ οὖτοι.  
2 See Algra, “Zeno of Citium and Stoic Cosmology.” 
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for Zeno, as for Cleanthes and Chrysippus, “soul is nourished from the blood and the 
substance of soul is pneuma.”3 A passage in Diogenes Laertius is more specific in 
saying that Zeno in his treatise On Soul defined the soul as a warm breath (πνεῦμα 
ἔνθερμον) and that moreover “we are alive through this pneuma and are moved by 
it.”4 These three sources taken together inform us that (i) pneuma is a physical 
substance (ii) through which our bodies are given life and (iii) motion and moreover 
(iv) that it is warm. In this way it would seem that Zeno is equating soul with pneuma 
and his reason for doing so is that he wants to establish the corporeal nature of soul 
which is a type of breath.  
Moreover, a text from Macrobius says that “Zeno said that the soul is the solid spirit 
of the body”.5 This text is unique in attributing solidity to pneuma but for this reason 
it may not be reliable and may simply be an exaggerated emphasis of the corporeal 
nature of soul espoused by Zeno.6 Nevertheless, it is clear that Zeno wanted to 
establish the corporeal nature of soul for in one of his syllogistic arguments he starts 
out with the premise that a living being dies when a corporeal substance departs from 
the body. He calls this corporeal substance pneuma or breath: 
Tertullian de anim. Ch. 5 (= SVF 1. 137)  
Indeed, Zeno, defining the soul to be a breath generated with (the 
body,) constructs his argument in this way: that substance which by 
its departure causes the living being to die is a corporeal one. Now it 
is by the departure of the breath, which is generated with (the body,) 
that the living being dies; therefore the breath which is generated with 
(the body) is a corporeal substance. 
A similar syllogism is recorded in Calcidius in Tim. 220 (= SVF 1.138):  
                                                            
3 Galen PHP 2. 8 (= SVF 1. 521) 
4 D.L. 7. 157 (= Pearson 85; SVF 1. 135). The doctrine is also attributed to Antipater and Posidonius in 
the same passage. 
5 Macrob. in Somn. Scip. 1,14 (= SVF 1.137 part) 
6 A further discussion of the solid nature of body in Zeno is discussed in relation to the definitions of 
body in the chapter on tension p. 151-3. 
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Indeed, Zeno raises the question of breath being the soul in this way: 
that thing on the occasion of whose departure from the body the living 
being dies is without doubt soul; but when the natural breath departs, 
the living being dies; therefore the soul is natural breath. 
According to Tertullian the breath is generated with the body; whether this is during 
the embryonic stage or after birth is not specified but from these two sources together 
we receive the additional piece of information that pneuma has the capacity to depart 
from the body. Its departing is also the death of the body. However, the fact that it 
departs implies that it must go somewhere and have an existence after the death of 
the body. This is confirmed in another passage preserved in Epiphanius: 
 “He [Zeno] also said that < the soul persists for some time* > after its 
separation from the body, and called the soul a long-lived breath but 
said that it is certainly not fully immortal. For it is exhausted to the 
point of extinction by the length of its existence, or so he says.”7 
It is most likely the case that because the soul is constituted by physical substance this 
also determines its mortality. Even if the pneuma is able to survive the body it 
nevertheless is extinguished at some point.8 The continued existence of pneuma has led 
some commentators on Stoic theory to believe that the Stoics may have posited a 
theory of transmigration of souls9 but this would be a Pythagorean or Platonising 
interpretation and not at all Stoic, as has been shown by Mansfeld.10 The pneuma of 
individuals does not depart the body and re-enter other bodies. There is in fact an 
                                                            
7 Epiphanius Panarion (= Adversus Haereses) 3. 508, 20-25 (= SVF 1. 146) ἔλεγε δὲ καὶ μετὰ χωρισμὸν τοῦ 
σώματος * καὶ ἐκάλει τὴν ψυχὴν πολυχρόνιον πνεῦμα, οὐ μὴν δὲ ἄφθαρτον δι’ ὅλου ἔλεγεν αὐτὴν 
εἶναι· ἐκδαπανᾶται γὰρ ὑπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ χρόνου εἰς τὸ ἀφανές, ὥς φησι. 
8 Cf. also Themistius de anim. 30.17 (=SVF 1. 145) “Yet some defence is left for Zeno [the Stoic], since he 
claimed that the whole soul was completely blended with the body, and did not make its exit without 
the compound being destroyed.” Earlier on in this passage there is a reference to “those who claim the 
soul is pneuma” but this most likely indicates the Stoics in general. 
9 Cf. Verbeke, L’évolution de La Doctrine Du Pneuma, 49–50. 
10 Jaap Mansfeld, “Resurrection Added. The Interpretatio Christiana of a Stoic Doctrine,” Vigiliae 
Christianae 37 (1983): 218–33. 
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explanation as to how the pneuma enters bodies in the first place and this is found in 
Eusebius11: 
The seed, says Zeno, which man emits is breath combined with 
moisture, a portion and fragment of soul, and a blending of the 
parents' seed, and a unified mixture of the various parts of the soul. 
For this, having the same laws as the universe, when emitted into the 
womb is caught up by another breath, which is a portion of the 
female's soul and grows into one with it, and being there stirred and 
kindled by it grows in secret, continually receiving additions to the 
moisture and increasing of itself. 
Pneuma enters at conception and is a blend of the pneumata of the mother and father. 
It is not clear that this blend should as of yet be considered an individuated soul. 
Nevertheless, this passage reveals a fully physical conception of the soul’s entrance 
into bodies, not via some mysterious metaphysical means but via the vital pneuma 
found in the fertile capacities of man and woman. It is very interesting to note that, 
according to Zeno, the pneuma is contained in what he calls the seed (σπέρμα) of the 
parents and that this seed contains the same laws as the universe. This is an implicit 
indication that for Zeno the cosmos, or perhaps the seed of the cosmos, is connected 
in some way to pneuma. Scholars have traditionally claimed that Zeno never applied 
the theory of pneuma on a cosmic level.12 Nevertheless, another passage in Calcidius 
explicitly records that Zeno attributed breath to the substance of the cosmos: 
Zeno adds that this substance is itself finite and that it is the one 
substance common to all of the things that exist, also that it is divisible 
and susceptible of change in every respect, for its parts change 
although they do not perish in the sense that they dissolve from their 
existent state into nothing. Rather, he thinks that it is as in the case of 
innumerable different forms, including waxen ones: no form, shape, 
                                                            
11 Eusebius Praep. Evang. 15.20 (= SVF 1. 128) 
12 cf. e.g Hahm, The Origins of Stoic Cosmology, 159 and Michael Lapidge, ‘ἀρχαί and στοιχεῖα’, Phronesis, 
18 (1973), p. 274 who claims that it was Chrysippus who ‘discovered’ cosmic pneuma. See also Verbeke 
who argues that the role of the cosmic pneuma in Zeno is taken over by the creative fire L’évolution de La 
Doctrine Du Pneuma, 22 & 24. 
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or quality generally is proper to matter, the foundation of all things, 
although it is conjoined and inseparably coheres with some quality. 
And he thinks that since it is equally without origin or end - since it 
does not come to subsist from a non-existent or dissolve into nothing 
- from eternity there is not lacking to it the breath and power to move it 
rationally, sometimes as a whole, sometimes in part, which is the cause 
of the frequent and violent process of change in the universe. He thinks, 
moreover, that this motive breath is not nature but soul, rational soul, which 
in bestowing life adorned the sensible world for the sake of this beauty which 
now makes it resplendent. And they call the world a blessed living being 
or god.”13 
In this passage, which describes Zeno’s physical theory, the substance of the cosmos, 
which is ever-changing but eternal, receives its eternality from the pneuma present 
within it. We may suspect that the eternality of the substance may be inferred from its 
not lacking breath or power. This inference is plausible because pneuma in Zeno, as we 
saw in the Epiphanius passage above, is described as πολυχρόνιον.14 We may assume 
that whilst in individual bodies the πολυχρόνιον pneuma has a limited lifespan, when 
in relation to the whole it is eternal. The attribution of the second half of this passage 
to Zeno may be disputed; yet it is quite feasible that he considered the substance of 
the cosmos to be composed of pneuma in the same way as the substance of the human 
soul is composed of pneuma.15 The final piece of evidence which attributes the concept 
of pneuma to Zeno is one which is often quoted and provides a connecting point with 
                                                            
13 Calcidius Tim. 292 (= SVF 1.88) 
14 In their sourcebook Long and Sedley question how the inference of the eternality of substance arises 
from pneuma. They do not make the connection with the Epiphanius text and instead connect its eternal 
character not with the pneuma but with the active principle; Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers. 
Vol. 2 Greek and Latin Texts with Notes and Bibliography, 267 (44 D). 
15 Verbeke, L’évolution de La Doctrine Du Pneuma cf. n. 91 & n. 95 is not keen on attributing this to Zeno, 
despite the direct reference, preferring to suggest its Posidonian provenance. In this passage Hunt sees 
Chrysippean influences because of the contrast between nature and soul: see A Physical Interpretation of 
the Universe. The Doctrines of Zeno the Stoic (Carlton, Australia: Melbourne Univ. Pr., 1976), 34. Yet the 
distinction between hexis, physis and psyche is Zenonian cf. Pearson, The Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes, 
92 fr. 43. and also Themistius In de anima 35,26 (on Aristotle De anima 411a7-16). 
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Cleanthes. This is the statement by Rufus of Ephesus that for Zeno “pneuma and heat 
are one and the same”.16  
To recapitulate, Zeno makes the soul physical and corporeal by describing it as a 
breath. This breath is both hot and vitalising and gives us the capacity for self-motion. 
When this pneuma departs from the body, we ourselves die but the pneuma lives on for 
a limited period of time. He removes any mysterious aspects of the soul by saying that 
it is naturally present in the sexual organs of man and woman and it is via procreative 
activity that it is transferred to a new life form, through the seed of the man and an 
element in the womb of the woman, who each provide a part of the breath present in 
the embryo. The embryo’s pneuma is united with that of the mother but grows on its 
own. The pneuma of the individual corresponds also with the pneuma of the whole and 
consequently the soul of the cosmos can be described as a breath. It is evident that for 
Zeno the main role he assigns to pneuma in his philosophy is to establish the physical 
nature of the soul on both the macro and micro cosmic levels. The significance of this 
for the integrity of the Stoic system will be explored in later chapters. Perhaps the most 
significant piece of information that can be gleaned from the evidence, however, is 
what is not said. For Zeno, whilst the pneuma has motion it is not the tensional motion 
that moves inwards and outwards simultaneously. The absence of this motion in Zeno 
also means that pneuma is not conceived of as creating coherence within individual 
bodies or within the cosmos. The pneuma, moreover, is not used to describe elaborate 
theories of sensory experience or action. This general absence of an elaborated theory, 
suggests that Zeno’s physical theory is lacking in both explanatory and integrative 
force when compared to later Stoic theory. 
Cleanthes of Assos 
The situation for Cleanthes is not much improved. In fact we have even less evidence 
for Cleanthes’ use of pneuma than we do for Zeno’s. In his seminal work on pneuma 
                                                            
16 SVF 1. 127 (= Pearson 84) 
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Verbeke dealt with this dearth of evidence by discussing texts that refer to soul (ψυχή) 
and mind (νοῦς) for his chapter on Cleanthes. Since for us at this stage our main 
interest is in the use of the concept of pneuma in these early heads of the school it serves 
for now to simply catalogue those references in which the term appears in relation to 
Cleanthes. Along with the reference already quoted for Zeno, Cleanthes is included 
as one of the Stoics who makes the substance of the soul pneuma.17 There are only two 
other sources which refer to Cleanthes using the concept of pneuma but both of these 
are informative. First we have a passage in Tertullian18: 
This logos Zeno defines as the maker who has formed and ordered all; 
he will have it that this logos is also called fate and God, and mind of 
Jove, and universal law. All this Cleanthes gathers up into breath and 
affirms it to pervade the universe. 
This text is an indication that Cleanthes makes a significant move away from Zeno’s 
original position. If we are to take the Calcidius text above as being an accurate 
account of Zeno’s theory then we see that whilst Zeno had attributed pneuma to the 
substance of the cosmos (i.e. the passive principle) Cleanthes applies it to the active 
principle and god. As we saw Zeno wanted to establish the corporeal nature of soul 
by defining it as a breath, however, he does not assign any sensory powers or reason 
to it, nor does he use the concept to designate the deity.19 Presumably for Zeno these 
aspects are not to be found in the pneuma itself but in the hegemonikon, which also 
makes it clear for us that Zeno needs the notion of the hegemonikon, not to vitalise the 
body but to make it rational and percipient. Cleanthes, on the other hand, activates 
the pneuma. It would seem that he did not clarify all of the ramifications of this since 
if the pneuma is active, the need for a hegemonikon is reduced because the pneuma would 
have already within it the rationality transmitted to it by the rational active principle. 
This clearly becomes a problem in later commentaries on Stoic theory where sensation 
                                                            
17 Galen PHP 2. 8 (= SVF 1. 521) 
18 Tertullian Apol. 21 (= SVF 1.160 (part) and 1. 533) 
19 This final point was also noticed by Verbeke, L’évolution de La Doctrine Du Pneuma, 39. 
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and vitality are often conflated. Hahm briefly discerns this issue but expresses it 
somewhat differently as an apparent conflict between pneuma and heat competing for 
creation in Cleanthes, which he tentatively attributes to Chrysippus’ influence on his 
master with no further discussion.20 I discuss this further in the next chapter. Suffice 
to say that we may discern the emergence of what will later become an interpretative 
issue, already with the alteration of Zeno’s original position by Cleanthes.21  
That Cleanthes still insisted on the hegemonikon and its distinctiveness from the pneuma 
is clear from another passage found in Seneca:22 
Cleanthes and his pupil Chrysippus did not agree on what walking is. 
Cleanthes said it was breath extending from the hegemonikon to the 
feet, Chrysippus that it was the hegemonikon itself. 
This oft cited source indicates a distinction between Chrysippus and Cleanthes.23 
However, it is useful to understand this in relation to Zeno. Cleanthes appears to be 
retaining aspects of his master’s account of pneuma with the active rational 
hegemonikon acting on the passive substance of the pneuma and guiding its motion. 
Clearly, there is some discrepancy here in Cleanthes’ use of the concept of pneuma, 
unless it is the case that his theory here is not that the hegemonikon is acting on the 
pneuma but that the pneuma is an extension of the hegemonikon. If this is the case, as the 
source seems to indicate, then it may be said with some certainty that Cleanthes is 
here combining  the physical aspect of Zeno’s pneuma with the active principle, which 
in Zeno has no obvious physical manifestation. In this way Cleanthes theory of pneuma 
would be able to accommodate the pervasion of god through matter via the extension 
of pneuma through the cosmos. 
 
                                                            
20 Hahm, The Origins of Stoic Cosmology, 159. 
21 Cf. p. 97-9 and n.64 in ch.3  
22 Seneca Epist. 113.23 (= SVF 1. 525 ) 
23 Cf. p.91-4 and n.54 in ch. 3 
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The evidence gathered above offers a brief indication of the emergence of the concept 
of pneuma in early Stoicism. It is clear that Zeno had not elaborated the theory of 
pneuma to be integrated with wider Stoic theory and it remains to be seen if he was 
able to offer a physical account of things like thought and action which would later be 
incorporated into the more elaborate pneumatic theory of his successors. Whilst Zeno 
was keen to use pneuma to establish the corporeal nature of the soul. Cleanthes 
adopted the concept of pneuma for his theory of action and to designate god and the 
deity’s corporeal pervasion throughout the cosmos. What is perhaps most important 
to take away from this collection of evidence is that we have no indication of pneuma’s 
peculiar motion, which is described as moving in towards the hegemonikon and out 
away from it, for these early heads.  Cleanthes made a firm step in this direction with 
his theory of walking but there is no clear evidence that he elaborated a theory of 
pneuma which was interactive between the internal motions of individuals and their 
contact with the external world. An understanding of how these early Stoics may have 
conceived of this interaction between the individual and the whole will require a 
diversion into Stoic cosmology. The next chapter will lay this groundwork for what 
follows.  
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3. Pervading Fire and the Cosmic Hegemonikon 
Introduction 
Ἐκπύρωσις is a central physical phenomenon in the Stoic world view. It not only is a 
pre-requisite for the innovative physics of the Stoics but it also has wider theoretical 
and practical applications in Stoic philosophy. The difficulty to comprehend what is 
happening at conflagration has repercussions on our understanding of Stoic views 
regarding their principles and incorporeals, their theory of knowledge and even their 
understanding of virtue and its attainment. The reason for this is primarily because it 
is in their theory of conflagration that we gain glimpses into the most contradictory 
aspects of their philosophical system; for it is there, where the hegemonikon of the 
universe is based, where we can gain a deeper understanding of the Stoic concept of 
pneuma and the processes involved in its motion, which leads to the manifest world 
order (diakosmêsis) and consequently details the drive and leading part of that motion. 
It seems clear to me that many of the contradictions that arise in the recondite extant 
evidence have to do with the conflation of notions which, arguably, were not fully 
articulated by the Stoic founder or even perhaps his immediate disciples, but which 
are crucial distinctions to make in order to comprehend the source of the difficulty. 
The requisite distinction is evidenced in our sources both explicitly and implicitly and 
the problem can be described as follows: in what way does the hegemonikon differ from 
the pneuma and what is the relation between the two? This chapter is an exploratory 
venture into not only the evidence that involves this conflation but also into the 
problems which derive from both the conflation and the distinction for the Stoics 
themselves. 
Intellectual Underpinnings 
Stoic cosmology dramatically differs from the Platonic and Aristotelian world views 
in significant ways, making it difficult to penetrate the polemical reports of the extant 
evidence but also exposing something of the way in which the Stoics attempted to 
combat the prevailing views and render their cosmic theory systematic and coherent 
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with reality more broadly and with their philosophy more specifically. Since many of 
our sources on Stoic cosmology come down to us from commentators, thinkers or 
doxographers who have an Aristotelian or Platonic bent, and since our own 
comprehension of philosophy during this period is a priori coloured by these views, 
the reconstruction that takes place is often susceptible to interpretations which 
presuppose notions which the Stoics had already dismissed or altered when setting 
up their system.1 That is to say, it is easy to fall into the trap of measuring Stoic 
doctrines by their capacity for standing their ground in relation to other schools and 
not examined relative to their own claims for coherency within the Stoic system of 
philosophy itself; thus the Stoic arguments are often valued according to criteria 
which are externally applied but which they themselves reject. It seems to me that 
these difficulties make it necessary to enumerate the fundamental features of Stoic 
cosmology which markedly differ from Aristotle and Plato at the outset in order to 
avoid this ‘trap’ and focus on the problems which the Stoics themselves have to face 
according to their own claim for coherency and based on their own principles. The 
purpose here is not to give a detailed analysis of the intellectual heritage the Stoics 
had access to but rather to bring into relief aspects of Stoic cosmology which 
distinguished them from Plato and Aristotle. 
Platonic cosmology describes a uni-directional eternality from an initial starting point 
or creation of the cosmos, that is to say that whilst the cosmos has a starting point it 
has no end point.2 Aristotle, reacting against this, claims that eternality must be infinite 
                                                            
1 Though Plato and Aristotle clearly provided strong stimuli to the development of Stoic thought, the 
Stoics were largely innovators, breaking free from philosophical conventions. There are many 
theoretical examples of this but it was also common knowledge at the time that Stoic philosophy was 
new; this is well brought out by a biographical element on record that the comic poets tried to ridicule 
Zeno but ended up praising him as with Philemon in his play Philosophers: “This man adopts a new 
philosophy. He teaches to go hungry, yet he gets disciples.” D.L. 7.27.  
2 For Plato’s discussion of this see the Timaeus and also David N. Sedley, Creationism and Its Critics in 
Antiquity (Berkeley (Calif.): University of California Pr., 2007), 98–113. As is often the case Plato’s view 
is far more complex than a simple initial creation out of nothing. Plato was only a creationist with 
regards to the physical world. But if the Stoics read the Timaeus literally, as many later thinkers were 
apt to do, including Aristotle (De caelo. 1.280a30), then Plato can appositely be interpreted as a 
creationist. 
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on both ends and removes genesis altogether.3 Here we have the first differentiating 
feature of Stoic cosmology; for they argue (it can be said somewhat paradoxically) that 
though the cosmos is eternal, it simultaneously is born and dies. Eternality, for the 
Stoics, then, derives not from an ethical understanding of divinity or of geometric 
circular perfection of celestial phenomena but instead from the integrative aesthetic 
requirement of coherency between whole and part and that even divinity must follow 
physical laws of creation and destruction. Thus the eternal is found not in something 
inherently and objectively fixed but rather in the process of death and re-birth.  
This leads onto the second feature of differentiation in that the cosmos is seen by the 
Stoics to be a living organism. In this way not only is it presupposed that the world is 
not eternal in itself but it is physically determined to be such that it is; for a living 
organism whilst being born must also, inevitably, die.4 As such any value structures 
which are imposed onto the nature of god must take this point into account as we shall 
see later. The final significant differentiating feature which I will be taking into 
account, is probably the most problematic for the Stoics; this is the bridge between the 
death and re-birth of the cosmos, the ἐκπύρωσις. When the cosmos dies it is 
‘destroyed’ by fire and when the cosmos is born again it is ‘created’ by this same fire. 
Do the Stoics therefore ascribe eternality to process or to fire or to both? If to fire then 
they are required to uphold an ethical perspective of god, similar to that of Plato and 
Aristotle wherein greater value is conferred on that which best withstands the ravages 
of time; if to process then their theory is more mechanical and physically based and 
they can avoid charges of an inhuman god whose providence conflicts with the evils 
                                                            
3 Aristotle took his refutations of creationism to be one of his greatest achievements and innovations to 
vulgate cosmological speculation (De caelo 279b4-280a33). The three views: (i) of a created but 
imperishable world (Plato); (ii) of an uncreated imperishable world (Aristotle) and (iii) of a created and 
perishable world (Stoics) are also presented in Philo De aeternitate mundi 7. For Philo’s presentation 
methods which are systematic rather than historical see Jaap Mansfeld, “Philosophy in the Service of 
Scripture: Philo’s Exegetical Strategies,” in The Question of Eclecticism : Studies in Later Greek Philosophy, 
ed. John M. Dillon and A. A. Long (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 78–79. 
4 Whilst the cosmos may be a living organism for Plato he also posits an eternal intelligible world, 
which, importantly, the Stoics deny.  
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that are manifest in a deterministic universe; if to both then we need a clarification as 
to how the one differs from the other and whether the process (cosmic cycle) is also 
god or separate from him, in which case we have to posit two eternal things in the 
cosmos. This tripartite distinction is used here for analytic purposes and it must be 
said that the Stoics do not make such clear-cut distinctions in their cosmology. 
Nevertheless, it will become clear that the early heads of the school placed different 
emphases based upon one of the three options enumerated. In what follows I aim to 
show that their primary concern is to show the unity of, or harmony between, god and 
cosmos, a concern which is directly correlated with the uniqueness of their 
cosmological theories and is why I consider it important to emphasise their 
differentiation from Aristotle and Plato rather than indicating any appropriation of 
ideas. Any changes to doctrine within the school will be shown to be incidental to their 
concern for internal harmonisation of theories. 
Methodological considerations 
The underlying premise which guides the Stoic study of the natural world is that there 
is a natural correspondence between the microcosm and the macrocosm. There have 
been many suggestions regarding the origins for, or influences on, this substratum of 
Stoic thought which have been dealt with elsewhere5 and which will be left out of the 
following line of discussion so as to avoid divergence from the topic at hand. What is 
of concern here is the consequence of this substratum more broadly for the Stoic 
system. Methodologically for Stoicism the character of their microcosm-macrocosm 
connection leads to two possible approaches for the study of the natural world (i) from 
a study of nature per se6 and (ii) from discovering truths about ourselves and 
extrapolating those onto nature. Another way of looking at this is that the study takes 
place from the part to the whole vis-à-vis the relation of the individual to the cosmos 
and vice versa. Effectively this leaves the Stoics always with a dual way of 
                                                            
5 For oriental origins see Verbeke, L’évolution de La Doctrine Du Pneuma n. 101; for pre-Socratic origins 
see Hahm, The Origins of Stoic Cosmology. 
6 Plutarch makes reference to the “strictly physical assertions” of the Stoics (De comm. not. 1077 A-C). 
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understanding the natural world, for each examination necessarily presupposes or 
implicates the other. That is to say that no study of the natural world can be complete 
without an understanding of the individual nature and likewise no study of 
individual nature can be complete without an understanding of the nature of the 
whole. The extant evidence is honeycombed with sources of such a dual character 
which are difficult to understand not only because of their fragmentary nature but 
precisely because the information that comes down to us comes laden with 
associations which require a background knowledge in more than one field that, 
moreover, presupposes a familiarity with the Stoics binary methodological 
framework.  
The clearest examples of such dual nature sources are ones which formulate 
arguments explicitly applying characteristics of the individual to the whole. These 
arguments are often formulated by analogy from part to whole or from whole to part. 
Moreover, they exist from the earliest stages of the school with some of the extant 
evidence being directly attributed to Zeno.7 
These arguments or assertions are usually made about physical reality extrapolated 
from an understanding of the individual and human psychology. So the types of 
arguments that predominate in the extant evidence are ones like: the cosmos is rational 
because humans are rational or the individual has heat and a soul which animates it 
and so too must the cosmos, making it a living organism. Using such sources which 
make the microcosm-macrocosm connection explicit, scholars have bolstered a claim 
that the Stoic study of nature emerges from the ground up, such that the whole is 
understood through the part and not the other way around. This view is supported 
by the natural, if mistaken, intuition that the particular brand of materialism adopted 
                                                            
7 Some examples are to be found at 1077D-E (= SVF 2. 1064) [Zeno]; Cicero ND 2.23 (= LS 47 C) 
[Cleanthes]; de comm. not 1077 D-E (= SVF 2. 1064) [Chrysippus]. For Stoics in general (probably 
Chrysippus) cf. Sextus M 9. 78 (= SVF 2. 1013); Plutarch Stoic. Repug. 1049F-1050B and 1055 C. 
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by the Stoics is compatible with thinking that their system is belligerent towards 
metaphysical thinking.8 
It is an interpretation that follows this line of thinking that is adopted by Verbeke in 
his seminal study of Stoic pneumatology and it has been hugely influential in 
subsequent literature. Early on in his study he frames the position succinctly: 
“cosmological considerations are not, like those of Ionian naturalists, at the origin of 
the Stoic system, but rather psychological doctrines, if at least the term is given a rather 
broad meaning to embrace all that relates to the explanation of life.”9 The advantage 
of this vulgate view is that our task for interpreting Stoic fragments is made easier in 
that we can easily give precedence to Stoic ethics and avoid much of the difficulty of 
reconstructing their physics and even effectively ignore the relevance of physics to 
Stoic ethics by maintaining that the path between the two is mainly uni-directional. 
This then becomes a philosophy where only our internal judgments about things are 
of service to our understanding. It is a view which implies that all truth exists in us 
because we are a reflection of the whole, but it is unbalanced because of the disregard 
for the questions that are asked of the whole which we are a reflection of. With this 
oversight we not only neglect large swathes of evidence which implicate the double-
turning methodology argued for above but, more importantly, we make it far more 
difficult to interpret many of our other sources which are often brooded over for their 
complexity or otherwise dismissed on the grounds that the original meaning and 
utility have been lost through the polemical agendas of the commentators on Stoic 
                                                            
8 For recent attacks on this “intuition” cf. D. T. J. Bailey, “The Structure of Stoic Metaphysics,” in Oxford 
Studies in Ancient Philosophy, ed. Brad Inwood, vol. 46 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 253–309; 
Katja Maria Vogt, “Sons of the Earth: Are the Stoics Metaphysical Brutes?,” Phronesis 54, no. 2 (2009): 
136–54. Cf. also Jean-Baptiste Gourinat, “The Stoics on Matter and Prime Matter: ‘Corporealism’ and 
the Imprint of Plato’s Timaeus,” in God and Cosmos in Stoicism, ed. Ricardo Salles (Oxford ; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), 46–70, who specifically rejects the idea that the Stoics are materialists 
as it does not fulfil two criteria of materialism: first their system is not materially monistic (it only 
appears so because the two principles are blended to form a unified body) and second the ‘inferior 
reality’ does not account for the ‘superior reality’. Already through Gourinat’s conclusions there 
emerges a delineation of the underlying methodological premise that I argue for above when 
approaching Stoic sources. 
9 Verbeke, L’évolution de La Doctrine Du Pneuma, 16 (my translation) 
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theory.  These “obscure” sources become far more accessible to us if we recognise the 
prevailing methodology adopted by the Stoics and introduce knowledge from other 
fields in Stoicism in order to understand Stoic sources which are otherwise 
convoluted, complex and confusing.10 As such, emphasis must be placed on 
abandoning the one-sided (asymmetrical, overbalanced) approach of interpreting 
Stoic sources through the narrow lens of what I have called from the part to the whole. 
In addition it is significant to note that the physical part of philosophy is constituted 
by two stages beginning with a study of the natural world and ending with theology; 
the paedagogical transmission of this latter part has been called “initiation in the 
mysteries”.11 The prevailing trend in the modern literature is to study Stoic 
cosmogony from the aspect of either one or the other of these two approaches: the 
physical or the theological. In studies of Stoic cosmogony the former approach is 
concerned mainly with the stratification of the elements and how they arrive at their 
respective locations,12 whilst the latter approach is concerned primarily with 
considerations of the Providence of god and his benevolent nature regarding the 
diakosmesis and destruction of the world.13 The bifurcate approach of the modern 
literature corresponds in some way to Stoic paedagogical methods which suggests 
                                                            
10 A similar strategy is taken up by Jaap Mansfeld in his paper “Providence and the Destruction of the 
Universe in Early Stoic Thought, with Some Remarks on the Mysteries of Philosophy,” in Studies in 
Hellenistic Religions (Brill, 1979), 129–88, where he appeals to ethical and theological arguments in 
response to Lapidge’s purely physical approach in his paper “Ἀρχαί and Στοιχεῖα”. It is made clear 
that physical doctrine can be informed and elucidated by ethical doctrine but we are obliged to concede 
that this methodology is also functional in the opposite direction from physics to ethics. 
11 Plutarch Stoic. Repug. 1035 A-B cf. also SVF 2. 1008 
12 Lapidge, “Ἀρχαί and Στοιχεῖα”; John M. Cooper, “Chrysippus on the Physical Elements,” in God and 
Cosmos in Stoicism, ed. Ricardo Salles (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 93–117; 
Ricardo Salles, “Chrysippus on Conflagration and the Indestructibility of the Cosmos,” in God and 
Cosmos in Stoicism, ed. Ricardo Salles (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 119–34; 
Furley, “Cosmology”; Michael Wolff, “Hipparchus and the Stoic Theory of Motion,” in Matter and 
Metaphysics : Fourth Symposium Hellenisticum, ed. Jonathan Barnes and Mario Mignucci ([Napoli]: 
Bibliopolis, 1988), 471–545; Hahm, The Origins of Stoic Cosmology. 
13 Mansfeld, “Providence and the Destruction of the Universe in Early Stoic Thought, with Some 
Remarks on the Mysteries of Philosophy”; Michael Frede, “La Théologie Stoïcienne,” in Les Stoïciens, 
ed. Gilbert Romeyer Dherbey and Jean-Baptiste Gourinat (Paris: Vrin, 2005), 213–32; Ricardo Salles, 
“᾽Εκπύρωσις and the Goodness of God in Cleanthes,” Phronesis 50, no. 1 (2005): 56–78. 
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studying physics before theology and yet the progression from one to the other - the 
bridge that connects the two - is largely neglected. 
By taking a doctrine of the Stoics that plays a significant role both on the macrocosmic 
and also on the microcosmic level, then, we may begin to get an inkling as to how to 
bridge the apparent gap between the theological (or providential) and the physical (or 
elemental) approach to Stoic cosmology. The initiatory process which involves an 
understanding of physics before moving on to theology probably consisted in 
grasping how the individual or (the part) is similar to god (or the whole).14 As 
mentioned above, to my mind the fundamental physical difficulty from which a great 
many Stoicorum repugnantia may be said to derive has to do with what appears to be a 
difficulty in the extant evidence regarding the relation between the πνεῦμα and the 
ἡγεμονικόν. The next section attempts to clarify some ways in which the connection 
between these two is conceived of by the early heads of the school.  
 
Locating the Cosmic Hegemonikon 
The hegemonikon has a definite location in the universe. In a passage in Diogenes 
Laertius (7.139) describing the three ways in which the cosmos is referred to by the 
Stoics, Diogenes lists the differing ways in which the hegemonikon of the cosmos is 
understood by various Stoics. We are told that whilst Cleanthes names the sun as the 
ruling part of the cosmos, Chrysippus in the first book of his On Providence says that 
heaven (οὐρανός) is the hegemonikon. Posidonius in his book On the Gods follows the 
same lines as Chrysippus naming heaven as the ruling part. Antipater of Tyre, who 
chronologically antedates Posidonius but postdates Chrysippus, names the aether as 
leading part. From a separate piece of evidence recovered by Mansfeld it seems 
                                                            
14 The similarity of the part to the whole and the sensation or perception of this is implied in a passage 
from Plutarch. In reporting Chrysippean doctrine he says that it is a natural consequence of their belief 
that our virtue is neither greater nor lesser than the virtue of god, that the sensation of congeniality 
(αἴσθησις τοῦ οἰκείου) exists within us (Stoic. Repug. 1038 C-D) 
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plausible that Zeno of Citium like Cleanthes considered the sun to be the ruling part 
also15. However, later we shall see that there were some Stoics who, strangely, posited 
the earth as the hegemonikon. 
From the above quoted texts, we have what appear to be three different locations for 
the hegemonikon ascribed to different heads of the school. It is possible that there was 
disagreement in the school and that these locations were changed as a response to 
polemics from other schools of thought. Yet, these disputes have not been traced 
anywhere and such a view would also imply that the Stoics readily changed their 
doctrines whenever encountering any resistance to their theories. It seems to me far 
more plausible to adopt the presupposition that the differences denote a developing 
and refining of pre-existing doctrines, as is also quite common in the Stoic literature 
more generally. Indeed, if we explore the context of the Diogenes Laertius text more 
closely, we see that in the immediately preceding passage, referring to the elements 
and their locations, he says: “Fire has the uppermost place, it is also called aether, and 
in it the sphere of the fixed stars is first created.” If we understand the sphere of the 
fixed stars as denoting heaven then we see that, in terms of location, heaven and aether 
may be equated. In addition to this, we may note that Chrysippus himself is likely to 
have thought of these as equivalent for although he locates the hegemonikon in the 
heaven, we are told that later on in the same work (On Providence) he offers a more 
nuanced description of the hegemonikon as the purest part of aether (D.L. 7.139). The 
only discrepancy that should be considered, therefore, is with the earliest heads of the 
school, Zeno and Cleanthes, who both seem to posit the sun as the ruling part. Our 
knowledge of Zeno’s physical speculations is scanty and indeed it is only by 
Mansfeld’s a fortuitous stumbling across a new piece of evidence that we can even 
                                                            
15 Alexander of Lycopolis Contra Manichaeorum opiniones disputatio ch. XII, p.19,2 f. Br (Not in SVF = LS 
46 I); cf. P. W. van der Horst and J. Mansfeld, An Alexandrian Platonist against Dualism. Alexander of 
Lycopolis’ Treatise « Critique of the Doctrines of Manichaeus » (Leiden: Brill, 1974), 74 n. 293-296; also 
Mansfeld, “Providence and the Destruction of the Universe in Early Stoic Thought, with Some Remarks 
on the Mysteries of Philosophy,” 154; cf. also Plutarch De comm. not. (= SVF 1.510 = LS 46L) where 
Cleanthes is said to have the sun assimilate the moon and all the stars at ἐκπύρωσις. 
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argue that Cleanthes most likely followed Zeno in understanding the sun as the 
hegemonikon. But why would later Stoics, starting from Chrysippus, alter this original 
doctrine from the founder of the school? There is no ready answer to this problem 
and, to my knowledge, it has been utterly neglected in contemporary literature. The 
sun is clearly a more precise location for the hegemonikon, so it may be rather odd that 
the development was to make its location vaguer, broader or even perhaps obscure 
by positing the aether in the heavens. This is a complex and composite issue and 
requires several diversions into wider Stoic cosmological theory.  
In practically all the surviving evidence the hegemonikon is reported to be the source 
from which all motion derives. This is true on both a cosmic and an individual level. 
Our understanding of this is partly informed by Stoic embryology. Galen reports that 
in the formation of the foetus “the heart is that which is generated before anything 
else” (De Foet Form. 4.698, 2-9; = SVF 2.761, LS 53 D) and Calcidius notes that the parts 
of the soul “flow from their seat in the heart, as if from the source of a spring, and 
spread through the whole body” (Calcidius 220 = SVF 2.879, LS 53G). The parts of the 
soul which Calcidius reports here must be the standard seven parts of the soul which 
the Stoics are known to have posited. These are outlined in an Aëtius passage which 
supports the wider context of Calcidius by describing the parts of the soul as growing 
and stretching out from the hegemonikon (4.21. 1-4 = SVF 2.836, LS 53H), which in Stoic 
tradition is placed in the heart.16 In numerous sources we discover how this stretching 
out takes place. It is described as a dual action motion which moves simultaneously 
inwards and outwards (Nemesius 70,6 -71,4 = not in SVF, LS 47 J) or, as Alexander of 
Aphrodisias describes, this simultaneous motion that occurs in bodies happens to be 
“out of itself and into itself” (Alexander de mixt. 224, 23-6 = SVF 2.442, LS 47 I). These 
sources suggest that the location from which this dual motion takes place not only is 
                                                            
16 But for one recorded exception Diogenes of Babylon who placed the commanding faculty in the head 
(Philodemus de pietat. 15 = SVF 3 Diogenes 33). Diogenes is known to have been a renegade also 
regarding cosmological theory. Along with Panaetius, his disciple, he is reported to have rejected the 
ἐκπύρωσις and eternal recurrence doctrines. 
72 
 
the hegemonikon but is also centrally positioned; for it stretches out (we assume in all 
directions) and returns to where it came from.  
Indeed, it seems as though this is a problem that Cleanthes, following his master in 
claiming that the sun is the hegemonikon, encountered. Heliocentric models of the 
universe were fairly common in the time of Cleanthes. One of the better known 
instantiations of this view is to be found in the theories of Aristarchus of Samos (310 – 
c. 230 BCE) who was a contemporary of both Zeno and Cleanthes and a disciple of the 
third head of the Lyceum, Strato of Lampsacus (aka “the physicist”), whom he met at 
Alexandria.17 Although Cleanthes claimed the sun was the central power in the 
universe, he nevertheless subscribed to a geocentric view, which also happened to be 
the traditionally accepted view in Hellenic culture from both religious and 
philosophical perspectives.18 We thus hear in his Hymn to Zeus (Stobaeus Ecl. I, 1.12 = 
SVF 1. 537 = LS 54 I) that “All this cosmos, as it spins around the earth, obeys you 
[Zeus]”.  But whilst the whole cosmos spins around the earth, Zeus is the ruling power 
of the cosmos and equated with the sun. This would seem somewhat contradictory 
for whilst the greatest power is given to the sun (otherwise referred to as the 
hegemonikon or Zeus), yet everything revolves around the earth. If this does not seem 
to us to be coherent it appears that Cleanthes did not think that, for it is clear that he 
was also familiar with the heliocentric models and is even known to have attacked 
Aristarchus’ views. Indeed it was not an idle attack but a more detailed and in depth 
refutation as is evidenced from the fact that he dedicated a whole book to responding 
to Aristarchus (Πρὸς Ἀρίσταρχον; D.L. 7. 174). In fact, rather than Cleanthes simply 
accusing and refuting Aristarchus, his book was most likely a response to Aristarchus 
who directly accused Cleanthes of being a bad Stoic who did not accept the 
                                                            
17 Aëtius 1.15.5 = Stob. Ecl. 1.16.1; for Strato’s stint in Alexandria cf. Robert W. Sharples, “Strato of 
Lampsacus: The Sources, Texts and Translations,” in Strato of Lampsacus : Text, Translation, and 
Discussion, ed. Marie-Laurence Desclos and William W. Fortenbaugh (New Brunswick (N.J.): 
Transaction Publ., 2011), 14–16. 
18 Thomas Bénatouïl, “Cléanthe contre Aristarque : stoïcisme et astronomie à l’époque hellénistique,” 
Archives de Philosophie 68, no. 5 (2005): esp. 208 & n.7. 
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consequences of his own principles, that is to say that Cleanthes should in fact be a 
heliocentrist like Aristarchus.19  
It could be that Cleanthes response to Aristarchus was largely ignored by the 
doxographers who preferred to record some aspects which distinguished one Stoic 
from the next or else chose to report the more provocative or apparently contradictory 
views and so if Cleanthes ultimately refined his theory of the sun as the hegemonikon 
and the earth at the centre, these developments were simply not transmitted for the 
above reasons. This cannot be known. There are numerous sources for early Stoic 
doctrine which speak of a movement of all bodies and elements towards a centre and 
in some of these the earth is explicitly reported as being found at the centre.20 Of all 
the sources where we have a geocentric perspective attached to the Stoics, Cleanthes’ 
Hymn is the only explicit extant evidence in which a geocentric doctrine can be 
ascribed specifically to him.21 There are numerous sources from early Stoic doctrine 
which speak of a movement of all bodies and elements towards a centre and in some 
of these the earth is explicitly reported as being found at that centre. What is notable 
in all the evidence is that very little has survived regarding the planetary motions 
                                                            
19 In the modern literature on Stoic theory there has been, so far as I know, no recognition of this initial 
attack from Aristarchus; see for instance the paper by Bénatouïl dedicated to this very topic (n.17). The 
reason for this is that the manuscript as it has been transmitted down to us reads as follows: « ὦ τάν, 
μὴ κρίσιν ἡμῖν ἀσεβείας ἐπαγγείλῃς, ὥσπερ Ἀρίσταρχον ᾤετο δεῖν Κλεάνθης τὸν Σάμιον ἀσεβείας 
προσκαλεῖσθαι τοὺς Ἕλληνας ὡς κινοῦντα τοῦ κόσμου τὴν ἑστίαν ὅτι <τὰ> φαινόμενα σῳζειν 
ἁνὴρ ἐπειρᾶτο μένειν τὸν οὐρανὸν ὑποτιθέμενος ἐξελίττεσθαι δὲ κατὰ λοξοῦ κύκλου τὴν γῆν ἅμα 
καὶ περὶ τὸν αὑτῆς ἄξονα δινουμένην. » (Plutarch de facie lun. 923A). The accusation of impiety being 
levelled against Aristarchus by Cleanthes is probably backwards. This is persuasively shown by two 
Italian scholars who traced the transmission of the Plutarch manuscript on which the canonical 
“modernized” version has been based. They show that the passage in question was altered by a 17th 
century French scholar who, most likely influenced by the prosecutions of Galileo and Giordano Bruno, 
emended an accusative for a nominative and vice versa. This emendation changes the meaning such 
that it would have been Aristarchus who ridiculed Cleanthes for being an impious Stoic who insisted 
on a geocentric model whilst making the sun the hearth (hestia) of the universe. For more on this story 
along with the manuscript alterations cf. Lucio Russo and Silvio M. Medaglia, “Sulla Presunta Accusa 
Di Empietà Ad Aristarco Di Samo,” Quaderni Urbinati Di Cultura Classica 53, no. 2 (1996): 113–21. 
20 See the excellent discussion by Lapidge, “Ἀρχαί and Στοιχεῖα,” 255–57. on the confusion created by 
these sources. 
21 The evidence is charted in Germaine Aujac, “Stoïcisme et Hypothèse Géocentrique,” Aufsteig Und 
Niedergang Der Römischen Welt 2, no. 36 (1989): 1430–53. 
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relative to this debate; instead the evidence indicates that these motions were 
described in reference to the elements and Stoic elemental theory, such that the earth 
at the centre refers not to our world but to the element ‘earth’. Although it is not 
possible to know for certain it is likely that Cleanthes was a heliocratic cosmologist 
whilst at the same time supporting a geocentric perspective. 
The hegemonikon being found at the periphery of the universe, in the celestial sphere, 
indicates a breakdown of the analogy between whole and part. If we proceed on the 
presupposition that Stoic cosmology is extrapolated from Stoic psychology, as is often 
the case, then we would expect to discover that the hegemonikon of the cosmos is to be 
found at its centre following the fact that the hegemonikon in humans is centrally 
located in the chest, but this is clearly not the case. This discrepancy has, as far as I 
know, been wholly neglected in the modern literature,22 possibly because it does not 
sit well with the prevalent methodological presupposition that the Stoics formulated 
their cosmology from their psychology and not the other way around or 
independently from it. The discrepancy is easy to overlook. In Lapidge’s excellent 
study, for instance, he does not give due attention to the problem of the hegemonikon’s 
location, thus neglecting Cleanthes’ heliocratic geocentricism and even rejecting 
perfectly reliable sources on account of not being “Stoic” enough, whilst failing to 
adduce at least two further pieces of evidence which confirm the doctrine.23 I think 
this “faulty” evidence may be rehabilitated into the story by appreciating that the early 
                                                            
22 With the exception of one German scholar in the late 19th century Ludwig Stein, Die Psychologie Der 
Stoa (Berlin: Verlag von S. Calvary & Co, 1886), 211. 
23 Lapidge, “Ἀρχαί and Στοιχεῖα,” 267–68 n.146. The sources he rejects for Stoic cosmogony are Aetius 
2.6.1 (= SVF 2.582) and SVF 1.495 (Hermias). Lapidge also fails to adduce two other pieces of evidence 
for the same doctrine being attributed to the Stoics in Eusebius Praep. 15. 15 and Stobaeus I, 21. 6ε 
[Archedemus], both of which are quoted below. For the sake of comprehensiveness it is worth also 
recording Philo de aet. mundi 109-111 “The uphill journey begins from earth. Earth is transformed by 
melting into water, water by evaporation into air, air by rarefaction into fire. The downhill path leads 
from the top, the fire as it is extinguished subsides into air; air as it is compressed subsides into water, 
while water is condensed as it changes to into earth”. This text goes hand in hand with another one 
(SVF 2. 413 [Arius Didymus]), which Lapidge in the same note finds “confusing”. The Hermias text 
(SVF 1.495) he refers to should more correctly be related to these latter sources, rather than the earlier 
ones, as it also refers to the transmutation of the elements into each other. 
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Stoic account was itself faulty, in so far as it was open to the attack of incoherence. The 
incoherence lies both in positing that, whilst everything gravitates around earth at the 
centre, the hegemonikon is in some way displaced at the periphery, and also in the fact 
that this dislodges the harmonious symmetry between the whole and the part, the 
cosmic and the psychological.  
As it seems to me, the evidence can only be rehabilitated if we presuppose that, for 
the Stoics, coherency of doctrine was in many respects methodologically more 
important than specific aspects of doctrine. Thus in an extract from Arius Didymus 
preserved in Eusebius we are told that certain unnamed Stoics held a radically 
different view than Zeno, Cleanthes and Chrysippus in that they “thought that the 
earth was the hegemonikon.”24 Aëtius confirms that was a Stoic view, adding that “the 
generation of the world started from the earth, as from a centre, and the starting point 
of a sphere is the centre.”25 We also discover a more precise attribution of this doctrine 
to the Stoic Archedemus of whom it is explicitly said that “the hegemonikon of the 
cosmos is found in the earth”.26 It is more than likely that the Stoics who made the 
earth into the hegemonikon of the cosmos were attempting to defend the Stoic system 
against attacks on its apparent lack of coherence. This need not necessarily mean that 
they abandoned the doctrine that fire is that out of which everything derives but 
merely that they were responding to attacks on the location of the hegemonikon and not 
its composition. So whilst fire is lifted up to the stratosphere early on in the world 
cycle, it gradually returns to the centre, such that, by the end of the cycle, the centre 
has been converted fully back into its fiery state. Arguably this account fits in better 
with the numerous sources which describe how everything, even fire, has a centripetal 
motion, with all the elements being pulled, as it were, towards the centre. In this way 
they would have a theory of the hegemonikon which equated it also with a force in the 
universe which was so powerful that it pulled everything towards it. The focus of this 
                                                            
24 Eusebius Praep. 15.15 
25 Stobaeus I, 21. 3β (= SVF 2.582) 
26 Stobaeus I, 21. 6ε 
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account is on hegemonikon as force rather than as substance, which also connects it to 
the active rather than the passive principle. The appeal to the integrity of the system 
of locating the hegemonikon centrally in the cosmos is clear, especially if, as we have 
seen with Cleanthes, that integrity was coming under attack. Altering the 
hegemonikon’s location was an easy and arguably even effective solution. 
Nevertheless, the first three heads of the school seemed to think it was important that 
the location and composition of the hegemonikon should coincide. Indeed, if we were 
to try to discover a weakness in the account which locates the hegemonikon at the 
central earth it would be this: that, since the focus is not on the composition or 
substance of the hegemonikon, but rather on its force, Stoics like Archedemus may have 
made the hegemonikon of the cosmos into an incorporeal in an attempt to avoid some 
of the difficulties of the strictly physical account that Zeno had set out in formulating 
his philosophy. This may account for the two antithetical views we have in our 
evidence about the principles as incorporeal (following the Suda) and corporeal 
(following the manuscripts of Diogenes Laertius).27 That is to say that the Suda and 
Diogenes Laertius respectively may have been referring to two different schools of 
thought within Stoicism, possibly with Archedemus heading the Stoics who preferred 
the principles to be incorporeal. This not unlikely possibility has the advantage in 
accepting both sources as reliable for different Stoics rather than claiming that one or 
the other is wrong for all Stoics in general. For the first three heads of the school, 
however, the principles were certainly corporeal. With regards to the analogically 
symmetrical relationship between whole and part, their insistence on the 
hegemonikon’s location at the periphery of the cosmos need not necessarily cause them 
                                                            
27 It is generally accepted in recent literature that the principles are corporeal, following the Diogenes 
Laertius manuscript 7. 134 and rejecting the Suda reading of ἀσωμάτους, cf. Gourinat, “The Stoics on 
Matter and Prime Matter: ‘Corporealism’ and the Imprint of Plato’s Timaeus,” 55, for a good 
background account into why the principles should be seen as corporeal for the Stoics in general. In the 
past this was widely disputed with numerous scholars having supported the Suda text e.g (implicitly) 
F. H. Sandbach, The Stoics (New York: Norton, 1975), 73–74; R. B. Todd, “Monism and Immanence: The 
Foundations of Stoic Physics,” in The Stoics, ed. J. M. Rist (Univ. of California Pr., 1978), 139–43 etc.  
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too much trouble because it may be noted that such symmetry does not exist either 
when they speak of the hegemonikon of lower organisms like plants whose hegemonikon 
was said to be found in their roots (i.e. also not centrally).28 The cosmos is clearly far 
superior to the individual, just as a rational animal is superior to a plant; differences 
are to be expected in this hierarchy and the location of the hegemonikon is one of these. 
The larger problem is the fact that the earth appears to be the strongest force in the 
cosmos because everything is in a way guided towards it. The result of focusing 
instead on the substance of the hegemonikon in determining its location is that these 
earlier heads must have considered its guiding power in a different way than viewing 
it as a centripetal force. More than this, though, they must have accounted for its 
integration with the Stoic system also, an integration which may have been neglected 
by later Stoics such as Archedemus after the onslaught of criticisms that the original 
account received.   
Increasing Fire? 
It will be possible to form a more integrated understanding if we have a clearer grasp 
of the role of fire in Stoic cosmology. It is well known that for the Stoics the cosmic fire 
that constitutes the hegemonikon and is located at the periphery of the cosmos is said 
to also be, or represent, the reason which pervades the cosmos. This fiery stuff forms 
a continuum allowing for no gaps or empty spaces to exist between the multiplicity of 
bodies, for it pervades every part of the cosmos and plays a decisive role in the unity 
and coherence that exists therein. It is also recorded in numerous places that the 
cosmic soul is analogous to the individual soul as for example in Plutarch:  
“Chrysippus asserts that Zeus, that is the universe, is like the human being and his 
providence is like its soul”.29 It would seem that once again this analogy is not as water 
tight as we might expect when it comes to describing the presence of fire in cosmic 
                                                            
28 Cicero ND 2.29 (= LS 47C) 
29 Plutarch De comm. not. 1077D-E (= SVF 2. 1064) 
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and individual souls. Cleanthes described how this vitalising principle is present in 
the individual and that its departure invariably leads to death: 
 
For everything which is hot and fiery is roused and activated by its 
own movement; but a thing which is nourished and grows has a 
definite and regular movement; as long as this remains in us, so long 
sensation and life remain, but when the heat has been chilled and 
extinguished, we ourselves die and are extinguished.30 
 
We should suppose that the death of the cosmos would involve a similar chilling as it 
ages, with a gradual relaxation of its fiery tension. It is easy to suppose that, being a 
living organism with a limited life cycle, the cosmos will die as it runs out of vitalising 
heat and fire and that conflagration occurs due to this gradual depletion of the 
vitalising principle within it. In his work on the Obsolescence of Oracles Plutarch records 
(411 C) that there existed a debate in antiquity about whether fire burns better when 
it is cold or hot outside; it would be plausible to place the Stoics on the side of the 
debate that views fire burning hottest when it is coldest outside, since in their physics 
fire is nourished by the colder elements. If the universe is coldest at the end of the 
cycle, then fire will naturally burn hottest, and this is confirmed by their theory of 
conflagration. However, in an interesting paper by Michael Frede the opposite view 
is suggested. He argues primarily from the theological perspective that as the cosmos 
ages it becomes more and more rational. Since Stoic nominalism allows for the 
substance of the cosmos to be called by different names including fire, reason and god, 
Frede’s view naturally involves a cosmos that gets hotter as it ages. As it happens this 
view is better supported in the evidence. And two sources can be adduced which 
explicitly state this Stoic position:31 
                                                            
30 Cicero ND 2.23 
31 Hager, “Chrysippus’ Theory of Pneuma,” 107, without too much explanation asserts that tension is 
at zero during conflagration and at maximum just before it i.e. it gradually increases during the cosmic 
cycle. “Third, if this account of Chrysippus is correct, it helps explain the significance of the dissolution 
of the universe into fire (ekpyrosis), signalling the end of one cycle and the start of another. The cycle 
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Zeus goes on growing until he has assimilated all things to himself, 
for, since death is the separation of soul from body, whereas the Soul 
of the cosmos not only is not separated, but continually (συνεχῶς) 
goes on growing (αὔξεται) until it has completely absorbed into itself 
the matter (ὕλην), it should not be affirmed that the cosmos dies.32 
The common reason having advanced so far, and a common nature 
having become greater (μείζων) and fuller (πλείων), and having at 
last dried up (ἀναξηράνασα) all things and absorbed (ἀναλαβοῦσα) 
them into itself, finds itself in the universal substance, having gone 
back to the condition first mentioned and to that resurrection which 
makes the Great Year, in which takes place the restitution 
(ἀποκατάστασις) from itself alone to itself again.33 
Nevertheless, Keimpe Algra has disputed the position of any increase in rationality 
for the Stoics in general both during conflagration and also for different stages of the 
cycle.34 He does not delve much deeper into this topic but there is another source 
which suggests that, contrary to the above sources, there is neither increase nor 
decrease of the substance of fire in the cosmos. This evidence has been largely 
neglected in studies of Stoic cosmogony, perhaps because of its absence from 
sourcebook translations. The position is recorded in the doxographical reports of 
Stobaeus (one of our most reliable sources) and comes in the common form of a 
definition describing the essential characteristics of the substance of the cosmos: 
According to Zeno, the substance (οὐσία) is the prime matter (ὕλη) of 
all existing things; this is wholly eternal and neither does it increase 
                                                            
starts with pneuma uniformly inter- penetrating hyle, the interpenetration becomes non-uniform as the 
cycle proceeds and returns to uniformity at ekpyrosis. In thermodynamic terms, in the pre-cosmic chaos 
the entropy is at a maximum (tension of the pneuma at a minimum). As the cosmos is formed entropy 
decreases (as tension of the pneuma is increased). Finally, ekpyrosis is inevitable, signalling a return to 
maximum entropy (and minimum tension).” It seems as though Hager argues thus because of his view 
that Chrysippus introduced tension; implied in the concept is that the tension can also snap when at 
maximal state i.e. leading to conflagration.  
32 Plut. Stoic. Repug. 1052C (= SVF 2.604) 
33 Eusebius Praep. 15.19 
34 Keimpe A. Algra, “Stoic Philosophical Theology and Graeco-Roman Religion,” in God and Cosmos in 
Stoicism, ed. Ricardo Salles (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 237. 
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(πλείω) nor decrease (ἐλάττω).  Its parts, however, do not remain 
stable (διαμένειν) but are divided (διαιρεῖσθαι) and fused together 
(συγχείσθαι). It is due to this [the substance] that the logos of the all, 
which some call fate, is propagated.35  
This substance which is being referred to exists in different ways which it is important 
to distinguish before further discussion. If we assume that the substance of the 
universe is primal fire then we need not enter into the difficulties regarding the 
separability and inseparability of the principles at this point.36 There appear to be two 
basic phases of the cosmic cycle which are relevant to substance, though we will later 
see, more precisely, that there are three. These two basic phases can be distinguished 
as substance during conflagration and substance during the cosmic cycle, otherwise 
known as the world of coming-to-be and passing away. During conflagration 
substance, equated with primal fire, exists alone. During the cosmic cycle, however, 
primal fire exists inside things as their vitalising and cohesive principle. If we maintain 
that the cosmos undergoes either a gradual chilling or else a gradual desiccation we 
find ourselves in both instances in contradiction with this doctrine of the Stoics which 
is not only attributed to the founder of the school but is prevalent throughout much 
of the early school’s lifetime, for Stobaeus tells us that it was also held by Chrysippus.37 
 
It is possible to avoid this problem by arguing that the definition applies to substance 
solely during the conflagratory phase of the universe and consequently need not be 
predicated of substance during the cosmic cycle. This is ultimately an unsuccessful 
enterprise also, for multiple sources can be adduced which speak of the increase of fire 
during conflagrationand indeed the extra-cosmic void is introduced into Stoic theory 
                                                            
35 Stobaeus Ecl. I, 11. 5α 
36 For a recent analysis of this problem along with a summary of the modern literature cf. Ian Hensley, 
“On the Separability and Inseparability of the Stoic Principles,” Journal of the History of Philosophy, 
Forthcoming. 
37 Stobaeus Ecl. Ι, 10. 16γ 
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primarily to accommodate this expansion of the fiery substance.38  Our records for 
Chrysippus and Posidonius offer a few further details which introduce a possible 
distinction between the increase that is being described during conflagration and the 
cosmic cycle and the type of increase that is being denied of substance: 
Chrysippus says that “prime matter is the substratum with reference 
to quality (ποιότητα): it is eternal and does not undergo either 
increase (αὔξησιν) or decrease (μείωσιν). As far as its parts are 
concerned, it accepts division (διαίρεσιν) and fusion (σύγχυσιν) with 
the result that corruption is developed between some parts and others, 
[this corruption is accomplished] not by division but by analogy 
relative to the fusion of some [parts] which arise from some [other 
parts].”39 
Chrysippus here offers us an additional piece of Stoic doctrine that is useful for 
understanding the type of increase that is being spoken of. We gain an insight into 
what the processes of division and fusion, which Zeno had mentioned, mean for the 
parts of the cosmos. Chrysippus claims that fusion is that which leads to the passing 
away of the parts of the cosmos. Division, then, must be that which leads to their 
generation. In another passage from Stobaeus, Posidonius confirms this: 
 
Posidonius says that there are four kinds of destruction and 
generation from the existent to the existent. For they recognised that 
there was no such thing as generation from, or destruction into, the 
non-existent, as we said before. But of change into the existent he says 
that one kind is by division (διαίρεσιν), one by alteration (ἀλλοίωσιν), 
one by fusion (σύγχυσιν), and one an out-and-out change which they 
call ‘by resolution’ (ἀνάλυσιν). Of these, that by alteration belongs to 
the substance, while the other three belong to the so-called ‘qualified 
individuals’ which come to occupy the substance. And it is along these 
lines that processes of generation come about. The substance neither 
grows (αὔξεσθαι) nor diminishes (μειοῦσθαι) through addition 
                                                            
38 e.g. Cleomedes Caelestia 6. 11-17 (= SVF 2.537 = LS 49 G); Philo De incorr. mund. 257.12 (= SVF 2.619); 
Plutarch De comm. not. 1077 B; Stoic. Repug. 1052 C etc. 
39 Stobaeus Ecl. Ι, 11. 5α 
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(πρόσθεσιν) or subtraction (ἀφαίρεσιν), but simply alters, just as in 
the case of numbers and measures.40 
Posidonius offers us a more precise description by qualifying the type of increase and 
decrease that are not predicated of substance: no new substance is contributed and no 
substance is taken away. That is to say, fire remains stable in terms of quantity and 
this is true during all phases of the cosmic cycle. Finally, thanks to Plutarch’s 
consistent desire to show the inconsistencies in Stoic thought we can determine the 
type of increase and decrease that is permitted of the substance which is incorporated 
into Stoic etymologising. 
Of their more strictly physical assertions, however, isn’t it at odds with 
the common conception to say that a seed is ampler and bigger than 
what is produced from it? … wherefore they say that the seed has been 
named sperm <after> the spiraling (σπείρασιν) of a large mass into a 
little one and nature has been named physis because it is a diffusion 
(ἐμφύσησιν) or expansion (διάχυσιν) of the formulae or factors which 
it explicates or resolves.  
On the other hand, however, they assert that fire is as the seed of the 
universe and that in the course of the conflagration the universe 
changes into seed, having its lesser corporeal mass greatly diffused 
(χύσιν) and taking over from the void an immense additional space 
upon which it encroaches by its growth, but that when the universe is 
being generated again the magnitude shrinks (υποχωρεῖν) and 
dwindles (συνολισθαίνειν), the matter subsiding (δυομένης) and 
contracting (συναγομένης) into itself in the process of generation.”41 
In his polemic Plutarch has provided us with a more precise understanding of the 
phases of substance, for whilst we had earlier made a distinction into just two phases 
(conflagration and cosmic cycle), Plutarch has shown us that the conflagration itself 
has two phases: one which is an expansion and one which is a contraction, the former 
corresponding to the end of the cycle and the destruction of the world and the latter 
                                                            
40 Stobaeus Ecl. Ι, 20. 7 
41 Plutarch De comm. not. 1077 A-C  
83 
 
corresponding to generation and the new world cycle. In addition to this extra detail 
and significantly for our discussion, the discrepancy in our sources regarding the lack 
of increase and decrease of fire is clarified. For the increase and decrease of fire is here 
being referred to in a spatial sense and not a quantitative one. So on a minute level, 
then, we can fill out the details: fire undergoes a spatial increase and decrease in 
extension, understood as a contraction or expansion. The Stoics conceive of a 
substance that whilst remaining quantitatively the same becomes more rarefied and 
thus larger at conflagration and denser and thus smaller when undergoing the process 
of generation.  
This account may seem insignificant but it invariably brings into relief the Stoic 
concern for a rigorous coherence between their physics and ethics. We discover that 
since fire does not increase or decrease there is no reason to conceive of fire as running 
out. Moreover, we discover that from the earliest stages of the school the Stoics were 
keenly concerned with the integration of their theories across the parts of philosophy: 
in this case between physics and ethics. In making the substance finite they recognised 
that the cosmos must be taken to be a closed system for otherwise hypothetical third 
world influences may be able to alter the parameters of the processes involved and the 
coherency of their physical system would be lost. So whilst they accommodate 
complex relations between the parts these relations are fixed or pre-determined by the 
unitary nature of the whole. There is no clear delineation of whether this view emerged 
as a consequence of their ethical belief in determinism or if their views on fate derive 
from their physical theory. What is clear is that they made elaborate efforts for these 
two fields of philosophy, physics and ethics, to cohere with each other. If they had not 
secured the finite nature of substance in their physics they would be unable to defend 
themselves against accusations of contradiction for they would leave themselves 
exposed to the possibility that the substance would have the capacity to replicate itself 
during the cosmic cycle, thus allowing for an infinite and consequently open system 
within which their strict determinism could hold no place, demolishing one of their 
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fundamental ethical doctrines. Further it would allow for an eternal cosmos that has 
no need for conflagratory regeneration as it replicates itself, thus also demolishing 
their own conception of a vital cosmos which inevitably must die.42 
That the finiteness of fire is well integrated into Stoic physical theory is evident also in 
the type of sympathy that the Stoics advocate for their system. Yet, the evidence once 
again needs to be pieced together from apparently disparate sources. The Stoics 
uphold the permeability of matter, making the incredible claim that there is no such 
thing as a discrete body. This position secures the physical backdrop for the unity of 
their cosmos yet based on how their theory of generation has survived we have little 
understanding of how fire is said to pervade the universe and create sympathy. A 
large problem which has also led to some of the contradictions in our sources is that 
the Stoics followed the intellectual tradition regarding the stratification of the 
elements.43 The cosmographical picture is described according to the grades of weight 
from light to heavy or else relative to the rarity and density of matter. Fire and earth 
being the rarest and densest elements are found at the highest and lowest extremes of 
the cosmos with air and water in their own spheres of influence in between. There 
have been some inconclusive studies on how they arrive at their positions in the 
cosmic scene, but my concern here is rather with how fire exists across the stratification 
and not only at one extreme of it, for it is only in this way that their theory of cosmic 
sympathy and of conflagration can be physically feasible. 
 
Zeno and the Homogeneity of the Cosmos 
To speak of fire as the element which permeates reality while at the same time 
upholding a theory of the stratification of the elements is prima facie contradictory. As 
                                                            
42 It would be interesting to know how the Stoics who rejected conflagration conceived of the substance 
of the universe and whether it was limited or unlimited.  
43 For the standard stratification cf. Aristotle De Cael. 1. 1-2; 3. 2; 4. 3; Physics 4. 5.212b20-22. Cf. also F. 
Solmsen, Aristotle’s System of the Physical World. A Comparison with His Predecessors (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. 
Pr., 1960), 254 ff. 
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it seems to me this contradiction is not solved by examining the stratification of the 
elements and how they rise or fall into their respective positions. Instead we should 
be looking at how fire is said to exist throughout the cosmos. By studying the body of 
Philo’s works we see that there was an active debate in antiquity regarding the 
problem of the homogeneity of the cosmos. Through Philo we receive a backdrop that 
helps explain a fundamental doctrine of the school that dates back to its founder, 
whilst also offering a likely reason for Chrysippus’ shift to perceiving the aether rather 
than the sun as the ruling part. First, though a few words need to be said with regards 
to using Philo as a source for Stoicism. Philo was writing in the first half of the 1st 
Century CE and his works, especially his allegorical corpus, have generally been 
neglected as a source for Stoic physics. Von Arnim’s collection contains no less than 
194 passages from Philo according to Adler’s index;44 by contrast Long and Sedley’s 
sourcebook contains only 10 texts, Inwood and Gerson’s not one, Algra et al. (The 
Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy) cite only 17 passages, while Hahm’s seminal 
The Origins of Stoic Cosmology utilises only one passage from Philo, from his work De 
Aeternitate Mundi. More recently it has been argued by Long that Philo may not be as 
useful as Cicero or Seneca (with whom Philo shares a timeline) for our understanding 
of Stoic theology and physics more generally, but nevertheless there is a gold mine of 
useful information for Stoic physics to be found in Philo.45 This is especially the case 
                                                            
44 Von Arnim is described by Runia as a vacuum cleaner who with regards to Philonic texts 
“indiscriminately sucks up everything in sight”: see David T. Runia, “Philo of Alexandria and Ancient 
Philosophy,” in Greek and Roman Philosophy, 100 BC - 200 AD, ed. R. W. Sharples and Richard Sorabji, 
vol. II (London: Institute of Classical Studies, School of Advanced Study, University of London, 2007), 
485–86. It is said that the long awaited and currently abandoned project of the Utrecht edition of the 
fragments of the Early Stoa will be deleting most of the excerpts from Philo, one of the main reasons 
being that effective use of these excerpts may only be achieved, as Runia concludes in the above work, 
via a contextual appreciation of Philo’s aims and methods, that is to say not by studying them in the 
fragmentary way they appear in sourcebooks. 
45 On this cf. A. A. Long, “Philo On Stoic Physics,” in Philo of Alexandria and Post-Aristotelian Philosophy, 
ed. Francesca Alesse (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 121–40, who also recognises the possibility of recreating “the 
essence of Stoic physics simply by studying Philo’s works” (p.140). For a more nuanced understanding 
of the relevance of Philo cf. Mansfeld, “Philosophy in the Service of Scripture: Philo’s Exegetical 
Strategies”. Mansfeld argues (p.73) that “once it is acknowledged that some of the individual tracts 
constituting the Allegorical Commentary are constructed as a series of questions and answers geared to 
the exegesis of the individual verses that form a biblical pericope, after the pattern of the much more 
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when we start weaving Philo’s references to Stoic ideas together. His syncretic bent 
and the historical period in which he flourished do not always offer his works up for 
direct comparison to Stoic thought. This is partly due to the various influences and 
general pervasion of Stoic thought and terminology throughout the philosophical 
schools of the Hellenistic world. Yet, working with the texts, one gains a growing 
familiarity with Philo’s approach. His largely spurned allegorical works have often 
fallen victim to the general approach in scholarship on early and middle Stoicism, 
namely, to read the texts which only directly refer to Stoic thought or Stoic thinkers 
via the fragmentary style in which they appear in sourcebooks like the SVF. This 
approach invariably ignores the wider context of the arguments. With specific 
reference to Philo’s allegorical works one soon realises that there is much Stoic 
argument incorporated within the wider context of the exposition which is not 
referred to directly and which substantially reveals the subtleties both of Stoic 
argumentation and the development within the school through the surrounding 
debates which Philo brings together in his accounts.46  
With this in mind we may enter into a discussion of some of these Philonic texts. Philo 
in his work on The Confusion of Tongues does not refer directly to the Stoics at any point 
and yet his work makes constant reference to Stoic doctrine, it would seem both in 
                                                            
formal Quaestiones et solutiones in Genesim and In Exodum, these treatises turn out to be far less rambling 
and incoherent than they have often been assumed to be.” For the dangers but also the importance of 
using Philo as a source for Hellenistic philosophy see David T. Runia, “The Beginnings of the End : 
Philo of Alexandria and Hellenistic Theology,” in Traditions of Theology (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 281–316. 
He also recommends working contextually with the material found in individual works as these are 
usually consistent in themselves but notes that it is unreasonable to expect accurate results if we pick 
and choose from across the corpus (p. 288): “It is reasonable to expect that the internal doctrinal 
consistency of these large-scale works will be greater than that of the corpus as a whole.”  
46 This methodological approach is also recognised and attempted by Long ibid. p.135-7. A good 
example on the general methodological approach to Philo’s allegorical works as useful in regurgitation 
of Stoic ideas but not Stoic arguments can be found in Todd, Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics. A 
Study of the De Mixtione with Preliminary Essays, Text, Translation and Commentary, 50–51, who observes 
Philo’s use of Stoic ideas and his exposition of original Stoic doctrine in relation to the Stoic theory of 
mixture, yet does not see the contextualised argument; in this way Philo is seen as simply picking and 
choosing whatever ideas come to his mind., Methodologically this does not account for the coherence 
in Philo’s own thinking which may offer us insights not only into the ideas he does choose to include 
but also (more indirectly and surreptitiously) the reasons for which he does so. 
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specific terms and also more generally.47 At §133 Philo offers a well-described picture 
of a common theme which runs throughout this work and is connected to Stoic (and 
sometimes Epicurean) philosophy more generally and to our particular problem 
specifically:  
“Many too have exalted their senses, as though they were a tower, so 
that they touch the boundaries of heaven, that is symbolically our 
mind, wherein range and dwell those divine forms of being which 
excel all others. They who do not shrink from this give the preference 
to sense rather than understanding. They would use perceptible 
things to subdue and capture the world of things intelligible, thus 
forcing the two to change places, the one to pass from mastery to 
slavery, the other from its natural servitude to dominance.”48 
This passage must be situated in the wider aim of the work which is to show that those 
who try to build bridges between heaven and earth misconceive their essentially 
different natures. Philosophically this is a distinction between the empirical and 
intelligible world, between Platonists and Stoics/Epicureans. Biblically, Philo connects 
this with Genesis and the building of the Babel tower, an act which is punished with the 
fragmentation of the common tongue leading to ‘the confusion of tongues’. Philo finds 
support for the folly of this enterprise of connecting heaven with earth in mythology as 
well; quoting Homer he refers to the legendary Aloeidae who attempted to pile three 
mountains on top of each other in order to ascend to the heavens. He uses the evidence 
                                                            
47 Three passages from this work are found in von Arnim’s collection without any Stoic being named 
directly. There are numerous other passages which may also be used that are not in SVF esp. e.g. §82 
for Philo’s appropriation of the concept of oikeiosis refuting the Stoic notion of affinity with oneself as a 
corruption of the Jewish idea of an affinity with god, in a similar application as homoiosis. For the 
differences which are applied here, see Carlos Lévy, “Éthique de l’immanence, Éthique de La 
Transcendance : Le Problème de l’« Oikeiôsis » Chez Philon,” in Philon d’Alexandrie et Le Langage de La 
Philosophie (Turnhout: Brepols, 1998), 162–64. For the Platonic influences on the “likeness to god” cf. 
Dillon’s commentary in Alcinous: The Handbook of Platonism (Trans. with Commentary by J. M. Dillon) 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 171–76. 
48 Trans. Colson and Whitaker. This passage is not found in SVF, though it has been recognised as Stoic 
by other scholars cf. Mauro Bonazzi, “Towards Transcendance: Philo and the Renewal of Platonism in 
the Early Imperial Age,” in Philo of Alexandria and Post-Aristotelian Philosophy, ed. Francesca Alesse 
(Leiden: Brill, 2008), 249. Regardless of whether Philo is here referring directly to the Stoics, with whom 
he was very familiar as we know from his other works, or speaking more generally about philosophers 
who take a more empirical approach to knowledge, we cannot deny that the theme has a Stoic flavour. 
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he gathers to describe the insolence and folly of philosophers who hypothesise that the 
world in its entirety is corporeal; a position which is predominantly Stoic and commonly 
Hellenistic.  
The passage above has an epistemological bent to it and so it is not so relevant to our 
problem of how the Stoics may have conceived of the unity between the peripheral fire 
and central earth. Fortunately, Philo extends his jeremiad into a denunciation of 
elemental theory and this is complemented by an addition of specifically Stoic 
terminology and typical use of etymology. Philo’s argument clearly draws on Stoic 
notions and the passage quoted below appears faithful to Stoic doctrine as is evident 
from the notions of sympathy and conflagration implied therein. Moreover, there is a 
clear distinction in the passage between the doctrine on the one hand and the argument 
which concludes it in the last sentence on the other, and it is plausible that Philo was 
quoting Stoic theory in such a way as to refute the Stoics through their own doctrine; 
that is to say, arguing that heaven and earth cannot touch directly for if they did the 
earth would be consumed based on the Stoics’ own principles. The passage §§156-7 (the 
main part of which is found in SVF 2. 664) is as follows: 
“No part of the earth can possibly touch the heaven for the reason 
already mentioned [cf. § 5], namely that it is just as impossible as it is 
for the centre to touch the circumference. Secondly, because the aether, 
that holy fire, is an unquenchable flame (φλόξ ἄσβεστος), as its very 
name shows, derived as it is from αἴθειν, which is a special term for 
“burn.” This is attested by a single part of the heavenly expanse of fire, 
namely the sun, which, in spite of its great distance, sends its rays to 
the corners of the earth, and both earth and the naturally cold extent 
of air, which divides it from the sphere of heaven, are warmed or 
consumed by it as the case may be. For to all that is at a long distance 
from its course or lies at an angle to it, it merely gives warmth, but all 
that is near it or directly under it it actually destroys with the force of 
its flames. If this is so, the men who ventured on the ascent could not 
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fail to be blasted and consumed by the fire, leaving their vaulting 
ambition unfulfilled.”49  
This passage is used by Philo to further his argument for the separation of heaven and 
earth and in the process he exposes an aspect of Stoic theory which is largely lost and 
can only indirectly be understood as being ascribed to them; as we have seen his 
purpose is to destroy the notion that heaven and earth are connected, his method is to 
attack corporealist philosophers like the Stoics for their epistemological convictions 
and he does this by showing that their physical and elemental theory destroys their 
own arguments for if the earth touched the heavens directly it would be “consumed 
by fire”. Philo’s argument is not elaborate but the thread is clearly visible and it offers 
us a clue to two difficulties in the Stoic view. First, that Platonists and Aristotelians 
would be prone to rejecting Stoic theory outright based on their own convictions that 
the celestial and terrestrial spheres were wholly separate. Secondly, that the common 
stratification of the elemental spheres, and in particular the fact that the aether and 
the earth are at the lowest and uppermost points, makes their unification problematic. 
Another, more subtle, problem is also revealed and that is that Philo sees the Stoics as 
making matter transcendent, or vice versa, the transcendent corporeal and in doing 
so, according to Philo, the problem they face is not that conflagration occurs but rather 
that they are committed to accepting that it occurs continuously. Indeed, this 
argument, though not so persuasively articulated by Philo, causes a serious problem 
to Stoic cosmology with its adherents having to balance two contradictory theories; 
the four-layer stratification of the elements and their natural separation with 
aether/fire at the periphery and earth at the centre on the one hand and their inherent 
unity on the other. Philo’s point seems to be that they cannot maintain both of these 
simultaneously and still lay claim to the coherency of their system. It is one or the 
other. If the elements are stratified they are also separated and the Stoics need to let 
go of their cosmic sympathy. If heaven and earth are indeed unified then there can be 
                                                            
49 Φλόξ as Stoic may also be corroborated by another text by Philo where he ascribes three kinds of fire 
to ‘a certain Stoic’ SVF 2. 612. Cf. also Lapidge, “Ἀρχαί and Στοιχεῖα,” 273. 
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no cosmic cycle as we know it, for there is perpetual conflagration and this is because 
the Stoics want to maintain that the incorporeal and the corporeal are one and the 
same, that is that what is commonly conceived as transcendent and separate is 
conceived by the Stoics as being inseparable from matter and indeed completely 
permeates it.  
However, Philo’s description of the Stoic theory is misleading for, despite his use of 
Stoic ideas, his primary aim in this work as in the entire Νόμων Ἱερῶν Ἀλληγορίαι is 
to interpret the world view of Moses as it is found in Genesis. In order to do so he 
blithely assumes that Stoic cosmology is similar to Aristotle’s, which had tried to 
secure elemental differentiation precisely for the purpose of separating the celestial or 
divine realm from the earthly one. Yet if we delve further into our evidence we 
discover that elemental differentiation in Stoicism must be understood very 
differently.  
By collating the evidence from another allegorical work of Philo’s we gain an insight 
into the essence of his objection to this doctrine of the Stoics and in so doing the 
remnants of an ancient debate are made palpable. In On the Migration of Abraham Philo 
places god outside of the cosmos for reasons which are commonly known, that is 
because God is unbounded and consequently he does not fit into the universe. He 
contrasts this with the Chaldean theory of the harmony between heaven and earth 
which bears an indirect resemblance with the Stoic concept of cosmic sympathy.50  I 
quote a large portion of the passage in order to follow the main lines of argument as 
sections of this text have been used inappropriately in other places51: 
                                                            
50 Cf. Verbeke, L’évolution de La Doctrine Du Pneuma, n.139, where he adduces certain eastern origins for 
the Stoic theory of the sun as heart of world, in particular Mithras, Chaldeans and Hermetic literature. 
51 Cf. e.g. Susan Sauvé Meyer, “Chain of Causes: What Is Stoic Fate?,” in God and Cosmos in Stoicism, ed. 
Ricardo Salles (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 81, who takes an isolated section of 
this passage to be in support of Stoic cosmic sympathy, whereas precisely the opposite is the case, with 
Philo supporting a completely different type of cosmic sympathy to that of the Stoics. Many passages 
from this work appear in von Arnim’s selection despite there being no direct attribution by Philo to any 
individual Stoic or the Stoics more generally. Here we see not only that context is required when using 
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“The Chaldeans have the reputation of having, in a degree quite 
beyond that of other peoples, elaborated astronomy and the casting of 
nativities. They have set up a harmony between things on earth and 
things on high, between heavenly things and earthly. Following as it 
were the laws of musical proportion, they have exhibited the universe 
as a perfect concord or symphony produced by a sympathetic affinity 
between its parts, separated indeed in space, but housemates in 
kinship. These men imagined that this invisible universe was the only 
thing in existence, either being itself God or containing God in itself as 
the soul of the whole. And they made Fate and Necessity divine, thus 
filling human life with much impiety, by teaching that apart from 
phenomena there is no originating cause of anything whatever, but 
that the circuits of sun and moon and of the other heavenly bodies 
determine for every being in existence both good things and their 
opposites. Moses, however, while he seems to confirm the 
sympathetic affinity of its parts displayed throughout the universe, is 
at variance with their opinion concerning God. He endorses the 
former doctrine by declaring the universe to be one and to have been 
made; for it came into being and is one, it stands to reason that all its 
completed several parts have the same elementary substance for their 
substratum, on the principle that interdependence of the parts is a 
characteristic of bodies which constitute a unity. He (Moses) differs 
from their opinion about God, holding that neither the universe nor 
its soul is the primal God, and that the constellations or their 
revolutions are not the primary causes of the things that happen to 
men. Nay, he teaches that the complete whole around us is held 
together by invisible powers, which the Creator has made to reach 
from the ends of the earth to heaven’s furthest bounds, taking 
forethought that what was well bound should not be loosened: for the 
powers of the Universe are chains that cannot be broken. Wherefore, 
even though it be said somewhere in the Law-book “God in heaven 
above and on the earth below” (Deut. Iv, 39), let no one suppose that 
He that IS is spoken of, since the existent Being can contain, but cannot 
                                                            
Philo but also that caution is necessary to not simply assume that he is espousing Stoic doctrine. Cf. 
also the following footnote with Runia’s cautionary remarks. 
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be contained. What is meant is that potency of His by which he 
established and ordered and marshalled the whole realm of being.”52 
Though the positions of the Chaldeans and of Moses both support the idea of a 
sympathy or unity between the parts of the cosmos, as Philo presents them they are 
clearly differentiated. On the one hand we have the world view attributed to Moses 
which is that the world is ruled and directed by God as if from a source; He exists 
outside of the cosmos for he cannot be contained, due to his infinite nature, but he 
contains the cosmos; it is not God Himself who unifies the cosmos but rather it is His 
power that binds the world together in a great chain of being. On the other hand and 
by contrast we have the world view of the Chaldeans (which resembles that of the 
Stoics), which maintains that God is to be found inside of things, He is contained 
within the cosmos and pervades it; Fate and Necessity are described as divine and it 
is emphasised that sympathy derives from the complex relations that exist between 
things; the affinity which they display is due to the fact that all the parts contain an 
element of God, pervaded as they are by the primary substance which constitutes God 
and, to some degree, all things; God, as a consequence of being contained must be 
quantitatively limited.53  The metaphysics of relations is contrasted to a metaphysics 
of emanation from one simple source, a philosophy where the cosmos and the things 
in it are directed from the inside out as opposed to one which functions from the 
outside in.  
From our above examination this passage has the potential to yield an interesting 
insight into a well-recognised and long standing problematic between Chrysippus 
                                                            
52 Philo De migrat. Abraham. §§178-183. See Runia, “The Beginnings of the End,” 290, who argues that 
accounts of Chaldean theology in Philo should not be confused as being Stoic on account of the absence 
of providence. For our purposes the passage serves to show that Philo generally took issue with 
theologies which conceived of god as existing within the cosmos rather than being transcendental. 
Whatever the case may be regarding who Philo attributes these ideas to there are clear Stoic hues with 
regards the presence of god inside rather than outside the cosmos. 
53 Cf. also Plutarch Obsolescence of Oracles 424 A who discusses this doctrine in relation to theories which 
posit multiple worlds “as for the dread which some especially have felt, and so use up the whole of 
matter on the one world, so that nothing may be left over outside to disturb the structure of it by 
resisting or striking it – this fear of theirs is unwarranted” 
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and Cleanthes regarding the nature of the hegemonikon and its interaction with the 
pneuma. Although the difference between the two heads relates to the example of 
walking and so to the pneuma’s role in their theory of action, the distinction between 
pneuma and hegemonikon in the part may be assumed to be applicable also to the whole. 
As such this differentiation has considerably confused both the modern 
understanding of Stoic cosmogony but also the natural philosophers of antiquity. The 
difference between the two heads is preserved in Seneca, Epist., 113, 23 (SVF 2.836, LS 
53L):  
“Cleanthes and his pupil Chrysippus did not agree on what walking 
is. Cleanthes said it was breath extending from the commanding-
faculty to the feet, Chrysippus that it was the commanding-faculty 
itself.” 54 
                                                            
54 Transl. Long and Sedley Cf. commentary for 53 L in Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers. Vol. 
2 Greek and Latin Texts with Notes and Bibliography, where the difference between Cleanthes and 
Chrysippus is described as unclear and “difficult to elucidate”. For a discussion of the difference in 
relation to: theory of action and psychology cf. Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism, 50–
51 and J. M. Rist, Stoic Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Pr., 1969), 33–34; the categories cf. 
Stephen Menn, “The Stoic Theory of Categories,” in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, ed. David N. 
Sedley, vol. 17 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 241–42 and  Jacques Brunschwig, “Stoic 
Metaphysics,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics, ed. Brad Inwood (Cambridge ; New York: 
Cambridge University Pr., 2003), 227–32; the emotions and impulse cf. Margaret Robson Graver, 
Stoicism and Emotion (Chicago (Ill.): University of Chicago Pr., 2007), 27 also Sauve Meyer’s forthcoming 
paper on impulse and action different sections having been presented at Oxford (June 2015) and Utrecht 
(April 2016) Susan Sauvé Meyer, “Affect and Impulse in the Stoic Doctrine of the Passions,” n.d., 
http://www.sas.upenn.edu/~smeyer/documents/Affect_and_ImpulseMay2013_000.pdf. Pearson sees 
the passage as recording a deviation caused by a desire (from Chrysippus) to insist more strongly on 
the essential unity of the soul and also  gives a few more references for this: The Fragments of Zeno and 
Cleanthes, 268. For the latest study cf. Brad Inwood, “Walking and Talking: Reflections on Divisions of 
the Soul in Stoicism,” in Partitioning the Soul: Debates From Plato to Leibniz, ed. Dominik Perler and Klaus 
Corcilius (Berlin ; New York: De Gruyter, 2014), 69–74. It is worth noting the contextual point that this 
reference to the disagreement between the two heads is used by Seneca to support his right to reject an 
essential part of Stoic doctrine, that of the virtues being vitalised bodies; i.e. ‘if Chrysippus can disagree 
with original doctrine I can too’. This is not a unique strategy and was used by Cicero also to make 
allowances for the Academic Sceptics who altered theories within their own school, just like e.g. 
Panaetius had done: Cicero De Divinatione 1. 3, 6-7.  As far as I know and on a more philosophical note, 
there has been no discussion of the consequent differences regarding the physical mechanisms of 
pneuma for each head which seems to me to be the most basic and valuable point, which Seneca draws 
out in preserving this distinction; this was also recognised by Inwood in his monograph of 1985 where 
he argued that the difference in relation to the theory of action is insignificant. Also cf. previous chapter 
p. 59-60. 
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In this case, if we extend this view of the relation between the hegemonikon and pneuma 
to a cosmic level we see that with regards to cosmogony there was a radical difference 
between Chrysippus and Cleanthes. It is not immediately clear what this difference 
is, in relation to cosmogony, but what can be gleaned from this at first glance is that 
Chrysippus saw the hegemonikon as that which pervaded the whole body whilst 
Cleanthes saw the pneuma directed by the hegemonikon as that which supports this 
function. The Philo texts may put us in a position to understand how and from where 
this division between the two heads originated, for, as we saw earlier, Cleanthes as 
well as Zeno considered the sun to be the hegemonikon of the universe and this was 
altered by Chrysippus to aether. The clues we have extracted from Philo already 
suggest that in antiquity there were arguments levelled against the Stoics for their 
theory of the sun being the source of the creative fire which pervades the universe. 
This is to be found in the passage from On the Confusion of Tongues discussed above 
and can be summed up as follows: If the sun’s fire is also god and god is thereby made 
into something corporeal rather than transcendent and separate, then cosmic 
sympathy which is produced by the activity of god would, for an advocate of 
corporealism, inevitably lead to the world being set ablaze without the opportunity 
even to undergo diakosmesis, for the fire must inevitably touch the earth in order to 
pervade it and produce sympathy between the parts. Combined with the passage 
from On the Migration of Abraham which follows the same theme in criticising the 
notion of not separating the divine from the terrestrial, the line of argument reveals a 
different approach: God or fire permeates all bodies and is moreover contained within 
them, there is no constant emission here as such but only total pervasion. Although it 
is apparent that Philo makes no real distinction regarding individual Stoic thinkers in 
these works and though he presents the ideas in syncretic style, it is apparent that the 
first passage is dictated by notions that were dominant in the teachings of Zeno and 
Cleanthes and the second passage leans more to a Chrysippean understanding of the 
coherency of the cosmos.  Indeed we have here an insight into one of the weaknesses 
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of early Stoic cosmology which inspired Chrysippus to make the change to aether as 
the hegemonikon.  
As noted in the introduction, many of the more elaborate theories of the Stoa are 
attributed to Chrysippus.55 One such instance is observed precisely with the topic 
under investigation. For though concepts such as sympathy and a coherent cosmos 
have largely been attributed to later Stoics in past studies56 these notions often have 
their roots already in the philosophy of Zeno. It is well recognised that the pervasion 
of the cosmos by a rational principle is part of Stoic dogma; this doctrine indeed goes 
back to the origin of the school. Chrysippus is credited with securing the mechanics 
of this pervasion, that is to say, with describing in a coherent way the underlying 
internal processes involved in the pervasion and permeability of the cosmos.57 
Nevertheless, Philo’s texts have lead us to understand that the question of the 
sympathy of the world involves the way in which we understand both matter and god 
as existing in the world or outside it. Philo, whilst agreeing with the Stoic notion of 
sympathy, cannot agree with the way in which this sympathy functions; for he does 
not allow for god to be contained within the world as this would implicate that god is 
quantifiably limited.  
In Zeno we receive an account of god existing within the world, which invariably 
brings into question the mechanics of just how god is in the world.  Early signs of this 
are available and are preserved in a passage from Sextus M 9. 101-3: 
And Zeno of Citium, taking Xenophon as his starting point58, argues 
thus: - “That which projects the seed of the rational is itself rational; 
                                                            
55 Cf. p. 12-13 above. 
56 E.g. Lapidge, “Ἀρχαί and Στοιχεῖα,” 274 , who sees Chrysippus as the one who “discovered” cosmic 
pneuma, implying that there was no coherent theory beforehand; René Brouwer, “Stoic Sympathy,” in 
Sympathy: A History, ed. Eric Schliesser, Oxford Philosophical Concepts (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2015), 20ff, who sees Cleanthes as the first explicit exponent of a sympathetic universe in Stoicism, 
but does not remark that it is, at least, implicit in Zeno. 
57 Cf. Cooper, “Chrysippus on the Physical Elements,” 95–97. 
58 This is Xenophon the Socratic cf. Xen.  Mem. 1. 4. 2.  Also there is apparently a fundamental difference 
between Xenophon and the Stoics in that the former took the elements to be simple whereas the latter 
made them compound (Sextus M. 9.92-98)  
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but the Cosmos projects the seed of the rational; therefore the Cosmos 
is rational. And thereby the existence thereof is also concluded.” The 
plausibility of this argument is obvious. For the origin of motion in 
every nature and soul seems to come from the hegemonikon and all the 
powers that are sent forth into the parts of the whole are sent forth 
from the hegemonikon as from a fount, so that every power which exists in 
the part exists also in the whole owing to its being distributed from its 
hegemonikon. Hence, what the part is in point of power, that the whole 
must certainly be first. Consequently, if the Cosmos projects the seed 
of a rational animal, it does not do so, like man, by frothy emission, 
but as containing (περιέχει) the seeds of rational animals59; but it does 
not contain them in the same way as we might speak of the vine 
“containing” its grapes, - that is, by way of inclusion (κατὰ 
περιγραφήν), - but because the seminal reasons of rational animals 
are contained within it. – “The Cosmos contains (περιέχει) the seminal 
reasons of rational animals; therefore the Cosmos is rational.” 
Here Zeno uses the Greek word for contain (περιέχει) with terminological precision 
and he makes a distinction between the containing that is expressed for things like 
grapes on a vine, that is as being self-contained and separable (κατὰ περιγραφήν)60 
such that we may pick them off the vine and eat them without believing that they are 
still a part of the vine and we are also eating the vine whilst eating the grapes. The 
‘grapes on a vine’ way of understanding containment is one where we can conceive 
of a transition from περιέχειν to παράθεσις – from being contained to being 
juxtaposed – a transition that is impossible for the other sort of containing that Zeno 
has in mind. The way the Cosmos projects the seed of a rational animal is neither like 
grapes on a vine nor like the frothy emission of intercourse which nonetheless both 
contain the seed of life inside when transferred away from the man or the vine.61 No, 
                                                            
59 For the frothy emission of man as being ‘a part and fragment derived from the soul’ cf. SVF 1.128 
«ψυχῆς μέρος καὶ ἀπόσπασμα» 
60 For more on the Stoic usage of κατὰ περιγραφήν compare e.g. D.L. 7.151, Sextus M 7.277; 8.161; 8.387  
61 Verbeke, L’évolution de La Doctrine Du Pneuma, 35 quotes only the first section of this passage and 
seems to ignore the rest for he mistakenly concludes that the causality exercised by the world over the 
living beings it contains is the same as the causality of the parents towards their children. This can only 
be half right as it fails to take into account the distinction that Zeno made between the seminal reason 
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the parts of the cosmos cannot be separated off in the same way.62 After projecting 
outwards the Cosmos contains its parts completely. No part is separate from or 
juxtaposed to the Cosmos; it contains, surrounds, embraces all the parts which are 
formed out of it. If we read that the seminal reasons of the Cosmos are contained 
within the cosmos as an isolated fragment we may be persuaded that the way the 
seminal reasons are contained in the cosmos is the way that a cistern containing water 
defines the boundaries of what is contained. Instead, if taken as a whole, we 
understand that what Zeno meant is that the Cosmos emits its seed and acts as a fluid 
medium permeating all of the parts. It thus contains its parts by being contained 
within them but also by being the medium in which they are contained. We thus have 
here a dual activity of creation where it is understood that the seminal reason of god 
– otherwise known as the creative fire or the hegemonikon – both remains within bodies 
as their formative principle but also acts as a medium which connects the said bodies. 
Here we have the remains of a very rare argument in early Stoicism. For whilst the 
commonly found arguments with respect to the rationality of the cosmos are made by 
analogy and expounded from the bottom up – that is from the part to the whole, as 
e.g. with reason existing in humans and consequently to a greater degree in the 
cosmos or else with the reason that is manifest in the patterns of nature like the seasons 
being applied to the cosmos as a whole – the argument that Zeno is making here is 
notably from the top down, or more precisely from the whole to the part. This is a rare 
insight into original doctrine which shows that from the earliest stages of the Stoic 
                                                            
of the cosmos and the sperm of man; the material causal connection of the former is continuous whilst 
that of the latter is only initiatory. 
62 Cf. Sextus M 9.352-354 “Such being the difficulties raised about this topic, 352  the Dogmatists—by 
way of providing themselves  with a little breathing-space—are accustomed to  argue that the external 
real and sensible object is  neither whole nor part, but it is we who apply to it the terms “ whole ” and 
“ part.” For “whole” is a relative term, since a whole is conceived in relation to its parts. And again, 
“parts” are relative, for the parts are conceived in relation to the whole. And relatives are in our 
consciousness, and our consciousness is in us; so the whole and the part are in us.  And the external 
real and sensible object is neither a whole nor a part but a thing of which we predicate our own 
consciousness.” 
 
98 
 
school there existed strong views regarding how the cosmic soul and the individual 
soul interact, which in turn reveals to us that Zeno himself laid down the foundations 
for how the mechanisms of the all-pervasive pneuma are to function guiding the 
developments later on in the school. First, Zeno must have had a clear idea that the 
cosmos and its parts must be distinguished and in what ways this distinction should 
be made. Moreover it is not clear that, as previously assumed,63 he argues only from 
the bottom up (from part to whole) to decide that the cosmos is rational but it seems 
as though he also decided on this a priori for he has a clear distinction between the 
way in which seminal reason is passed from part to part and the way it is passed from 
whole to part. This shows us clearly that Zeno himself was developing a way in which 
to connect the cosmic and the individual, a view which has up until recently only been 
ascribed to Cleanthes as the earliest exponent.  
Moreover, although the evidence from Alexander of Lycopolis and Diogenes Laertius 
shows us that the sun is the hegemonikon of the cosmos for the earliest heads of the 
school there is evidence that Zeno and Cleanthes had views regarding the aether also. 
In Cicero ND 1.36-7 we hear that although Zeno regards the divine law of nature as 
alive, he makes the aether divine, yet lifeless. Whilst this passage as a whole suggests 
that Zeno had not fully worked out a cosmobiological system, it is likely also that by 
‘lifeless’ in this context is meant natural mechanisms which are devoid of sensation 
(as Cicero indeed mentions) but nevertheless pervaded by reason and that Cicero here 
is conflating sensation with vitality.64 What should be extracted in any case is that the 
aether is divine for Zeno. For Cleanthes also the aether is divine. This may not seem 
significant at first, for the Stoics are known to have made the moon divine and deify 
the other elements also by allegorising air as Hera, Sea as Poseidon etc.. Nevertheless, 
                                                            
63 Verbeke, L’évolution de La Doctrine Du Pneuma, 39. 
64 This is also done by Seneca in his disagreement with the Stoics regarding the vitality of the virtues 
Epistle 113 (cf. esp. 17-20) where he claims that sensation and impulse are required for things to be alive; 
justice or bravery do not have these in themselves but acquire them from the soul and therefore cannot 
be alive contra standard Stoic doctrine. Plutarch De Stoic. Repug. 1053 C is also confused into conflating 
vitality with sensibility. 
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Cleanthes is said to have claimed that the aether is the most unquestionable deity 
(Cicero ND 1.37). So, whilst Chrysippus is the first to specify the aether as the ruling 
part, both Zeno and Cleanthes deify the aether and moreover Cleanthes sets the 
groundwork for Chrysippus to make the doctrinal switch to aether from the sun as 
the ruling part by claiming it is the most divine of the elements from which all others 
derive. Indeed, it is granted as general Stoic theory that whilst the hegemonikon is said 
to be the highest (ἀνώτατον) part of the soul (Aetius 4. 21, 1-4; = SVF 2.836 = LS 53 H) 
the aether is said to be the highest (ἀνώτατον) part of the cosmos (D.L. 7.137). This 
may ultimately be Chrysippean doctrine but there are clear lines which suggest that it 
emerged as a development of, rather than as a fracture from, original Stoic doctrine. 
Thus, having seen that there is doctrinal continuity in the school in relation to the 
hegemonikon of the cosmos, the question emerges as to why the shift from sun to aether 
occurred in the first place. There are various clues which lead us to the solution of this 
problem but the main one seems to be that over and above doctrinal continuity the 
Stoics insisted on doctrinal integrity and coherence. Aristarchus’ polemic and criticism 
of Cleanthes heliocentrist views along with Cleanthes’ response would no doubt have 
brought into question the necessity of viewing the sun as the hegemonikon of the 
cosmos. This may have been defended as Bénatouïl says,65 by claiming geocentric 
heliocracy but no doubt damage had been done to the reputation of the system, 
despite or perhaps even because of Cleanthes dedicating a whole work to respond to 
Aristarchus’ critique. In addition to this and certainly more importantly there was a 
glaring weakness in the sun’s capacity to fulfil the mechanisms of pervasion that are 
outlined in the Zeno source (Sextus M 9, 101-3) above, for, as Cleomedes tells us, “If 
the substance of the whole were not naturally suffused throughout the whole, neither 
would the universe be able to be held together (συνέχεσθαι) and governed 
(διοικεῖσθαι) by nature (ὐπὸ φύσεως), nor would there be any sympathy 
                                                            
65 Cf. p. 72-3 above 
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(συμπάθεια) among its parts.”66 The problem is empirical, for how can the sun’s light 
and heat be said to pervade the darkest and coldest corners of the cosmos? When the 
Stoics in Heraclitean fashion equated fire with logos but added also a few extra 
capacities such as vitality, this was done through quotidian observations that all life 
has some form of heat inside it.67 From the cosmogonical perspective the vitalising, 
creative, principle requires a source from which it derives its power, the most 
observable great source of heat and fire in the universe is the sun and so making the 
sun the source of this fire was easily justifiable for the earlier Stoics. Yet, although we 
might say the heat of the sun is invisible it is in many senses also visible in the form of 
light and tangible in the form of warmth. The light and heat of the sun are capacities 
that are required to penetrate the material world or the parts of the cosmos, from an 
external source (the sun) and on a continuous basis. That this does not fully 
accommodate the Stoic criteria of total pervasion is empirically obvious. There are 
numerous instances when we can intensely experience the absence of both heat and 
light from the sun, such as in a pitch black cave or in the freezing Hyperborean 
mountain wind in dark winter. A later source even has the sun’s incapacity for full 
penetration or diffusion as standard part of Stoic doctrine.68 The diverse roles that 
Stoic fire needs to fulfil demand a more flexible concept of fire than the one offered by 
the sun. The aether is the perfect candidate. By establishing this as the hegemonikon of 
the universe Chrysippus makes the concept altogether more abstract. Moreover, 
aether was traditionally, that is to say in Aristotelian physics, considered to be the 
πεμτουσία, the quintessential, divine element,69 and being equivocal it fulfils diverse 
                                                            
66 Cleomedes, Caelestia 1. 1. 69–71 (trans. Todd) (= SVF 2. 546) cf. also Epictetus, Diss. 1. 14. 1–2, where 
the question of whether the whole is a unity (ἡνῶσθαι τὰ πάντα) is accompanied by the question of 
whether terrestrial things are in sympathy with the heavens. 
67 Verbeke, L’évolution de La Doctrine Du Pneuma, 15, takes it that Zeno was influenced in this doctrine 
by medical schools esp. Sicilian rather than the Hippocratic tradition and indeed he rejects the 
Heraclitean influence altogether. Though there may well be some truth in the medical influence it 
would be mistaken to reject the Stoic assimilation of Heraclitus for their pneumatic theory. 
68 Cleomedes Caelestia 1.4. 113-130 
69 Aristotle Cael. 1.3.270b20-24 and Meteor. 1.3.339b21-27 cf. also D. E. Hahm, “The Fifth Element in 
Aristotle’s De Philosophia,” in Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy, II, ed. J. P. Anton and Anthony Preus 
(Albany (N.Y.): State University of New York Press, 1983), 404–28. 
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roles connected as it is to both light and burning, whilst having no visible or tangible 
source, as it were, for its effects cannot be empirically observed. This invisible and 
intangible character of aether offers itself perfectly for the type of active role that the 
Stoics want the hegemonikon and the pneuma to play in their physics, that is, as an all-
pervasive substance which permeates all bodies and contains them in the fashion 
which Zeno describes. After all this discussion it is possible to decide with some 
confidence that, although our sources have preserved differences between the heads 
of the early school regarding the hegemonikon of the cosmos, we are able to discern 
clear lines of development which lead to these changes as a way to preserve one of 
Zeno’s more prevalent doctrines: the coherency of the cosmos.  
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4. Pneuma and Nourishment 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter we encountered a difficulty in the extant evidence with 
regards to the supposed increase of fire during the world cycle. An increase in fire may 
be understood as implying that there is a corresponding increase in the rationality of 
the cosmos. The notion of a fire which grows but does not increase appears to be 
contradictory.  In order to remove these contradictions, a study of Stoic views 
regarding growth and nourishment is necessary. In this chapter, after a few 
introductory remarks, I examine two of our best extant references to nourishment in 
Stoic theory, one in Plutarch which refers to the nourishment of Zeus and the other in 
Sextus which refers to nourishment in individual bodies. Examining these two sources 
in light of each other I attempt a reconstruction of a differentiation in process between 
the nourishment of the whole and the part, which helps to resolve some of the 
apparent contradictions in Stoic theory. I then chart the evidence related to 
ἀναθυμίασις in Zeno and Cleanthes and argue that the balance of the evidence guides 
us towards reading this doctrine of theirs in relation to aspects of their cognitive 
theory.  
The Stoic cosmos is a living organism. This thesis was probably forged out of Stoic 
corporealist beliefs,1 for basic sensory experience of the natural world reveals to us 
that all things in the natural world have a beginning and an end. Physical entities, 
regardless of whether they are animals or gods, being corporeal, have a life span and 
expiration date. Whilst this need not necessarily result in the belief of the cosmos as a 
living organism, for it could reasonably be said that something generated and 
destroyed could also be inanimate, the Stoics, like Plato, were under the impression 
that the universe was self-moving, which, in the Greek tradition, is a precondition for 
                                                            
11 For the similarities with Plato’s Timaeus see esp. 34ff. and cf. Betegh, “Cosmological Ethics in the 
« Timaeus » and Early Stoicism”; Gourinat, “The Stoics on Matter and Prime Matter: ‘Corporealism’ 
and the Imprint of Plato’s Timaeus.” 
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vitality. The conclusion the Stoics draw from this, however, starkly contrasts with 
Plato who considered that whatever has the power of self-motion is immortal.2 It is 
significant to note that the different metaphysical approach determines each 
conclusion, with the Stoics proceeding from observation of the world around us and 
Plato proceeding with the use of dialectic.  An interesting consequence of the Stoic 
position is that we are left unable to point at things and say they are eternal, like 
Aristotle proudly pointing at the celestial spheres which were, innovatively, eternal 
on both ends – not only had they no end but they also had no beginning.3 What sets 
the Stoic theory apart is that despite being corporealist it does not seek the eternal in 
some exemplary physical entity from which to deduce conclusions about our own 
experience and understanding, but rather the eternal emerges out of the interactions 
between the matrix of bodies. In this way we are left with something like repeating 
processes and the Stoics put a significant amount of energy into explaining and 
integrating these processes into their system. A corollary of this approach was that it 
laid especial emphasis on the notion that we could look at the world around us and 
apply our observations to the world above us (the heavens) and this ruffled feathers 
in the intellectual community, in particular for those in the Platonic tradition. Many 
truculent criticisms ensued with commentators accusing the Stoics of turning things 
upside-down on the grounds that we should understand the world with the highest 
part of ourselves (the intellect) and not the lowest (the senses). The Stoics, faithful to 
common experience, however, did not let go of this thesis4 and it is a well-integrated 
part of the Stoic matrix of doctrines.  
                                                            
2 Plato Phaedrus 245 C-D 
3 Cf. for instance Phsyics 4. 223b21–3 where Aristotle chooses the celestial sphere as the absolute measure 
of time due to its eternal motion. 
4 Discounting Panaetius and Boethus of Sidon who seemed to be more concerned with ethics than 
physics and wanted to avoid any confusion that the theory of eternal recurrence kindled in people’s 
minds when it came to everyday moral considerations. 
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Chrysippus on Nourishment: the evidence of Plutarch and Sextus 
It is a worthy endeavour to work at elucidating some of the processes which act as 
examples of this integration. With regards to the living cosmos doctrine particularly 
fertile ground for this topic is to be found in attaining a better understanding of the 
process of nourishment.5 Whilst we may seek the origins of this doctrine in many 
places including medical theories and even myth,6 my main concern lies with how this 
theory is integrated in Stoicism. It is well known that the cosmos is vitalised by the 
permeating pneuma. Seneca, in a passage which discusses what the earth has which 
allows it to nourish other things, presents two types – or functions – of pneuma:  “I do 
not mean just the breath that makes it cohere and keep its parts united, which is found 
even in rocks and dead bodies, but I mean the life-giving breath that is vigorous and 
sustains everything.”7 This distinction is interesting because it reveals to us that 
although the cosmos is alive this does not imply that all the things in the cosmos are 
alive also. The Stoics are not animists in this sense. Indeed despite pneuma often being 
synonymous with vitality it does not confer vitality on everything it touches. It is a life 
giving force but only for bodies which have the capacity for nourishment and growth; 
whilst this position can be extrapolated from the standard scala naturae,8 the Seneca 
passage is the only place I know of where it is said explicitly.9 In this instance the 
                                                            
5 In the modern scholarship surprisingly little has been done regarding how the Stoics conceived of 
nourishment in individual bodies and in the cosmos cf. in particular Hahm, The Origins of Stoic 
Cosmology, 146–48, who emphasises the Aristotelian influences. For theory of noursihment in later 
Peripatetic philosophy with possible Stoic influences see Victor Miles Caston, Alexander of Aphrodisias 
on the Soul. Part I Soul as Form of the Body, Parts of the Soul, Nourishment, and Perception (London: Bristol 
Classical Press, 2012), 59–63, with accompanying commentary also by Caston. 
6 In the golden age fire was celestial and required no fuel. When this celestial fire was taken away 
because of Prometheus’ deception of Zeus Prometheus stole a seed of fire from Olympus, with the 
planting of this seed of fire it meant that, henceforth fire was born and so could also die out, unless 
constantly fuelled. For the medical origins see Verbeke, L’évolution de La Doctrine Du Pneuma, 15. 
7 Nat. Quaest. 6.16.1 (trans. Hine) 
8 For a detailed discussion of the Stoic scala naturae, see Inwood 1985, 21-7  
9 The significance of this point can easily be overlooked, yet even recently (Francesco Ademollo 
Symposium Hellenisticum, Utrecht 2016; also presented at Oxford a few months later) obfuscation has 
arisen with the claim that the Stoic cosmos is not truly unified because of the type of pneuma that is 
found in rocks and bones which are dead, this can alternatively, and persuasively, be expressed as 
follows: if all the parts of the cosmos are not animate how can the cosmos be said to be animate. If we 
take into account Seneca’s distinction between life-giving pneuma and cohering pneuma then this thesis 
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position is a natural extrapolation from the standard doctrine of the scala naturae 
where hexis is seen as the cohesive force of inanimate bodies like rocks. In addition to 
this there is a high probability that Seneca was using Chrysippus’ work On Providence 
when writing this section, for we know from Plutarch that nourishment was a theme 
present in the work and a few lines later Seneca states a theory that we know appeared 
in Book 1 of that same work by Chrysippus, namely that the universe receives its 
nourishment by the interchange of its parts. 
The Plutarch passage in question (Stoic Repug. 1052 B-E) is our most complete source 
on the Stoic theory of nourishment and we must rely on it to fill out our account as far 
as possible: 
Moreover, in the third book on the Gods Chrysippus makes the 
following statement about the nourishment of the rest of the gods: 
“Nourishment is used in a similar way by the rest of the gods – it is 
through it that they are sustained (συνεχόμενοι), but Zeus and the 
universe <sustain themselves> in a different way <from those that 
periodically> are absorbed <into fire> and arise out of fire.” Here, then, 
he declares that there is nourishment of all the gods except the 
universe and Zeus, but in the first book on Providence he says that 
Zeus goes on growing (αὔξεσθαι) until all things have been 
consumed in his growth: “For, since death is the separation of soul 
from body and the soul of the universe is not separated but goes on 
growing (αὔξεται) continually until it has completely absorbed its 
matter, the universe must not be said to die.” Now who could more 
plainly contradict himself than the man who says of one and the same 
god now that he grows (αὔξεσθαι) and again that he does not take 
nourishment? And inference is not needed to reach this conclusion, for 
in the same book he has himself clearly written: “The universe alone 
is said to be self-sufficient because it alone has within itself everything 
                                                            
is a lot less troubling; for the question is reframed and cohesion thus does not need to derive from 
vitality within individual bodies but from the vitalising force which is also naturally cohesive. It may 
be noted that this confusion is probably also due to a recidivism for generalising Stoic doctrine and not 
distinguishing the differences between heads as here with Zeno’s fire being contained within 
individual bodies and the Chrysippean development which elaborates on the notion of the cohesive 
pneuma. 
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it needs, and it gets from itself its nourishment and growth (αὔξεται) 
by the interchange of its different parts into one another.” So he is in 
conflict with himself not only because in the former passages he 
declares that except for the universe and Zeus there is nourishment of 
the rest of the gods and in the latter he states that there is nourishment 
of the universe also but even more because he says that the universe 
grows (αὔξεσθαι) by getting nourishment from itself. The likelihood 
was just the contrary, that this alone does not grow, since it has its own 
decay for nourishment whereas the rest of the gods, since they get 
nourishment from without, do have increase and growth (αὔξησιν) 
and that it is rather the universe that is consumed in their growth if it 
is a fact that, while it is its own source, they are always drawing upon 
it for their nourishment. 
This problem recorded by Plutarch has been explored in the past and has caused much 
consternation, largely being accepted as simply contradictory. In the main scholars 
have utilised the distinction between the non-creative and creative fire to make the 
distinction between a fire that requires fuel and one which is self-sufficient i.e. one 
which requires nourishment and one which does not. With the sun explicitly being 
said by Zeno to consist of creative fire, which unlike the non-creative/terrestrial fire is 
productive and preservative,10 the statement that the sun is said to “consume” the 
moisture in the universe is viewed by Lapidge to be a “patent contradiction” for which 
he sees no resolution.11 Mansfeld, also utilising the distinction between the two fires, 
whilst recording other literature that has likewise done so, offers no solution either. 
His approach to the problem is somewhat different, however, in that he prefers to see 
the paradoxical nature of the account as part of general Stoic practice and his riposte 
to Lapidge is simply to ask the question whether “the palpable paradox is less 
palatable than other Stoicorum Repugnantia”.12 Nevertheless, as we have already seen,13 
                                                            
10 SVF 1. 120 
11 M. Lapidge, “Stoic Cosmology,” in The Stoics (Univ. of California Pr., 1978), 181 cf. also “glaring 
contradiction” Lapidge, “Ἀρχαί and Στοιχεῖα,” 273. 
12 Mansfeld, “Providence and the Destruction of the Universe in Early Stoic Thought, with Some 
Remarks on the Mysteries of Philosophy,” 152–54 n.  70. 
13 See p. 74-77 in ch.3 
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there are instances when the whole-part analogy breaks down as a natural 
consequence of their inherent differences. We should not expect that god and 
individual bodies are both spoken of in the same way and it is possible for this reason 
to simply view Plutarch’s cavil as innocuous. In doing so, however, we must also be 
committed to elicit as much information as we can from the evidence he does give us.     
The verbatim quote that Plutarch initially gives us does not include the immediately 
preceding passage from Chrysippus’ work On the Gods but what we discover is that 
the gods are nourished in a similar way to something else in the Stoic cosmos. It is 
reasonable to assume that the “something else” is all other bodies in the cosmos that 
have the capacity for nourishment like plants and animals, for these, like the gods, are 
absorbed into fire at conflagration. The nourishment that Chrysippus is describing 
here has to do with bodies that undergo generation and destruction, whilst Zeus and 
the universe do not have the same sort of process of sustenance. Now, Plutarch is not 
concerned here with the actual process of nourishment and a description of this is 
absent in the passages he quotes from Chrysippus. If we wish to understand 
something of the processes from the information available to us here, it is useful to 
note which works are being cited along with which doctrines. It is clear that Plutarch 
is pushing his agenda of contradiction-mongering when he makes a jump from “Zeus 
and the universe sustain themselves in a different way” to his own comment that this 
must mean that everything is nourished “except Zeus and the universe”. From the 
passages he has quoted this conclusion cannot be drawn; what we can gain from this 
instead is that we may distinguish between two types of nourishment. The type of 
nourishment that takes place for Zeus or the universe was discussed by Chrysippus 
in the work On Providence and this process is described as an interchange of parts into 
one another. We have noted in the previous chapter14 that being a closed system the 
substance of the universe cannot be said to increase15 and yet here Plutarch seems to 
                                                            
14 See p.77-84 
15 It seems Plutarch overlooked this even though he quotes a passage from Chrysippus which is 
suggestive of how this process unfolded via “the interchange of its different parts into one another”. 
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be applying the same process of nutrition which is described in the work On the Gods, 
which has to do with destructible bodies, to the type of nourishment that takes place 
in the case of Zeus or the universe. Thus he is able to find a powerful argument against 
the Stoics, that if the universe is self-sustaining (a closed system) its basic material 
should not be able to increase for the reason he gives but also for the reasons 
enumerated in the previous chapter of this thesis. With this background in mind the 
contradiction Plutarch presents in fact gives us two useful pieces of information 
regarding the Stoic theory of nutrition as well as one useful insight into how the Stoics 
(or at least Chrysippus) used terms. First, then, it reveals to us that if we are to make 
a distinction between the type of nutrition that takes place in bodies which undergo 
generation and destruction (like gods and animals) and that which takes place in 
bodies which are ungenerated and indestructible (i.e. Zeus), then we can say 
Plutarch’s contradiction would only stand if it meant that when he was referring to 
the increase of Zeus he had in mind an increase “by addition”. We can, however, 
conceive of a spatial increase which does not necessarily imply a quantitative one and 
we know that the Stoics themselves did indeed distinguish three different types of 
growth: addition, extension and comparison.16 This gives us our first useful point: the 
nourishment of Zeus involves a type of growth which is spatial, or, in Stoic terms, an 
extension or expansion. Secondly, extrapolating from the above it would necessarily 
imply that the nourishment of bodies which are destroyed at conflagration involves a 
growth which increases their matter by addition, which is to say when a plant, an 
animal or a god grows, their growth is not necessarily spatial but quantitative. So we 
can easily speak of nutrition and growth throughout an individual’s life even if they 
                                                            
On this idea Sambursky says: “Here the Stoics hit upon an important physical law which applies to 
closed systems that are not subject to any interference” Physics of the Stoics, 114. However, the notion is 
already present in Plato: cf. Timaeus 33 C 8 – D 3.  
16 Cicero De Fin. 3. 34 where it is explained that the value (ἀξία) of virtue is a matter of kind, not degree. 
The distinction arises in ethical theory which supports the premise that the different parts of philosophy 
elucidate and inform each other. Cf. also Heracleitus DK (Freeman trans.) 126b. “One thing increases 
in one way, another in another, in relation to what it lacks.” (though Zeus increases not because he lacks 
anything) 
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shrink in size as they grow older.17 The same cannot be said of Zeus, for any 
nourishment he receives is accompanied by a proportionate increase in size. Further 
to this, we see that Chrysippus is not consistent with his terminology, at least this is 
the case when describing processes from different perspectives (or works), for his use 
of αὔξεται is clearly inconsistent from one case (quantitative increase) to the other 
(spatial increase). Finally, it is significant to note that destructible bodies receive their 
nutrition from outside of themselves whilst the type of nourishment applicable to 
Zeus is received from within. This cleanly explains why we can speak of a genuine 
addition to the former but not to the latter. 
With this distinction in mind we can now turn to our other major source for the 
nourishment of bodies, namely Sextus (M 7. 236-241). The passage in question requires 
a more complex analysis but provides us with greater insight into the actual processes 
involved for nourishment in relation to the activities of pneuma. In this passage Sextus 
is describing the Stoic epistemological theory of presentation  
But they do not seem even in this way to have escaped the charge. For 
when the leading part is nourished and grows, for God’s sake, it is 
altered by way of being affected (κατὰ πεῖσιν). But that kind of 
alteration in it, although it is by way of being affected, or a condition 
(διάθεσιν), is not appearance – unless they were in turn to say that the 
appearance is a peculiar way of being affected, which is different from 
conditions of that kind, or they were to say this: that since appearance 
comes about either from external things or from effects in us (τῶν ἐν 
ἡμῖν παθῶν) (and this is more properly called by them “empty 
attraction”), in the account of appearance there is absolutely implied 
at the same time the fact that the process of being affected (πεῖσιν) 
occurs either by way of impact from outside (τὴν ἐκτὸς προσβολὴν) 
or by way of effects in us (τὰ ἐν ἡμῖν πάθη) –and in the case of 
alterations that take the form of growth or nourishment, this can no 
longer be understood as included.18 
                                                            
17 This example is also noted by Alexander de anima 35. 12-13 
18 Trans. Bett 
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At the outset it becomes evident that we must make a distinction between alteration 
and growth, which seems also to be a distinction which Chrysippus held by 
implication when discussing growth (or increase) in his different usages of the term 
noted above. We may note here that Chrysippus does indeed make the distinction 
explicit to some extent when discussing the growth argument propounded by 
Epicharmus, as he applies growth and diminution to modifications of the substrate of 
individual bodies whereas he claims that others have mistakenly termed these 
modifications generation and destruction.19 Sextus, however, uses the absence of this 
specificity on Chrysippus’ behalf (in the particular work that Sextus is referring to) to 
equate the alteration that takes place inside the soul (or hegemonikon) during the 
process of presentation and impression with the alteration that takes place during the 
process of nourishment and growth. Since both types of alterations happen by way of 
passivity (κατὰ πεῖσιν), Sextus takes the Stoic position to be incoherent because, as 
his reasoning goes, if the process is the same so too must be the result. Instead what 
we have here is an indication of the unitary structure of Stoic thought which 
endeavours to explain all processes in accordance with the physical principles of the 
active and the passive.  
As with impressions the focus of attention for nutrition here is on particular bodies 
and not on the universe or Zeus. So the type of growth spoken of here involves an 
increase by addition and not an increase of size or extension. Whilst the passivity of 
an impression involves either an impact from the outside or else via an internal 
passion, Sextus concludes that nutrition, despite being passive, does not receive its 
alteration by means of impact. According to this passage, then, nourishment of 
particular bodies is not achieved by means of tensional motion, which is a prerequisite 
for any striking and impact to take place in bodies. If tensional motion is not involved 
in the initial reception of nourishment then assimilation must take place via some 
other type of passivity. We can therefore exclude the inward-outward motion of 
                                                            
19 Plutarch De comm. not. 1083 B-C 
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pneuma, which creates tensional motion, as being responsible for the absorption of 
nourishment. There is no obvious solution readily at hand as to what aspect of pneuma 
is involved in the nourishment of bodies, yet we can be certain that pneuma has some 
crucial role to play as it is described in numerous sources as the vitalising, nourishing 
and preservative force of bodies. 
Zeno’s integration of Presentations with Soul as a Vaporous Exhalation 
Although we have seen that the analogy between whole and part breaks down when 
it comes to the kind of increase (spatial or numerical) that results from nutrition, this 
need not mean that the process of nutrition itself differs from whole to part. This is 
especially the case if we accept the supposition that passivity and not activity is to be 
involved for the nourishment of both the universe and the particular contained by it. 
If Sextus’ cavil against the theory holds some persuasive sway with us we may simply 
recognise that the different result occurs because of the difference in the natures 
receiving the nourishment. Furthermore, whilst we may find fault with the 
fragmentary evidence for obscuring much of Stoic theory, we can to a large extent 
avoid such captious conclusions by relying instead on the concinnity of process that 
pervades the system. I will attempt now to bring into relief the attention that the Stoics 
gave to weaving integrity into their system and moreover to show that this project 
was well-established practice since Zeno.  
The Stoics are well known for having described the nature of psychic pneuma, i.e. soul, 
as a vaporous exhalation (ἀναθυμίασις). This definition goes as far back as Zeno20 
and this is significant as the notion of ἀναθυμίασις is crucial for divulging the 
                                                            
20 See: Eusebius Praep.  15.20-21 (=SVF 1. 139). We are fortunate that Eusebius preserves the usage of 
ἀναθυμίασις by Zeno as this attribution is not made explicit in any other extant evidence. It is more 
than likely that Eusebius had access to original works of Zeno’s at the library of Caesarea, probably 
deposited there by Origen who held many original works of the Stoics (Eusebius Historia Ecclesiastica 
VI.19.8) cf. A. J. Carriker, The Library of Eusebius of Caesarea (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 9 & 126–28. On the 
general reliability of Eusebius cf. Algra, “Zeno of Citium and Stoic Cosmology”. Further, in Nemesius 
de Nat. Hom. 2. 19. 10-13 we also find a possible attribution to Zeno though it is not said explicitly; the 
argument for this attribution based on context can be found at Verbeke, L’évolution de La Doctrine Du 
Pneuma, 20 n.35. 
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physical connections between whole and part, which in turn show that Zeno placed a 
large emphasis on the integration of his theories and the development not only of 
systematic thinking but also of a system of thought. Whilst it may sound like an odd 
description for soul, it is one which pays particular attention to the soul’s physical, or 
material, attributes which is at the heart of Stoic metaphysical beliefs. Zeno, no doubt, 
very consciously chose such a description not only for the metaphysical reasons of 
emphasising the soul’s corporeal nature but further to show that the underlying 
processes of the cosmos and those of individual living organisms are naturally 
harmonious. We have here an indication of Zeno’s systematising which became the 
inheritance of Stoicism in general and is usually credited to Chrysippus. The notion 
of ἀναθυμίασις is not only a significant aspect of Stoic embryology and the genesis 
of the soul as indicated by the etymology of soul being derived from the chilling of 
the first inhalation,21 it is also essential for understanding that the Stoic soul is not just 
brought into existence but it also needs to be sustained. The means of the soul’s 
nourishment by ἀναθυμίασις is closely tied to Stoic elemental theory in cosmology 
for just as Zeus is nourished via the terrestrial vaporous exhalations so too do 
vaporous exhalations nourish animal souls. In the process we can discern three 
components: liquid, air and fire. The two former are explicit in the evidence the latter 
is implied. 
It is necessary that this pneuma, that is the psychic kind, be nourished. 
From where else then, they claim, will it have its nourishment except 
from the air that is drawn in by inhalation? And yet also it is not 
unreasonable that this be nourished from the vaporous exhalation of 
the blood. (SVF 2. 783; cf. also SVF 2. 782 (= LS 53 E) 
The evidence presents us with some sort of equivocation, for ἀναθυμίασις is used to 
describe both the nature of soul and its nourishment, but this should not come as a 
surprise to us since the Stoics are used to describing things according to what they are 
composed out of, for example Zeus and fire being one and the same. It is an indication 
                                                            
21 Cf. SVF 2. 806 
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that the soul is indeed a physical thing and as such there is a physical process that 
underlies it and which needs to be explained. There is also possibly a discrepancy 
regarding the reliability of the sources here. The sources which say the soul is a 
vaporous exhalation may be seen as a reduction of the more specific theory that the 
vaporous exhalation is the nourishment for the soul,22 which would indicate that fire 
is the key component of the soul in a similar way as the fiery aether is nourished by 
vaporous exhalations from the sea. If indeed there is congruity of process with Stoic 
elemental theory then we can certainly show both that the soul is founded in the 
material world and that its existence relies on an underlying physical process. It is 
worth understanding as much as we can of this materiality of the soul for it is, 
invariably, foundational for describing many other aspects of the Stoic system 
including epistemology, theory of action and ethics.  
Now the passage quoted from Sextus above utilised the theory of growth and 
nourishment to show that there was some discrepancy in the coherence of the Stoic 
system with regard to how impressions are taken in by our hegemonikon. Sextus’ attack 
presupposes an underlying belief that the Stoics would have felt threatened by a 
doctrine in the logical part of philosophy being found to be inconsistent with a 
doctrine in the physical part. The effectiveness of this approach would only be 
successful if the Stoics did indeed have the conviction that their system was integrated 
in such a way as to require that something apparently quite independent, like the 
soul’s nourishment, be found to fit in with the process of receiving impressions from 
our sensory organs. Moreover, the attack is not focused on some metaphysical notion 
that the soul is nourished and survives because of our sensory experiences but rather 
the point is that the physical processes underlying the soul’s reception of nourishment 
on the one hand and impressions on the other are considered to be the same. If this 
                                                            
22 Harold Fredrik Cherniss, Plutarch Moralia. Vol. 13 Part 2 (Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University 
Press, 1976), 861 note g. 
114 
 
were an isolated instance we could simply put the issue to rest by arguing that this is 
just a part of Sextus’ Sceptical methodology – but it is not.  
In the contemporary literature, as far as I know, only Tieleman has shown interest in 
the wider scope of nourishment in Stoicism and he has uncovered the connection 
between nourishment and voluntary movements in the soul, which is to be seen as a 
later development by Diogenes of Babylon. Diogenes is conceived of as a renegade 
partly because of his position but, as Tieleman argues, this is probably down to 
Galen’s polemic.23 This indicates the possibility that in the early Stoa their theory of 
nourishment implies far more than is at first evident. Indeed, from the sources 
presented here it seems as though Diogenes of Babylon was building on what had 
come before. There are numerous sources attributed to earlier (as also to later) Stoics, 
which speak of nourishment and growth in the same passage as sensory impressions 
and in fact it seems as though the majority of sources in speaking of nourishment refer 
in some way to impressions or cognitive process. Moreover, whilst some of these 
sources are attacking the Stoic theory others are rather using the two theories together 
for exposition purposes.24 It is worth quoting Plutarch’s critique: 
And in what they suppose to be the essence and genesis of conception 
itself are they not at odds with the common conceptions? For 
conception is a kind of mental image, and a mental image is an 
impression in the soul; but the nature of soul is vaporous exhalation, 
                                                            
23 Tieleman, Galen and Chrysippus on the Soul, 90–95. 
24 In addition to Sextus M 7. 236-241 there is M. Aurel. V. 33 (ἀναθυμίασις), VI. 16 (Marcus refers to the 
changing nature of the result of the soul’s nourishment (exhalation) and of the result of impressions 
(appearances); Epictetus Dis. 2. 22,5 (suitable nourishment and impressions are ready to hand but not 
received well by dull souls). More elaborately physical accounts are to be found at Plutarch De comm. 
not. 1084F – 1085B and Eusebius Praep. 15.20-21 (quoting Zeno and Cleanthes’ views from Arius 
Didymus [20] and Longinus attack [21]) parts of which I quote here. In addition to this there is also the 
evidence which describes the soul not as an exhalation from the blood but rather as an exhalation 
endowed with sensation (Eusebius Praep. 15. 20 & SVF 2.778). In Cicero too nourishment and the 
breathing of air are directly correlated with sensory stimuli and experience (ND 2.83). Finally, we have 
a wonderful source which expresses this connection explicitly for Chrysippus, Galen PHP III 1.25 ( = 
SVF 2. 886): “for impressions (ἐμφάσεις) arise in us as if it were vaporised (ἀναθυμιωμένου) from the 
heart and were pushing out against certain parts and were blowing (ἐμφυσῶντος) into the face and 
hands.” For a discussion of this passage in relation to the passions see Tieleman, 237–38. 
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on which it is difficult to make an impression on account of its subtility 
(μανότητα) and for which to receive and retain an impression is 
impossible. Liquids being the source of its nourishment, i.e. of its 
genesis, this is in process of continual accretion (συνεχῆ ἐπιφορὰν) 
and consumption (ἀνάλωσιν); and its mixture with the air of 
respiration is for ever making a new thing of the vaporous exhalation 
as this is altered and transformed by the current which rushes in from 
without (θύραθεν) and withdraws again. For one could more easily 
suppose shapes and imprints and forms being kept by a stream of 
running water than by a moving breath which is perpetually being 
blended with vapours and moistures within and with another, an inert 
and alien breath as it were, from without. The Stoics, however, are so 
heedless of themselves as to define conceptions as a kind of conserved 
notions and memories as abiding and stable impressions and to fix 
absolutely firm the forms of knowledge as being unalterable and 
steadfast and then to place beneath these things as base and 
foundation a substance that slides and scatters and is always in motion 
and flux.25 
 
Plutarch’s objection is obvious. How can we speak of a unified consciousness if that 
consciousness is based on something that is ever-changing? Is the permanence of the 
self not necessarily vanishing in the perpetual flux of ever new exhalations? But it 
seems to me that this is indeed the point that the Stoics and Zeno wish to make. The 
soul is not eternal but is for ever changing not only due to its nature but also due to 
the fact that it is receiving impressions constantly. Indeed because the foundation is 
made up of physically alterable stuff it is no easy task to have a unified consciousness 
as this necessarily involves being able to understand the diversity of these alterations 
as some collective whole, which is simply not possible until the individual has some 
experience or power of the mind to do so. Of necessity then one needs to receive a 
multitude of information before one is able to see any coherence between the 
individual pieces. It is for this reason that despite a baby having an awareness of self 
                                                            
25 Plutarch De comm. not. 1084F – 1085B 
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in terms of its own survival it has no awareness of its self as a unified individual. And, 
whilst sensation is available from birth once the newly born has taken its first breath, 
it is said that the mind and the greatest powers of the soul are not implanted as reason 
directly at birth. Reason is that which unifies the ever-changing nature of our soul via 
the impressions we receive from the outside.26  And so the stability of the soul is 
secured by a gradual accretion of impressions. The passivity of process involved in 
the growth of the soul via inhalation and nourishment conforms to the passivity 
involved in the soul which is altered by the impressions it receives.  
If we return to the aporia presented by Sextus that the hegemonikon is affected in such 
a way as to increase both when receiving nourishment and when receiving 
impressions, we begin to have an inkling as to why we attain different results when 
the hegemonikon is increased by way of impression and by way of nourishment. Whilst 
both have to do with the introduction of air from the outside the character of the air is 
different and so too is the way that it is received. For the hegemonikon passively 
assimilates the circumambient air for nourishment whereas it is passively struck by 
the aeriform impressions from the outside in presentations. So whilst the processes 
may seem similar in that they are both passive (as Sextus notes), the passivity has two 
forms, which are not always so easy to discern from the evidence. The result is that 
our hegemonikon grows and is sustained and preserved by inhalation securing its 
survival, and it is altered and strengthened by being struck continuously by 
impressions that ultimately secure the soul’s awareness of identity. Both processes 
appear to be automatic and both occur by means of passivity (κατὰ πεῖσιν). That these 
processes are indeed intimately bound to each other should become further evident 
by the fact that the way the hegemonikon is altered by impressions ultimately leads to 
its ability to take in more refined forms of nourishment that do not rely on respiration 
and on blood but rather on the more refined aether and in so doing provide the soul 
                                                            
26 Cf. e.g. D.L. 7.55-56  
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with an existence that extends beyond a life of flesh and bone.27 In this way we far 
more easily make sense of the standard Stoic doctrine that reason (logos) is attained 
only after a period of constant accretion of impressions assembled up to the age of 
fourteen.28 It is safe to assume that it is this which also secures an awareness of a 
unified consciousness and the arrival of thought which includes such things as living 
according to nature and living virtuously. The soul, or rather the hegemonikon, requires 
a period of incubation in which it is forged from the continuous blows of impressions. 
The physicality of the process is brought into stark relief. Likewise we can understand 
why Cleanthes is said to have held that the mind comes in from the outside 
(θύραθεν εἰσκρίνεσθαι τὸν νοῦν), and how this is indeed in harmony with the 
fundamentally physical account of the soul developed by Zeno.29 
So how does this all fit in with the problem which we set out to elucidate at the 
beginning of this chapter regarding the increase of fire during the cosmic cycle? Our 
analysis of the texts has shown that impressions have the power of altering our soul 
by way of passivity. The alteration of our soul by our impressions may be directed 
either towards virtue or vice and if to the former our soul will invariably become more 
rational. On a physical level this means that our souls become more fiery. The 
alteration can thus be perceived in relation to the substance of the universe and is best 
described as an elemental transmutation in individual bodies from denser to more 
rarefied states. A passage from Arius Didymus, preserved in Eusebius, shows us that 
the world soul and the individual soul are bound together in this way. 
                                                            
27 Plutarch de facie luna 943 D-E: “When souls become firm (σταθερά) and translucent (διαυγές), 
because of being close to the moon, then they are also nourished easily by any type of exhalation that 
reaches them.” 
28Stobaeus Ι, 48. 8 Πάλιν τοίνυν περὶ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ πασῶν τῶν κρειττόνων δυνάμεων τῆς ψυχῆς οἱ 
μὲν Στωικοὶ λέγουσι μὴ εὐθὴς ἐμφύεσθαι ταὸν λὀγον, ὕστερον δὲ συναθροίζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν 
αἰσθήσεων καὶ φαντασιῶν περὶ δεκατέσσερα ἔτη. 
29 Stob. Ι, 48. 7. Verbeke sees Cleanthes as generally faithful to the fundamental principles of the 
psychology of his master, but on this point of the mind entering from the outside he mistakenly sees 
Platonic influences and a divergence from Zeno: Verbeke, L’évolution de La Doctrine Du Pneuma, 47.  
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And they say [Zeno and Cleanthes] that there is a soul in the universe, 
which they call aether, and air surrounding the land and sea, and 
exhalations from them; and that to this soul are attached 
(προσπεφυκέναι) all the other souls, both those in animals, and those 
in the surrounding air; for the souls of the dead still continue.30  
This passage does not qualify the type of animal here. It may be that irrational animals 
are referred to as well but this seems unlikely, given the general attitude of the Stoics 
towards animals, and also because a further comment refers to the souls in the 
surrounding air, which can only be the gods and thus an appropriate contrast is 
provided between rational gods and rational humans. It is however not impossible 
that irrational animal souls would also continue after death. This would contribute to 
speeding up the gradual dessication of the universe but it would not cohere so well 
with Zeno and Cleanthes’ theories of nutrition and the forging of the soul via 
impressions. Moreover, Arius Didymus in the same passage further on provides a 
more specific account by saying that the souls of the foolish and irrational animals 
only last for certain periods of time.31 In physical terms the souls of irrational animals 
are presumably not fiery enough to reach the aether and are as such reabsorbed back 
into the cosmic cycle rather than assimilated into Zeus.  
Thus, an integrated picture begins to emerge. The sources referring to the continuous 
growth of the substance of the universe up to conflagration may be seen as describing 
a gradual transmutation from the denser elements to the more rarefied. This 
transmutation invariably corresponds to an expansion of the substance. The 
                                                            
30 Eusebius Praep. 15.20 
31 In general the Eusebius (Arius Didymus) passage provides us with more details than the oft cited 
Diogenes Laertius 7.157.  Diogenes records a difference between Cleanthes and Chrysippus: “Cleanthes 
indeed holds that all souls continue to exist until the general conflagration; but Chrysippus says that 
only the souls of the wise do so.” Arius Didymus is more precise with the idea, if not with the 
attribution, in recording that some Stoics have the “souls of the foolish and of irrational animals perish 
together with their bodies” and for other Stoics that “the soul is created and perishable, but does not 
perish immediately when freed from the body, but abides for some time by itself; the soul of the good 
until the resolution of all things into fire, but the soul of the foolish for certain periods of time.” So it 
would seem as though the length of time a soul survives for is graded according to how good or 
irrational it is and so its fieriness is directly related to its temporal duration. 
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expansion is not perceived as a quantitative increase because the same quantity of 
substance was always present simply in a denser form and as it becomes fiery it 
naturally grows in size. The most interesting aspect of the process, however, is the 
inventive way in which the early Stoics wove their system together and how their 
physical explanation of the conflagration was intimately bound up with their 
psychological theories. The role of rational beings in the ultimate conflagration of the 
cosmos is decisive and reflects a greater connection with god, for without rational 
beings there would be no conversion of the denser substance back into its fiery state. 
By our own sensory natures we interact with the physical world and in this interactive 
process with our environment we assimilate the physical matter of aeriform 
impressions into ourselves and through our own rationality transmute this into more 
refined and coherent matter. Without the rational transmutation of matter the 
universe – as it gradually becomes more and more dense – would, eventually, die. By 
observing the integration of their doctrines in this way we may gain a glimpse into 
what the Stoics considered the paedagogical necessity of studying physics before 
theology, for in this way it may be said that our καθῆκον extends beyond our selves 
and our world to the whole cosmos. 
 
  
120 
 
5. Pneumatic Texture and the Cognitive Process 
Introduction 
We have seen in the previous chapter that Stoic ideas about the growth and nutrition 
of the cosmos were bound up with views about psychology and epistemology at the 
individual level.  In this chapter I turn to a fuller examination of the physical activities 
that underlie the processes of attaining knowledge.  It is no easy task to discover these. 
Anna-Maria Ioppolo, in an erudite paper, established that when we speak of thought 
processes in early Stoic philosophy we must take these to be mechanical and physical 
rather than psychological.1 It is well understood that physics is important for Stoic 
epistemology. In his excellent and concise monograph On the Stoic Theory of Knowledge 
Gerard Watson acknowledges this significance of physics for an understanding of the 
Stoic theory of knowledge by initiating his study with an examination of physics. In 
due course he assigns some of the basic qualities of pneuma’s motion to the acceptance 
and retention of knowledge. He designates expansion to the outward movement and 
contraction to the inward motion of pneuma and claims that the former corresponds to 
the acceptance and the latter to the retention of knowledge.2 This very brief description 
is the extent to which he explores the pneumatic aspects of attaining knowledge3 and 
he unfortunately does not explain the underlying physical processes involved any 
further. Later on we will see that his assumption here is mistaken.  
Watson’s account is one of the more philosophically aware of the involvement of 
pneuma in knowledge reception and accretion. More recently Gourinat has given 
perhaps the fullest account of the physical processes involved in cognition which he 
accompanies with ample use of the sources related to the cognitive process.4 Whilst 
                                                            
1 Anna Maria Ioppolo, “Presentation and Assent : A Physical and Cognitive Problem in Early Stoicism,” 
Classical Quarterly 40 (1990): 433–49. 
2 Gerard Watson, The Stoic Theory of Knowledge (Belfast: Queen’s Univ., 1966), 22. On an interesting 
account of the role of contraction in δόξα cf. Margaret E. Reesor, The Nature of Man in Early Stoic 
Philosophy (London: Duckworth, 1989), 131–33. 
3 I exclude his account of sensation on p.28 which is simply a description of what is in the source text 
(D.L. 7 158).  
4 Gourinat, Οι Στωϊκοί για την ψυχή [Les stoiciens et l’ame], 51–109. 
121 
 
informative his description is confined to sources which are well-known. Similarly, 
other studies involve physics in their accounts to the extent that they refer for instance 
to the much used sources which refer to the extension (συνέντασις) of the soul from 
the hegmonikon to the senses5 or speak of an assent as being firm and steady or weak 
and changeable6 or refer to the passivity of an impression and the active nature of an 
assent.7 Whilst these physical aspects are referred to, acknowledged and accepted as 
the fundamental framework on which the Stoic theory of knowledge is based, there is 
scant discussion of the actual mechanical processes that are taking place. This sorry 
state of affairs is due to the problem of our extant evidence. Our only evidence that 
comes close to describing the underlying physical processes of pneuma in the 
attainment of knowledge is that which has to do with impressions that arrive to us via 
sensory perception8 but we have no direct evidence of what is going on in the pneuma 
when for instance we assent or yield to that impression, let alone what is going on 
when the impression is a cognitive one (καταληπτική). In order to get any idea of 
what the Stoics might have been thinking in this regard we will have to use material 
from other contexts which will mainly be part of the physical philosophy of the Stoics. 
It is not my aim, when discussing the physical texts, to disentangle which doctrines 
were held by individual heads of the school but I will be focusing on Zeno’s theory of 
knowledge.9 This chapter should be understood in relation to much of what is said in 
                                                            
5 Cf. e.g. SVF 2. 879, 864, 866  
6 Cf. e.g. Stob. Ecl. ΙΙ, 7. 11ιβ (= p. 111, 18 – 112, 8); Sextus M 7.151–52 
7 In addition to Gourinat referred to in n. 4 above, on the extension of soul cf. especially Gould, The 
Philosophy of Chrysippus, 51–66; Todd, “Συνέντασις and the Stoic Theory of Perception”. On the 
firmness and weakness of assent cf. esp.Annas, “Stoic Epistemology,” 186–87; Katja Maria Vogt, Belief 
and Truth : A Skeptic Reading of Plato (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Pr., 2012) Ch. 7 “Why 
Beliefs Are Never True: A Reconstruction of Stoic Epistemology”. On the passive and active nature of 
impression and assent respectively cf. Michael Frede, “Stoic Epistemology,” in The Cambridge History of 
Hellenistic Philosophy, ed. Keimpe A. Algra et al. (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Pr., 
1999), 300–301 & 306–7; Ioppolo, “Presentation and Assent,” 435–36. 
8 See n.5 above 
9 I am not concerned here with the debate between Academic Sceptics and Stoics which involved later 
members of the school and which has been studied extensively with particular emphasis on what is the 
object of our assent  is it a real object or a proposition or an assertible? I touch upon this only briefly 
below in relation to the difference between cognition and science.  For exemplary studies on the debate 
with Academics see in particular: Annas, “Stoic Epistemology”; Frede, “Stoic Epistemology”. 
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the rest of the thesis and in this way it should be possible to at least discern that much 
of what is reconstructed here has its origins in specific aspects of the pneumatic 
theories of individual Stoics. 
I shall here approach a reconstruction of the underlying physical processes of 
perception by sustaining the underlying methodological principle that there is 
coherence between the general and the particular in Stoic physics. I shall first present 
Zeno’s analogy describing the acquisition of knowledge which graphically presents 
the basic stages of the Stoic theory of knowledge acquisition. I shall then chart the 
evidence related to a missing part of the process in the analogy and link it to the usage 
of the Stoic terminology related to pneuma’s activity, focusing primarily on two attacks 
on the Stoic doctrine: a critique of the relation of strength to the tensility of a body in 
Alexander of Aphrodisias, and an attack on the relation of the coherence of a body to 
its rarity and density in Galen. I shall argue first that when taken together these 
sources reveal to us that Stoic terminology was not always understood with fidelity 
to the original ideas, and then that by tracing the confused use of these terms across 
the arguments of commentators we have access to some of the underlying physical 
processes in the Stoic theory.  
Zeno on the Acquisition of Knowledge; Yielding and Assent 
In a passage found in Cicero Zeno offers a visual depiction with his hands of how the 
cognitive process takes place. This graphic depiction is very helpful with imagining 
what goes on.10  
1. An open palm  we receive a presentation (φαντασία) from the phenomenal 
world  
2. Fingers closing to touch the tip of the thumb  we assent (συγκατάθεσις) to 
that impression  
3. A clenched fist  we gain a stronger grasp once we have assented (κατάληψις) 
4. Our other hand grasps the clenched fist  knowledge is secured. (ἐπιστήμη) 
                                                            
10 Cicero Academica 2.145 (=SVF 1.66 = LS 41 A) 
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The analogy describes a temporal sequence in the acquisition of knowledge which is 
not exactly accurate regarding the specifics of the Stoic theory. Firstly, the temporal 
location of assent is misrepresented as our evidence shows that assent can occur 
simultaneously with phantasia, following swiftly after it, simultaneously with katalêpsis 
or even after it. In addition to this, an aspect of the process is missing. The absence is 
most likely due to it being both didactically unhelpful for newcomers to the Stoic 
school and also less concise and less easily represented. In our evidence we encounter 
a term that is often paired with assent: yielding (εἶξις). Yielding is often confused or 
conflated with giving hasty assent or weak assent, that is an assent to a non-cognitive 
impression, in other words to an impression which is either deceptive or false and one 
which cannot lead to knowledge but only to opinion. At other times it is equated with 
the type of assent that occurs with sensory perception. In his seminal book on impulse 
in Stoicism Inwood distinguished between assent and yielding; the latter, he argued, 
was the primary means towards impulse and action in animals since it involves an 
automatic response to stimuli, whereas rational beings have greater control and 
responsibility over their actions and therefore their activity is dominated primarily by 
assent and not by yielding.11  
The passive and active qualities of assent and yielding are not definitive, for they both 
contain both passive and active elements. Yet, treating this moment in the process as 
solely weak, negative and passive is something that opponents of Stoicism often do.  
More than this it often emerges as negative in Stoic texts as can be seen for example in 
Galen’s description of a Chrysippean account of shameful action: “One person desists 
when dangers arise, another became limp and gave in when a reward or penalty was 
brought, another on encountering other such things, which are not few in number. 
Every such situation defeats and enslaves us, so that by yielding to it we betray friends 
and cities and offer ourselves up to many shameful acts after our former impetus has 
                                                            
11 Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism, 75–88. Inwood’s discussion here is excellent but 
invariably his account on yielding is incomplete due to the fact that he does not take into account all 
the sources and thus neglects to recognise the active aspect to yielding. 
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gone slack.”12 Our response to difficult situations is negative when the tensional 
motion in our soul is slack and we are said to yield to the temptation of responding in 
a way that is not in our best interest or in that of others around us. On this account 
yielding can be understood to be the opposite of assent, it is a non-rational, passive 
way of responding to life and our environment and in this way we act in a non-
voluntary way –  as slaves. Contrariwise assent is seen to be our way to freedom. It is 
the rational part of our soul at work and is seen to belong only to rational animals. 
Epictetus would later on describe this in his incisively didactic way to show that it is 
our judgment which is the only thing that is completely within our control and it is 
this which sets us free from the enslavement of our passions; his description has 
become a very compelling idea in the askêsis of Stoicism.13  
Assent is as such given pride of place in Stoic theory for not only is it that which 
enables us to attain the criterion of knowledge but it is also the source of our very 
freedom. Despite the elegant simplicity of this account it is clear that the majority of 
our evidence for it is rather late, viz. Chrysippean, or even later if we include Epictetus. 
This is not necessarily a problem since much of our understanding of Stoic theory is 
derived from Chrysippean accounts or at least attributed to him. Nevertheless, with 
regard to yielding and assent we encounter discrepancies in the evidence relative to 
this standard narrative. Whilst the evidence that can be adduced is rather cursory, it 
is worth bringing together as it provides us both with an insight into the origins and 
development of the theory of yielding and assent but also with a stepping stone to 
further understanding the complex terminological usages considered above. In 
                                                            
12 Galen PHP IV 6. 7-8 
13 For an excellent discussion of assent as an expression of our free will see M. Frede, A Free Will : Origins 
of the Notion in Ancient Thought / Ed. by  Anthony A. Long ; with a Foreword by  David N. Sedley [A Free Will] 
(Berkeley (Calif.), 2011), 31–48. On the active nature of assent cf. Gourinat, Οι Στωϊκοί για την ψυχή 
[Les stoiciens et l’ame], 88–90 who quotes Sextus M 7.237 to show that assent is purely active; also 
Ioppolo, ‘Presentation and Assent’, 435–436 and Teun Tieleman, Chrysippus’ « On Affections » : 
Reconstruction and Interpretation (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 38–39, who connects this with the tension of the 
pneuma. 
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combination the sources provide an upside down perspective of the one considered 
so far i.e. that yielding is active and assent passive.  
So for instance, a weak assent or a hasty assent or an assent to a false impression are 
also described as yieldings.14 The overall picture that emerges of yielding is that it is 
entirely passive and irrational but it is also the source of all our wrong assents. This 
seems to be a natural way of understanding yielding for it is in a sense a giving up or 
a giving in, an incapacity to resist, involuntarily and unconsciously accepting 
whatever is thrown at us. Even an appropriate assent can on occasion be viewed as 
involuntary and passive for as Cicero tells us:  
But those who refuse sense-perception and assent are virtually robbed 
of their minds. For just as a scale must sink when weights are placed 
in the balance, so the mind must give way to what is self-evident. It is 
no more possible for a living creature to refrain from assenting to 
something self-evident than for it to fail to pursue what appears 
appropriate to its nature.15 
The analogy of the scales and weights was used by Chrysippus16 but derives from 
Zeno.17 And that this is not an isolated example is further confirmed by Sextus who 
quotes a more graphic example which the Stoics liked to use:  
Hence the apprehensive appearance becomes the criterion of truth not 
without qualification, but when it has no obstacle. For this one [the 
apprehensive presentation (kataleptike phantasia)], they say, being plain 
and striking, all but grabs us by the hair, and draws us into assent, 
needing nothing else to strike us in this way or to suggest its difference 
from the others.18 
In these descriptions assent occurs involuntarily because we are unable to resist what 
is striking and evident. Indeed, with the analogies the Stoics use it is almost as though 
                                                            
14 The evidence must be seen in combination e.g. Plutarch Stoic. Repug. 1056 E-F; SVF 2.131 (=LS 41 D); 
Cicero Acad. 1.41-2; Sextus M 7.151 
15 Academica 2.37-8 (= LS40 O) 
16 Plutarch Stoic. Repug. 1045 C 
17 See Ioppolo, “Presentation and Assent,” 437 n.36. 
18 Sextus Μ 7.257 (Trans. Bett [modified]) 
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we are yielding to these impressions. But these are specific types of impressions. All 
the evidence which refers to this type of assent is related in one way or another to 
sense perception from which we receive cognition of surface qualities like white and 
black, or rough and smooth.19 I have been unable to discover anything extant which 
refers this type of passive assent to a cognition that is reached through demonstration. 
This suggests that the type of assent involved in reaching cognitive conclusions on the 
existence of god or harmony between parts, for example, can only be active. Yet, this 
evidence, on its own, brings us no closer to understanding the underlying physical 
processes in the pneuma which are involved in assent to an impression. What we can 
gain from this, however, is the recognition that there is a passive type of assent, which 
– at least in the way it is described by Zeno – acts in a similar way to yielding in that 
assent is achieved by a sort of giving way. This type of assent is often described as 
yielding in the modern literature20 and the balance of the evidence shows that, in 
specific circumstances, yielding and assent are used interchangeably. In light of the 
evidence we can easily arrive at several different interpretations.  
 
We can argue (i) that yielding is simply a form of involuntary, passive assent; (ii) in 
favour of maintaining a clear distinction regarding the voluntariness of assent and the 
involuntariness of yielding, i.e. we could say that weak, hasty and deceptive assents 
are, properly speaking, yieldings, for they are passive; (iii) that yielding and assent are 
two distinct aspects of the same process and that yielding is always accompanied by 
assent. Of these three interpretations, the first two should be rejected because the first 
fails to explain why assent should be used at all in describing what is clearly yielding 
and the second fails to explain why the terms are used interchangeably in different 
contexts. In my view we should accept the third interpretation which necessarily 
excludes (ii) and in some way assimilates (i). Following the vulgate narrative which 
                                                            
19 D.L. 7. 52 
20 See Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism, 77–88 and the evidence he adduces there. 
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describes assents as purely active and yieldings as purely passive is not helpful in 
explaining the balance of the evidence.  
Whilst we have seen that assents are described as both passive and active we also have 
evidence which describes yielding as active, which as far as I know has been largely 
overlooked in the modern literature.21 One source even states explicitly that the Stoics 
categorised yielding as an ἐνέργεια τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ.22 It is likely that despite our (and 
the commentators’) predispositions for conceiving yielding as passive, εἶξις was a 
precise philosophical term for the Stoics, whilst those who preserved their theories 
showed a relative disdain for Stoic insistence on their idiosyncratic and precise 
terminology. Cicero tells us as much in another context, that the Stoics cling “doggedly 
to their own terminology”.23 In a passage of Alexander’s de fato, the Stoics are accused 
of treating yielding as if it were voluntary.24 And in Diogenes Laertius Zeno is said to 
have distinguished between those impressions that are from real objects and those 
that are not: when from a real object the impression is καταληπτική, when not from 
a real object it is ἀκατάληπτος. He then goes on to say that an impression from a real 
object is followed by both yielding and assent, indicating that these are two distinct 
things which are both required for a κατάληψις.25 In light of this evidence, yielding 
needs to be rehabilitated back into the Stoic theory. Thus, we must reject 
interpretations (i) and (ii) above since neither of them treats yielding as distinct from 
assent but rather subjects it to being a weaker form of assent which cannot be the case 
when it is also involved in the acquisition of cognitive impressions (καταληπτικαί 
φαντασίαι) and also volition. I will in what follows attempt to show that 
interpretation (iii) explains the available evidence more completely and also offers us 
a deeper understanding of Stoic theory.  
                                                            
21 Cherniss has noticed that yielding was promoted as passive by opponents of Stoicism see Stoic. Repug. 
[1057 A] p.600-601 n. a 
22 Plutarch De Virtute Morale 447 A 
23 Cicero De fin. 4.78 cf. also Simplicius In Arist. Cat. 7. 166, 30-33 where he shows a disdain for the “fine 
distinctions” of the Stoics. 
24 Alex Aphr. De fato 183.21-30 (= SVF 2. 981) 
25 D.L. 7. 46-51 
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Let us return to the stages which Zeno describes in his hand analogy. It would seem 
as though there is a temporal sequence to the process of cognition. This sequence, 
though is not as clear-cut as the analogy represents. To recapitulate, according to the 
analogy, (first stage) we receive an impression; (second stage) we assent to it; (third 
stage) we grasp it cognitively; (final stage) we collect all our cognitions together and 
have science. Zeno’s theory has an elegant simplicity to it.  The first three stages are 
based on sense-perception and are the means for our acquisition of knowledge. As we 
have seen a sense-perception is so striking that essentially we have no option but to 
assent to it; once we assent we have a cognitive grasp of it which is retained in our 
memory. What we are assenting to is the real object and not simply an image of it. This 
makes it possible for all people to recognise, for example, that rain is wet, mountains 
are big and jasmine smells sweet at night-time. Impression, assent and cognition all 
occur virtually simultaneously. There is no deliberation involved in the realisation of 
the above examples and one can note that the cognitive process is, up to this point, 
neutral.26 That is to say, that knowledge comes to us in a pure form, unadulterated by 
things like deception or value judgment. Our interaction with the environment is 
seemingly one sided. We are receivers passively absorbing the sensory stimuli that 
come our way. In this way knowledge is readily accessible to all, sages and fools alike, 
and is not the sole property of a few trained minds. Since knowledge belongs to all, 
this gives a very strong foundation to make the argument that everyone is responsible 
for their beliefs, for they cannot easily fall back on the excuse of ignorance or being 
deceived by their senses. Whilst in many ways the Stoic theory is a response to 
previous models of cognition, it is not primarily a result of their reaction to others but 
rather a natural consequence of their physics. The soul is a physical entity which 
interacts with the environment. That this is the case is also evident from the criticisms 
levelled against the Stoics. Plutarch for instance, in an attempt to destroy the Stoic 
                                                            
26 Alex. Aphr. De fato 184. 20-22 cf. Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism, 44.  
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theory by appealing to common sense, reveals to us that the Stoics viewed the transfer 
of impressions from the real objects of our environment to the mind of our soul as 
being the transfer of the moving pneuma (πνεῦμα φερόμενον) from within with 
another inert and alien pneuma from without.27 The difference is that the pneuma which 
is internal to us is also vital and sensory while that which is external to us is the hexis 
type devoid of self-motion and sensation. Nevertheless, the cognitive process is clearly 
an interaction of pneumata. Plutarch’s qualm is that pneumata are unable to imprint or 
retain any type of shape or form: “for one could more easily suppose shapes and 
imprints and forms being kept by a stream of running water than by a moving 
breath”.28 He continues by complaining that the Stoics make the result of these 
interactions to be stable and firm even though they have the most slippery 
foundation.29 Plutarch is not the only commentator who complained in this way and 
there are numerous examples of criticisms which follow the same theme. Moreover, 
these criticisms further help to establish the underlying physical process at play 
during cognition and thus also help us clarify the role of yielding.  
Attacks on Stoic Theory by Alexander of Aphrodisias and Galen 
Both Alexander of Aphrodisias and Galen arraign the Stoics for their recalcitrant 
theory of what constitutes a body. These types of polemics promulgate common 
misconceptions about Stoic thought and moreover make it difficult to make sense of 
how to pair Stoic theory with Stoic nomenclature. This problem is pronounced for the 
Stoic theory of pneuma since there is much technical terminology regarding the 
condition and texture of the pneuma and, worse, it is not at all clear what is meant by 
each of these terms as it seems they were often used in contradiction to entrenched 
assumptions. Further to this, some of these terms appear only in the works of one 
commentator and so cannot be collated with other evidence and the confusion 
between terms also arises in modern translations which often conflate terms which 
                                                            
27 Plutarch De comm. not. 1085 A 
28 It should be noted that this passage is pervaded by indirect references to the nourishment of the soul. 
29 Plutarch De comm. not. 1085 B 
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should be understood as distinct. For intstance it is very common practice to translate 
the terms ‘ἄτονος’ and ‘εὔτονος’ with the terms ‘soft’ and ‘firm’ respectively; yet this 
seems to assume too much and a more precise translation would be ‘toneless’ or ‘slack’ 
and ‘well-tensioned’ or ‘elastic’. This lack of precision is problematic when ‘soft’ is 
used for something like μανός and ‘hard’ is used to translate παχυμερής because if 
we do not distinguish between terms then we do not distinguish between ideas and 
we lose out on the realisation that in Stoic theory μανότης in physical process is 
opposite to ἀτονία. Terms such as these would seem to be used in a technical way and 
further than this some, which we would ordinarily think go together – such as density 
and stability or high tensility – do not. It is for this reason that we need to disentangle 
some of this terminology from confused commentaries which impugn any clear 
understanding of the original theory. It is significant to note that whilst the main 
sources adduced in what follows are arguing primarily from a physical perspective 
and for this reason (probably) have, as far as I know, not been used in analyses of the 
Stoic theory of knowledge, they explicitly refer in the former case to αἴσθησις and in 
the latter to φαντασία.  
The following passage from Alexander challenges the Stoics for their incapacity to be 
common-sensical:30 
Another point: for what reason can things which are in the dark not 
be perceived from the light, whereas those that are in the light can be 
seen from the dark? To say that illuminated air has in its capacity of 
distinguishing (or perhaps: by being split up [viz. by light]) greater 
strength and is capable of moving sensation via pressure, whereas 
unilluminated air is, due to its slackening, unable to tighten under the 
                                                            
30Alexander Aphrod. de anima libri mant. p. 131, 30 Bruns (= SVF 2.868): ἔτι διὰ τι ἐκ μὲν φωτὸς τὰ ἐν 
σκότῳ ὄντα οὐχ ὁρᾶται, ἐκ δὲ σκότους τὰ ἐν τῷ φωτί; τὸ γὰρ λέγειν, τὸν μὲν πεφωτισμένον ἀέρα 
τῷ διακεκρίσθαι μᾶλλον ἔχειν ἰσχὺν καὶ δύνασθαι τῇ ἐπερείσει τὴν αἴσθησιν κινεῖν, τὸν δὲ 
ἀφώτιστον τῷ κεχαλᾶσθαι μὴ δύνασθαι ὑπὸ τῆς ὄψεως συνεντείνεσθαι, καίτοι πυκνότερον ὄντα 
τοῦ πεφωτισμένου, πῶς πιθανόν; 
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pressure of vision even if it is more dense than illuminated air - how 
is this credible?31 
Alexander here considers that something that is denser should also be stronger and 
have a greater tensile capacity. I would say that Alexander’s complaint is legitimate: 
after all which is softer, an airy foam bed or a dense bed of rock? If something is not 
dense (πυκνόν) it is more rare or fine and so it is also looser and more relaxed 
(κεχαλᾶσθαι). But here we see that Alexander is thrown off course by the fact that the 
Stoics, in contradistinction to the vulgate view, would have rarity be both tighter 
(συνεντείνω) and firmer than something which is denser.  Moreover, this account is 
extracted from wider Stoic theory and thus segregates the terms from their proper 
context.32  
Alexander is not the only one to complain about this. In a separate context Galen takes 
on the Stoics for similar reasons:33 
For with regard to the easy-to-hand phantasia, it could be said that the 
hard and resistant-to-touch and the dense holds itself together. But on 
the other hand, the fine34 and the soft and the compliant need 
                                                            
31 The issue is a familiar one in problêmata contexts: how is it that when we are in the light we cannot 
see what is in the dark (e.g. inside a dark house), whereas from the dark we can see what is in the light 
(e.g. if we look from a dark room into the light outside). I have Keimpe Algra to thank for the above 
comment and help with the translation of this text. The Stoics claimed that darkness was visible due to 
the fiery rays that are sent out from the eyes cf. Calcidius in Tim. 237 and SVF 2.864. See also Gourinat, 
Οι Στωϊκοί για την ψυχή [Les stoiciens et l’ame], 62.  
32 On the context (or lack thereof) see Mansfeld and Runia, « Aëtiana » : The Method and Intellectual 
Context of a Doxographer. 2, The Compendium, 146.   
33 Galenus Περὶ πλήθους 3 Vol. VII p. 526 K. (= SVF 2.440):  ὅσον μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τῇ προχείρῳ 
φαντασίᾳ τὸ μὲν σκληρὸν καὶ ἀντίτυπον καὶ πυκνὸν ἑαυτὸ συνέχειν <ἂν> λέγοιτο, τὸ δ’ἀριόν τε 
καὶ μαλακὸν καὶ ὑπεῖκον ἑτέρου δεῖσθαι τοῦ συνέξοντος. οὐ μόνον δὲ ουδεμίαν ἀπόδειξιν εἰπόντες 
οἱ ἄνδρες ἀξιοῦσι πιστεύεσθαι τὴν ὑπόθεσιν αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ὑποτιθέμενοι 
μαχομένην οὐκ ἔτι αἰσθάνονται. τὰ γὰρ ἁπάντων λεπτομερέστερα καὶ μαλακώτερα καὶ 
εἰκτικώτερα, τὸ πῦρ καὶ <τὸν> ἀέρα, ταῦτ’αἴτια τῇ γῇ τῆς σκληρότητός τε καὶ ἀντιτυπίας εἶναί 
φασιν, ὡς ἐνδεχόμενον ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ τινὶ μεταδοῦναι δυνάμεως ἢ φύσεως ἢ ἐνεργείας ἢ ποιότητος, 
ἧς οὐ μετείληφεν αὐτό. καὶ γὰρ αὖ καὶ φαίνεται σαφῶς οὐ μόνον οὐδὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς 
συνεχόμενον, ἀλλὰ αὶ διαλυόμενα πάντα. πρὸς μὲν δὴ τὴν τῶν Στωϊκῶν ὑπόθεσιν ἑτέρωθι 
λέλεκται διὰ πλειόνων. 
34 The Stoics seem to have their own unique way of understanding this term (ἀραιός). The LSJ 
definitions do not account for this usage. I translate it as ‘fine’, in the sense of rare or subtle, to contrast 
appropriately with Stoic usages of πυκνός and παχυμερής. If we follow LSJ however we would use 
terms like ‘loose’ or ‘thin’ or ‘intermittent’ which can easily be confused with a slack or weak tension 
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something else for coherence. Thus not only do the men presume their 
own hypothesis even though they have no proof for this, but also they 
do not even perceive that they are making a hypothesis which 
contradicts itself.  
For they claim that the more refined and the softer and the more 
readily yielding fire and air are the cause for hardness and resistance 
in earth and that supposedly it is possible for one to impart to another 
power or nature or energy or quality of which it had no share in itself 
since again it appears clearly that not only is nothing held together by 
fire but (contrariwise) all is dissolved in it, and regarding this 
hypothesis of the Stoics it has been discussed elsewhere by many 
others.35 
According to the Galen passage, for the Stoics, that which is more refined 
(λεπτομερέστερα), softer (μαλακώτερα) and yielding (εἰκτικώτερα) (i.e. a fiery, airy 
nature) also possessess those properties which are the cause for hardness (σκληρότης) 
and resistance to touch (ἀντιτυπία). He inveighs against the Stoic theory in a similar 
fashion to Alexander, yet there appears to be a contradiction between the two sources 
for Alexander complained that the dense was more relaxed and that the light was 
harder but although Galen substantiates Alexander’s complaint about fire and air (i.e. 
the fine) being the cause of hardness he also claims, apparently in contradiction with 
Alexander, that it is also softer, more refined and more yielding. And here is the first 
clue that we are dealing with specific terminology which is being misused by the 
commentators.36 For one is talking of the tension and the other is talking of the texture 
                                                            
in the pneuma whilst also perhaps suggesting that there are interstices in the texture of the pneuma, 
which would be irreconcilable with the Stoics’ belief in the cosmos as a plenum with no void inside of 
it. 
35 This passage has been almost entirely neglected, the only other scholar I have been able to unearth 
who makes use of it is Sambursky, Physics of the Stoics, 35. He also finds that Alexander of Aphrodisias 
is familiar with this theory of the Stoics but refers to another passage which lacks much of the 
corresponding terminology De mixt. 223, 36 ff. 
36 In criticising the Stoic theory they could also fall back on the theories prevalent in many other 
philosophers regarding the hardness of dense bodies and the softness of rare ones such as the Epicurean 
atomists (see Sextus M 10. 43-44) who perceive softness (τὸ μαλακόν) as arising from the dilation or 
expansion (διάτασις) of atoms and hardness (τὸ σκληρόν) from their coming together or contraction 
(συνέλευσις). 
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of the pneuma. It would appear that these are two distinct things for the Stoics. Texture 
is characterised by density (πυκνότης) or rarity (μανότης), whilst tension is 
characterised by tightness (συνεντείνεσθαι) and slackness (κεχαλᾶσθαι). By 
recognising this distinction between tension and texture we are able to better 
understand the distinction and relation between yielding and assent. 
Yielding is a process which can and should be understood on the physical level. It is 
dependent on the density or rarity of pneuma. Yielding is often understood as forced 
assent but we can also see it as assent due to pre-determined physical necessity. As 
with many ideas in Stoicism there is an ambiguity in yielding which may appear 
contradictory. So it is that if we look at this from a psychological perspective, yielding 
can be seen as a giving in after an attempt at resistance. For example I don’t want to 
drink alcohol but then I go to a nice dinner, all my friends are drinking and I give in 
to the pressure of the social norm as well as to the desire for drink, against my initial 
wishes or regard for good health. Yet, there is another way to understand yielding and 
that is not as part of the process of resistance but as part of the process of assimilation 
or absorption of physical reality. A pneuma that is more yielding is also less dense, in 
other words it is more fiery and less watery. And if yielding is always accompanied 
by assent, be it forced or otherwise, the assent is bound to come once the soul has 
yielded as far as it can go, in other words once there is no space for it to yield any 
further. The capacity for either the assimilation of a presentation – where one becomes 
familiar with all its characteristics –  or for the absorption of an affection – where one 
can suffer greater impacts because there is still space in the soul –  is what marks out 
the strong (i.e. fiery) pneuma. Invariably the opponents of Stoicism jump on these 
apparent contradictions of Stoic equivocation which leads to paradoxical pairings 
such as giving in being coupled with strength, flexibility with stability, softness with 
high tension.  
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The Distinction between Tension and Texture 
When Alexander and Galen complain about these contradictory pairings we gain an 
indirect insight into the original theory. A narrative on aspects of Stoic cosmogony 
found in Dio Chrysostom, which unlike the previous sources is not describing the 
cognitive process or sensation, nevertheless sheds further light on this idea.37  
 
For indeed, when the mind alone had been left and had filled with 
itself immeasurable space, since it had poured itself evenly in all 
directions and nothing in it remained dense but complete rarity 
prevailed — at which time it becomes most beautiful — having 
obtained the purest nature of unadulterated light, it immediately 
longed for the existence that it had at first… 
… And having made fluid all his essence, one seed for the entire 
world, he himself moving about in it like a spirit that moulds and 
fashions in generation, then indeed most closely resembling the 
composition of the other creatures, inasmuch as he might with reason 
be said to consist of soul and body, he now with ease moulds and 
fashions all the rest, pouring about him his essence smooth and soft 
and easily yielding in every part. 
This text divulges something that was already implied in Galen and Alexander that 
‘thinness’, or rarity, is a characteristic of the most refined pneuma and consequently of 
the pneuma which has the highest tension and greatest coherence and stability. Further 
than this, though, it reveals to us the congruous relationship between rarity and 
                                                            
37 Dio Chrysostom Or. XXXVI § 55 (II p. 15, 8 Arn.) (= SVF 2.622): λειφθεὶς δὴ μόνος ὁ νοῦς καὶ τόπον 
ἀμήχανον ἐμπλήσας αὑτοῦ ἅτ’ ἐπ’ ἴσης πανταχῇ κεχυμένος, οὐδενὸς ἐν αὐτῷ πυκνοῦ λειφθέντος, 
ἀλλὰ πάσης ἐπικρατούσης μανότητος, ὅτε κάλλιστος γίγνεται, τὴν καθαρωτάτην λαβὼν αὐγῆς 
ἀκηράτου φύσιν, εὐθύς ἐπόθησε τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς βίον … ὑγρὰν δὲ ποιήσας τὴν ὅλην οὐσίαν, ἓν 
σπέρμα τοῦ παντός, αὐτὸς ἐν τούτῳ διαθέων, καθάπερ ἐν γονῇ πνεῦμα τὸ πλάττον καὶ 
δημιουργοῦν, τότε δὴ μάλιστα προσεοικὼς τῇ τῶν ἄλλων συστάσει ῴων, καθ’ ὅσον ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ 
σώματος συνεστάναι λέγοιτ’ ἂν οὐκ ἄπο τρόπου, τὰ λοιπὰ ἤδη ῥᾳδίως πλάττει καὶ τυποῖ, λείαν 
καὶ μαλακὴν αὑτῳ περιχέας τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ πᾶσαν εἴκουσαν εὐπετῶς. Dio’s poetic inclinations and 
golden mouthed rhetoric may put his reliability into question with regards to his use of technical Stoic 
terminology but regardless of the terminology the main ideas of the subtlety, softness and receptivity 
of the Stoic god remain. On the relative reliability of this passage see Mansfeld, “Providence and the 
Destruction of the Universe in Early Stoic Thought, with Some Remarks on the Mysteries of 
Philosophy,” 181–82. 
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yielding, that is to say, that not only is rarity necessary for yielding but, contra some 
scholars and commentators, who would make yielding paradigmatic of animal 
natures and weak souls, both yielding and rarity are physical signs of a strong rather 
than of a weak soul, that is to say, one more capable of perceiving incisively. 
If it is starting to make sense to accept that the pneuma has a texture then how is this 
to be distinguished from its tension? The tension can be described as the tone or 
frequency at which the texture of the soul vibrates. The tension is in a mutually 
interactive relation with the texture of the pneuma and both of them are intimately 
bound to the inward-outward motions that have their common source in the 
hegemonikon. If the inward-outward motion is a type of expansion and contraction, 
then, following Stoic elemental theory, we can say that an expansive pneuma is one 
that is more fiery and rarefied whilst a contracted one is more dense and consequently 
airy. A tonos is the result of this interaction between air and fire, expansion and 
contraction. The texture cannot be seen as the inward-outward motion itself but 
should rather be seen as the rarity or density of their combination. So, if we were to 
imagine a trampoline, the tension would be how tightly or loosely stretched the 
material is whilst the texture would be the material. And if we were to imagine a 
trampoline the size of a football pitch, then we would also probably need a special 
type of material that is more suited to functioning at tension over larger spaces. Just 
so, for a soul to have the capacity to expand to the greatest degree it requires an 
especially rare pneuma. On the other hand if the pneuma does not have the requisite 
rarity, i.e. it is too dense, then if the soul happens to stretch beyond the limit of its 
textural capacity it is liable to snap.  
Whilst there are implications here for ethical theory at this stage it should be noted we 
can and should avoid the notion that sensation happens by an inward-outward 
motion of the pneuma. That is to say, that we should scrap the idea that the pneuma 
stretches out from the sensory organs, touches the object of sense and the stimulus 
returns by means of the inward motion of pneuma. Whilst this palindromic motion is 
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commonly understood to be the way the sentient individual interacts with the world 
around oneself, the underlying process is easily confused as being one whereby the 
pneuma reaches out from the hegemonikon to the object, touches it and then returns. But 
in light of the above examination this view appears to be far more primitive then it 
originally seems. For it implies a process that involves temporally distinct moments 
of sensation so that for example we send out a pneumatic current from our ear as an 
outward motion, then this current is hit by a sound wave and then the pneumatic 
current turns back again to relay that impact back to the hegemonikon. This makes for 
a remarkably clumsy account of sensation which fails to describe the simultaneity of 
perception. The evidence gathered suggests that the theories of both tension and 
texture exist so as to avoid such scissions in the process. Aside from this, the inward-
outward motion is not described as being the means by which sensation takes place; 
it is rather described as that which sustains the body and makes it cohere with itself. 
It is not so much that the pneuma reaches outward through its expansive motion to 
touch things, but rather it is a matter of two pneumata touching each other: our own 
pneuma coming into contact with the pneuma of an external object. This is why 
sensation is described as a striking; it is as it were the impact when the two pneumata 
meet. The strike leads to an impact which invariably causes a vibration in the pneuma. 
This vibration travels through the pneuma to the hegemonikon. If the pneuma is dense 
the vibration does not travel smoothly and so the impression is not received in a clear 
and distinct way.  
Now we can understand statements which are otherwise  easily overlooked like the 
following from Sextus; “we find that the bodies of things apparent which are 
composed of far denser parts than is breath are unable to retain any impression at all 
that is made upon them”38. Their density rather than their tension is that which 
prevents them from retaining any impression. So in forming an opinion which is 
described as ἀσθενῆς and ψευδῆς we may imagine that this is due not only to a poor 
                                                            
38 Sextus M 7. 374 
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tension in the pneuma which receives the impact of the impression but also to the fact 
that the pneuma is not open enough to retain it. In fact we are encouraged further to 
interpret the process in this way when we see a descriptive report from Calcidius 
explaining what goes on in the pneuma:  
And they think that the mind senses in response to the stimulus of the 
breath, which transmits its own experience of the aggregation of 
visible forms to the innermost parts of the mind: when extended 
straight [tension] and, we might say, opened up [texture] it reports the 
visible objects as being bright, but when confused and muddied it 
indicates them as dark and shadowy.39 
 
We may also pay attention to the fact that a φαντασία was considered by the Stoics 
to be a type of illumination, related as it allegedly is to light (φῶς)40 and light is well 
understood as being like fire of a rare or fine character.41 In the fourfold categorisation 
of presentations (φαντασίαι) a convincing presentation is one that produces a smooth 
motion in the soul.42 The same term is used in the Dio Chrysostom text above (λεία). 
That this smoothness characterises the vibration (or texture) of the tension seems 
plausible when we see the Stoics explicitly referring to vibratory waves in the context 
of the pneuma:43 
So the Stoics claim that air is not comprised of tiny fragments but is 
continuous and wholly without void. When it is struck by pneuma, it 
develops waves in straight circles ad infinitum, until it fills the air which 
is found there, in the exact same way as a swimming-bath which is 
struck by a stone: the bath itself moves in a circular fashion and the air 
spherically.44   
                                                            
39 Calcidius in Tim. 237 
40 SVF 2. 54; Sextus M 7. 163, & 442 (light reveals not only other things but also itself) 
41 SVF 2. 432 
42 Sextus M 7. 241ff. 
43 Pseudo-Plutarchus, Placita philosophorum 902 E 
44 Οἱ δὲ Στωικοί φασι τὸν ἀέρα μὴ συγκεῖσθαι ἐκ θραυσμάτων, ἀλλὰ συνεχῆ <εἶναι>, δι’ ὅλου μηδὲν 
κενὸν ἔχοντα· ἐπειδὰν δὲ πληγῇ πνεύματι, κυματοῦται κατὰ κύκλους ὀρθοὺς εἰς ἄπειρον, ἕως 
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These vibratory waves are not applied solely to the elements to describe how, for 
instance, sound travels. But these vibratory waves are directly linked to our own 
apprehension via pneuma as this passage from Sextus shows: 
For just as air, when many people are speaking, receives an untold 
number of different impacts (πληγάς) at once, and right away the 
alterations that it takes on are also many, so too the leading part, when 
it has a variety of appearances, will experience something analogous 
to this.45 
Not only is a convincing presentation smooth but ignorance itself is described as a 
fluttering.46 It is not unreasonable at this stage to understand fluttering to mean more 
than just a mental or psychological vacillation but that it corresponds to physical 
reality also. 
Now although we have seen that the rarity of the pneuma plays a role in both the 
reception and retention of an impression it is as of yet still only inchoately understood 
how yielding is related to assent on the physical level. We are said to assent 
automatically once we have yielded. Having established that yielding is necessary for 
assent in that it plays a role in transferring impressions to the hegemonikon and in 
retaining those impressions, it follows that yielding also plays a role in assents which 
are not simply down to passions, weakness or deception but which have to do with 
volition, clarity and knowledge. Yet an assent of the latter kind is not automatic. How 
then do the mechanics of pneuma allow for one to be automatic and the other not? It 
seems to me that an automatic assent is more readily explained than a voluntary one 
in relation to the yielding pneuma. We can say that the rarer a pneuma is, the more 
receptive and flexible it is also. However, yielding when assent is automatic must be 
the yielding of a dense soul. Being dense it consequently yields very little. In some 
ways yielding can be understood also as a completion; this is partly the source of the 
                                                            
πληρώσῃ τὸν περικείμενον ἀέρα, ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς κολυμβήθρας τῆς πληγείσης λίθῳ· καὶ αὕτη μὲν 
κυκλικῶς κινεῖται ὁ δ’ ἀὴρ σφαιρικῶς.    
45 Sextus M 7.231 
46 Stobaeus II, 7. 5β (= SVF 3.663 [repeated in SVF 1.563]) 
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confusion that a soul yields in the completed sense of giving up, rather than flexibly 
or malleably giving in or giving way for an impression to be received and retained. If 
the texture of the pneuma is dense then its capacity for yielding is limited and so when 
it “fills up”, as it were, it is forced into assent. To express it in pneumatological terms; 
assent is our fire (hegemonikon) striking the pneuma  and a yielding is the process by 
which additions occur to the soul and indeed this being the process it also plays an 
important role before assent for it is the way that an impression is incorporated into 
the hegemonikon.  
The amount of capacity for yielding determines also our capacity to withhold assent. 
If we have a soul which does not yield easily then assent occurs too soon for our soul 
has in a sense been filled and confuses something which is incomplete, an opinion, 
with something which is complete i.e. a cognition. We are thus impelled to assent. So 
whilst it may seem that we are wholly responsible for each of our beliefs and 
consequent impulses and actions, the physical dimension describes a situation where 
we actually have no choice in the matter.47 This is why the stringent criterion held by 
Epictetus that in each situation it is our assent and only our assent that is responsible 
for our beliefs and actions is a rather hard-core Stoicism. Whilst emancipating us in 
the sense that it offers us a conviction in our own power over how we respond to our 
everyday interactions, it also opens us up to feelings of guilt and shame if we do not 
or sometimes cannot live up to those standards because the only one to blame is our 
self. The early Stoic understanding, however, seems to account for this as it can be 
understood through the physical dimension which allows for the possibility that our 
beliefs and actions are in some way physically determined such that we do not have 
control over them in the very specific sense which is incipiently evident in Epictetus’ 
Stoicism. After all even cognitive impressions are sometimes so clear and distinct as 
to make our assent automatic in the same way as a complete yielding does such that 
                                                            
47 Stevens has gathered together the evidence for this though he argues that the impulse comes before 
the assent rather than us being impelled to assent, “Preliminary Impulse in Stoic Psychology,” Ancient 
Philosophy 20, no. 1 (2000): 139–68. 
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it grabs us by the hair and forces us to assent. This should indicate that yielding is part 
of the process and that since the impression is so powerful the pneuma yields as far as 
it can go and so assents. When we say that we hold opinions there is a strong physical 
foundation for showing that an opinion is not simply a weak state of mind. Perhaps 
the opinion will not stand the test of time but in the present the individual who holds 
an opinion is utterly convinced of their own point of view. On a physical level we are 
convinced of our opinions because our pneuma does not have the capacity (it is not 
capacious enough) to contain anything more than what it does and our hegemonikon 
necessarily thinks that what it does contain corresponds with what is.  
This is also why an impulse is seen to be excessive (πλεονασμός) when it is a passion; 
physically speaking it is more than what the pneuma can handle in its current state.48 
Nevertheless, whilst it may be physically determined that we are subject to certain 
passions and convinced by certain opinions these are ways in which our pneumatic 
condition is naturally altered for when we discover that our opinion or passion was 
wrong or harmful then the condition of our pneuma is also altered. In a recent paper, 
Irene Liu has argued that it is a mistake to conceive of Stoic wisdom as consisting in 
an unshakeable grasp of the fundamental principles of nature. She refers to this as the 
“dominant view among modern scholars” and rightly claims that this view 
mistakenly focuses on the content of the Sage’s knowledge.49 Her chief aim in this 
paper is to crush this “dominant view” and her arguments are both persuasive and 
insightful. Ultimately, she argues that it is the disposition of the Sage that determines 
his or her wisdom, not whether one has grasped the truths of nature but how one grasps 
them. A consequence of this is that a fool may equally have knowledge of the same 
things as a sage, yet still remain a fool. Whilst Liu’s thesis is attractive, she mentions 
at the end of her paper that there is more of the story to tell. As far as I know there has 
not been much follow up on this, excepting a few comments on the “ordinariness” of 
                                                            
48 Galen PHP IV 6. 35ff; Stob. II, 7. 5β (=SVF  1. 563) 
49 Irene Liu, “Nature and Knowledge in Stoicism: On the Ordinariness of the Stoic Sage,” Apeiron 41, 
no. 4 (2008): 247–76. 
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the sage by Brouwer in his recent monograph.50 One deficiency in Liu’s paper is that 
she makes no clear connection with Stoic texts regarding what is meant by disposition; 
it sometimes appears that she would equate disposition with ἕξις.51 This omission 
leaves her position up for attack.52 Whilst Liu recognises that dispositional wisdom is 
a physical state she does not venture further into an examination of this. In what 
follows I argue that the disposition of the sage has to do with the rarity and density of 
the pneuma.  
Condition (διάθεσις), Disposition (σχέσις) and State (ἕξις) 
The Stoics in their own terms offer a clearly physical definition of knowledge as a type 
of pneuma, the ἑκτική type, which has a certain tension and a certain power that makes 
it receptive of presentations (φαντασίαι).53 We have seen that there are active and 
passive senses of yielding or an incomplete and a complete sense. The incomplete 
sense of yielding is to be understood as the διάθεσις or ‘condition’ of the soul.54 
Indeed, our discussion of nourishment included a consideration of this passivity in 
the passage by Sextus.55 In this text there is a confusion between the passivity of 
nourishment and of presentation which as we saw are intimately connected and are 
both seen to be a condition of the soul. What is meant by the διάθεσις of the soul when 
receiving presentations however is not entirely clear, but it is crucial in our 
understanding of yielding. The condition (διάθεσις) of our pneuma is that which, on a 
physical level, I have described as an incomplete yielding which makes us able to 
assent freely. In the modern literature and in translations, the term is not always 
rendered as ‘condition’ and it sometimes appears as ‘state’ or ‘disposition’. This 
invariably may lead to confusion since the early Stoics had a threefold categorisation 
                                                            
50 Brouwer, The Stoic Sage, 85 & 178. 
51 Liu, “Nature and Knowledge in Stoicism: On the Ordinariness of the Stoic Sage,” 263. 
52 cf. Brouwer, The Stoic Sage, 33 n. 96. 
53 Stobaeus ΙΙ, 7. 5ια (= SVF 3. 112, LS 41 H) 
54 Cf. the interesting passage at Simplicius In Arist. Cat. 8. 333-334 (= SVF 2. 185) where it is said that the 
passive is referred to in two ways: in relation to the active and in relation to the condition (διάθεσις). 
55 Sextus M 7.239-241 cf. also 237 
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which distinguished between condition (διάθεσις), disposition (σχέσις) and state 
(ἕξις). This distinction is preserved in a helpful passage from Simplicius56.  
It is also worth knowing what the Stoics have to say about these terms. 
For some people believe that they hold an opinion which is the 
converse of Aristotle’s, that condition (διάθεσις) is more stable than 
state (ἕξις). There is some basis for this belief, not because the 
difference between the two terms lies in being more or less stable, as 
the Stoics say, but because conditions differ; for they say that states are 
liable to intension and remission, but that conditions are not. That is 
why they say that the straightness of a rod, even if it is variable so that 
it can be bent, is a condition; for the straightness could not undergo 
remission or intension, nor could it admit the more or the less, so it is 
therefore a condition. In this way the virtues too are conditions, not 
because of some particular stable feature, but because they cannot be 
intensified and cannot admit the more; but the arts, although not 
easily changed, are not conditions. 
The Stoics appear to consider state (έξιν) as belonging to the latitude 
of the form, and condition (διάθεσιν) to the completion and 
consummation of the form, whether there is change and alteration, as 
in the case of the rod and its straightness, or whether there is none. We 
should rather consider whether the Stoic term ‘disposition’ is the same 
as Aristotle’s ‘condition’, being distinct from ‘state’ in so far as it is 
easy or hard to remove. But they do not agree even to this. For 
Aristotle says that unreliable health is a condition, while the Stoics do 
not agree that health of any kind is a disposition (σχέσις); for it has 
the particular feature of a state; for dispositions are characterised by 
acquired circumstances, while states are characterised by activities 
stemming from within themselves. So the Stoics do not think that 
states get their specific features from length of time or strength, but by 
some particular feature and characteristic; just as plants with roots are 
rooted to a greater or lesser degree but have one single common 
particular feature – a grip on the soil – so state is viewed as being the 
same in things that are hard or easy to change. Βroadly speaking, 
many things which are generically qualified have the particular 
                                                            
56 Simplicius In Arist. Cat. 8. 237-8 
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feature according to which they are specified in an attenuated 
(ἀνειμένως) state (sour wine, bitter almonds, and Molossian and 
Maltese hounds, for example – all of which share in the generic 
character, but in a limited degree and weakly). The state remains 
consistently one as far as its actual account is concerned, but it is often 
easily changed for some other reason. (20) 
That is why the Stoics commonly extend the term ‘states’ to things that 
are easily changed, whereas Aristotle calls these ‘conditions’, and they 
think that these differ greatly from dispositions. For the state of 
someone who regains his health is altogether different from being 
seated, from being on one’s guard and other such dispositions. For the 
latter have no firm roots or structures, while they say that the former 
exist in such a way that even when they undergo remission they 
endure as far as is possible for them, providing that something from 
themselves and their particular account lasts. That is why no 
disposition, not even one that is in some way hard to remove, is a state 
according to them. For it has from outside itself the feature of being 
hard to remove, like a thumb in a thumb screw, it would not be in a 
state resulting from such circumstances. But if it provides the actuality 
of being such from within itself, then it would be in a state, like clay 
which is transformed into pottery; it itself becomes pottery from 
within itself. So much for that.57 
Prima facie this passage seems quite complicated and it is not clear what the 
significance or value of the differences between διάθεσις, σχέσις and ἕξις is.58 Yet, the 
                                                            
57 Barrie Fleet’s translation does us the service of providing a corresponding distinction in English, 
which I follow: διάθεσις = condition; σχέσις = disposition; ἕξις = state. However, despite being clear 
with the distinction in this passage Fleet is not consistent throughout his translation see e.g. 212, 12-20. 
Long and Sedley in their collection use διάθεσις = character; σχέσις = state; ἕξις = tenor for their 
translation of this passage (47 S) but they do not maintain a consistent rendering for in other places they 
translate both διάθεσις and σχέσις as disposition (rather than as ‘character’ or (‘state’) e.g. 29 C & E, 39 
G, 41 D & G etc.. They also use disposition and state in relation to the so called ‘categories’ cf. their 
notes to 30 G where they point out a disposition and a state derive from the active and passive forms 
of the verb ἕχειν and claim that the Stoics themselves were not clear as to the difference between ποιόν 
and πῶς ἕχον. 
58 Long in his commentary on this passage is dismissive of the Stoic account A. A. Long and D. N. 
Sedley, eds., The Hellenistic Philosophers. Vol. 1 Translations of the Principal Sources with Philosophical 
Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 289: “There is clearly a measure of 
linguistic arbitrariness in these distinctions.” And Simplicius is also not so keen on (what he views to 
be) the overly assiduous distinctions of the Stoics in general In Arist. Cat. 7. 166, 30-33 
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Stoics had good reason to make the distinctions in this way as becomes evident if we 
simply look at the underlying physical structures involved in each one.  
According to this passage an ἕξις has the following character: (i) it is real. That is to 
say that honey is sweet regardless of any relation to other sweet or bitter things. It is 
not sweet only when compared to the bitterness of a lemon and the fact that it is less 
sweet than sugar does not make it any less reasonable to predicate sweetness of it. It 
is inherently sweet. (ii) Whatever we do to honey it will always be inherently sweet; 
if we at some point manage to make honey bitter the Stoics will say that it has been 
altered and has a different tension such that it is no longer honey. (iii) The same 
applies to something like health, which is not seen as health by virtue of being 
compared to disease and if all disease is eradicated, health will still be health and is 
essentially different to disease and not dependent on comparison with it. (iv) This is 
not to say that there are not grades of sweetness or health, for honey from flowers may 
be sweeter than honey from pine and this corresponds with the fact that on a physical 
level an ἕξις admits intensification and remission. A σχέσις on the other hand can (i) 
be altered far more easily with the passage of time and external circumstances.59 (ii) It 
is acquired from being in relation to other external circumstances, that is to say that a 
woman becomes a mother when she has a child and if that child dies she is no longer a 
mother. The woman remains though, which is why motherhood cannot be seen to be 
an ἕξις for if it were the woman would also perish when she stops being a mother just 
like a clay pot which is a clay pot but when smashed is no longer one. (iii) When 
speaking of σχέσις we say that it shows that there is no real difference, that is to say no 
difference that is fixed throughout time, between a mother and a daughter for when 
the daughter has a child she also becomes a mother in relation to her own daughter.  
(iv) A σχέσις is not easy or hard to remove. This is because it has no internal tension 
to characterise it. Consequently also there are no grades to, for example, being a 
                                                            
59 Cf. Simplicius’ critique of the Stoic account by accusing them of making it (in correspondence with 
the προς τι πῶς ἕχοντα) insubstantial thus contrasting with the ‘realness’ of an ἕξις In Arist. Cat. 8. 172, 
1-10 and 173, 20-32 
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mother or sitting down; two mothers are equally mothers and equally sitting down, 
one is not more or less of a mother than another nor is she sitting down more or less 
than the other. There are no degrees of intensification or remission in a σχέσις because 
there is no internal tension to characterise it, instead it receives its character from 
outside.60 
Having more or less clarified the distinction between σχέσις and ἕξις we can better 
understand διάθεσις for which less information is offered. The most significant point 
to note is that it is specifically said of διάθεσις that it does not admit of intension and 
remission. We have seen also that σχέσις is not intensified or relaxed in tension, 
though this is not said explicitly of it but is rather extrapolated from the account. 
Whilst both a διάθεσις and a σχέσις are not relaxed or intensified there is a basic 
difference. A σχέσις does not alter in tension because it has no inherent tension and 
thus no inherent pneumatic motion. Conversely, a διάθεσις is said explicitly to not 
admit intension and remission and this is because the Stoics see a διάθεσις as having 
an inherent tension and consequently a pneumatic motion.61 However, the tension of 
a διάθεσις is peculiar in that it differs from all other tensions in the Stoic cosmos as 
being constantly at its maximal tensility. It is thus called the completion and 
consummation of the form and for this reason also virtues are described as διαθέσεις. 
Yet, whilst the tension is stable this does not mean that the features or physical 
expression of a διάθεσις remain stable. A διάθεσις can undergo alteration and change 
in a different way to an ἕξις for whilst the latter admits of more or less and 
intensification and remission a διάθεσις can undergo a different type of alteration. 
This alteration, whilst not related to tension, seems to correspond with the rarity and 
density (or texture) of the pneuma for in another passage Simplicius tells us that whilst 
virtue is stable it has within itself an infinite capacity for expansion (χύσις) and 
                                                            
60 This account can also be corroborated by what is said at Simplicius In Arist. Cat. 7. 165, 32 – 166, 29 
61 See also Porphyry In Arist. Cat. 137. 29 - 138. 5 (= SVF 3. 525); D. L. 7. 101; Plutarch De comm. not. 1076 
C 
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contraction (συστολή).62 So when we speak of the rarity and density of the soul we are 
speaking of its condition and since, as Sextus notes, a presentation is “a passivity of 
ours and a condition”63 we can safely say that an impression occurs by means of the 
yielding capacity of the soul. This also gives us some clarification regarding what little 
is known about the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος, which is described as that which is involved 
in choosing what is akin to us and avoiding what is alien.64 This capacity is an internal 
condition of the soul which comes into play once the tension of the pneuma has been 
struck.65 It is also that which makes us differ from animals and why we have the 
capacity for virtue,66 which as we’ve seen involves pneumatic contractions and 
expansions. In this way we have a deeper insight into why it is the case that a 
contraction of the pneuma that accompanies a passion like sadness or anger will affect 
the way that we perceive and make judgments. Clearly, a denser and more contracted 
pneuma will invariably prevent us from both perceiving clearly and acting 
appropriately. 
However plausible this account may seem thus far we encounter perceptible 
difficulties. We hear that there was a difference in doctrine between Chrysippus and 
                                                            
62 The distinction also helps us clarify one of the confusions in reports of Stoic theory that a virtue was 
seen to be a state (ἕξις) because it is considered to be an art. In fact there are the intermediate arts which 
are states and so admit intension and remission and then there are arts like virtues which are διαθέσεις 
and do not. Simplicius, whilst being aware of the distinction (as he is the one who records it), 
nevertheless conflates the two later on by saying that both the virtues and the intermediate arts are 
states and then claiming the Stoics are confused in that some states admit intension and remission and 
others do not (Simplicius In Arist. Cat. 8. 284-285) cf. also Sextus M 9. 88 
63 Sextus M 7.237 
64 Sextus PH 1.65 The phrase is often rendered and interpreted as “internal speech” see Teun Tieleman, 
“The Spirit of Stoicism,” in The Holy Spirit, Inspiration, and the Cultures of Antiquity: Multidisciplinary 
Perspectives, ed. Jörg Frey and John R. Levison, Ekstasis : Religious Experience from Antiquity to the 
Middle Ages, volume 5 (Berlin ; Boston: De Gruyter, 2014), 52 n.44; Gerard Watson, “Discovering the 
Imagination : Platonists and Stoics on Phantasia,” in The Question of Eclectism. Studies in Later Greek 
Philosophy, ed. John M. Dillon and Anthony A. Long (Berkeley: Univ. of California Pr., 1988), 215. Cf. 
Reesor, The Nature of Man in Early Stoic Philosophy, 57, who gives a brief summary of the history of its 
discussion as both passive and active. 
65 Inwood observed that these powers of choosing, were possibly described by Zeno as dispositions 
(Inwood’s term for διάθεσις). He also posits another possibility: that for Zeno the powers of choosing 
were modifications of the pneuma but Inwood ventures no further than this statement. Cf. also n.117 in 
the same work, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism, 40. 
66 Sextus M 8. 275-276 
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Zeno. “Well, Chrysippus, in On Emotions, Bk 1, tries to prove that emotions are 
judgements of a kind of the rational, while Zeno thought that the emotions are not the 
actual judgements, but the contractions and expansions, risings and fallings of the 
pneuma that supervene on judgements.”67 If for Zeno the judgment comes before the 
contraction or expansion of the pneuma then it would seem that for Zeno the emotion 
itself does not affect the judgment but the judgment creates the emotion. Chrysippus, 
as is well known, considers the hegemonikon and the extension of the pneuma to be one 
and the same and thus his account could in some way accommodate our interpretation 
more readily for the judgment and the emotion are more intimately bound together. 
For Zeno there is a temporal succession from judgment to emotion.  
Here we may observe the gradual emergence of the idea in Stoicism that judgments 
are completely within our control, an idea which as we considered above culminates 
in the practical philosophy of Epictetus. By bringing them closer together Chrysippus 
removes the distinction between the two, thus making it harder to say that a judgment 
arises on its own or that an emotion has a life of its own. For Zeno, however there is 
greater interaction between emotions and judgments and this is because they are two 
distinct processes which as such can exist in relation to each other. We may imagine 
then that for Zeno whilst a judgment is what creates an emotion it is also plausible 
that the emotion then continues to have a life of its own as a contraction or expansion 
which invariably will affect a later judgment which in turn will lead to another 
emotion. In light of this it becomes relatively easy to see that one contraction of the 
pneuma will lead to further contractions and expansions will lead to further expansions 
which in a way train or temper the pneuma and determine its διάθεσις. So we can see 
that whilst judgment and assent play a dominant role in Stoicism, in the earliest stages 
of the school, yielding provided the substratum which determined how these played 
out. Philosophically speaking, the greatest consequence of this is that culpability and 
                                                            
67 Galen PHP V 1. 4-5 (=SVF 3. 461 (repeated in SVF 1.209) = Ian G. Kidd, ed., Posidonius. 3, The Translation 
of the Fragments (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Pr., 1999) f. 152). 
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responsibility played less of a role in individual actions. That is to say, that there is 
invariably a process of progress involved with the expansions and contractions of the 
soul and that these affect the διάθεσις of the pneuma. An individual judgment, whilst 
being solely our responsibility in one respect, is also a consequence of our previous 
actions and thoughts and so each individual assent is in some way physically 
predetermined absolving us to some extent of complete responsibility in individual 
cases. For Zeno it would seem that there is a physical integration of the notion of 
προκοπή which fails to emerge in the Chrysippean account.  
149 
 
6. Pneumatic Tonos 
Introduction 
The theory of tonos is largely absent in Zeno and appears only in a limited sense in 
Cleanthes. Whilst previous chapters have shown how the functions and mechanics of 
pneuma are well-determined from the time of Zeno, the theory of tonos stands apart as 
largely a Chrysippean development.1 This is not to imply that tension is contrary to 
Stoic doctrine for as we shall see it was developed to support the physical doctrine. 
Yet, it is perhaps this idea which, more than anything else, altered the face of Stoic 
physics and marked a shift away from original doctrine.2 In rehabilitating texture back 
into the system, the role of tension, as commonly conceived, has been reduced 
regarding the traditional functions of pneuma; a good tension is not seen as the only, 
nor even necessarily as the main factor, in virtuous thought and action, at least in so 
far as the earliest stages of the Stoa are concerned. This is largely due to the fact that 
quite simply, for Zeno, tonos was not involved in the process for it had not been 
conceived and yet he still needed to account for the physical dimension of ethics in 
just the same way as he needed to account for the ethical dimension of physics. It 
seems, however, as though Zeno had, intentionally or unintentionally, given a rather 
general account of the ‘physicality’ or solidity of bodies. This left the Stoics up for 
attack.  
In what follows I will briefly consider the development of the Stoic definition of body 
and how this is directly related to the notion of tonos. I will then chart the evidence 
available for the notion of tonos in the early Stoics (Zeno, Cleanthes and Sphaerus) 
considering the origins and emergence of the idea in Stoic physics. Finally, I will 
                                                            
1 See the excellent study of the development in Hahm, The Origins of Stoic Cosmology, 153–74; cf. also 
Sambursky, Physics of the Stoics, 28–40; Gould, The Philosophy of Chrysippus, 99–102; Scade, “Stoic 
Cosmological Limits and Their Platonic Background.” 
2 Lapidge, “Ἀρχαί and Στοιχεῖα,” 273, recognises this shift and attributes it instead to the inception of 
pneuma as a cosmic force. The cosmic operations, however, were well established in Zeno via his theory 
of rarefaction and densification and his description of god as being contained in the world. Rather, and 
as we shall see, the emergence of this shift is to be attributed to the introduction of the theory of tension. 
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consider what appear to be the most significant of the Chrysippean additions to the 
theory.  
Modern scholarship has generally conceived of tension being extended to the cosmic 
sphere as one of the most significant developments of Chrysippean physics. What has 
rarely been questioned is how strongly established the theory of tension was prior to 
Chrysippus, not simply regarding the cosmic level but also in relation to the parts. 
Stoic philosophy as it has come down to us is full of references to tension. However, 
it is not always clear what role tension plays in Stoic theory, probably because its 
usages are so flexible, appearing in Stoic theories of perception and theory of action, 
as well as being conceived of as present within all bodies of the Stoic cosmos. It is on 
this final point that we find previous aspects of Stoic theory, in particular rarefaction 
and densification, being incorporated into a new conception of the Stoic cosmos and 
the bodies within it. There is a definite shift present in the understanding of the Stoic 
system, yet it seems as though this shift was brought about in congruity with an 
aspiration for continuity and coherence. The evidence which was preserved in 
commentaries on Stoicism is often fraught with difficulties where two very different 
conceptions are conflated in terms of both explanation and technical terminology, 
incorporating tensional theory with the previous physical conceptions. This is evident 
throughout the extant sources, as we partly saw in the previous chapter. To elucidate 
with a further example, we see that the standard scala naturae, which was present in 
Zeno,3 is concerned with the different ‘grades’ of existence (inanimate, animate, 
rational). With the introduction of tension we also encounter a more explicit 
description of different degrees of tension within these grades. Whilst a higher tension 
in rational beings is conceived of as being conducive to rational and virtuous action 
and a slack tension to foolish and vicious action, there is no clear indication that non-
rational animals have a more slack tension than rational animals nor that things like 
                                                            
3 Themistius In de An. 35, 30-35 (411a11-13) (= Pearson fr. 43 = SVF 1.158) cf. also Stob. Ecl. Ι, 19. 4 (= 
Pearson fr. 67 = SVF 1.99) where the notion of ἕξις is seen by Zeno as belonging to all bodies in the 
cosmos.  
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rocks and sticks have the slackest tension.  Quite the contrary in fact, an ἕξις which 
belongs to things like rocks is described as “the strongest bond”.4 These confusing 
distinctions however are not present in an account which simply conceives of the scala 
naturae as grades of rarefaction and densification. If we say that a rock is more dense 
then, on the Stoic account, we would automatically think that its tension is also more 
slack and indeed numerous commentators use this confusion to level attacks on Stoic 
theory. 
Definitions of body 
This confusion is also present in the Stoic definitions of body. There are two basic 
definitions which have been passed down to us. The first is that a body is that which 
is capable of acting or being acted upon.5 The second is that a body is that which is 
spatially extended in three dimensions and has resistance.6 In the modern literature 
the former definition is often considered as more fundamental. This is argued for very 
strongly by M. E. Reesor who goes so far as to deny that the second definition belongs 
to the Stoics.7 In this early paper Reesor did not take into account some sources which 
explicitly attribute the second definition to the Stoics.8 Some scholars rightly point out 
that three-dimensionality is also predicated of some of the incorporeals, viz. void and 
space, and thus argue that three-dimensionality should not be taken as a proper 
definition of bodies.9 Indeed, from the second definition that which should be taken 
as primary is solidity and resistance rather than three-dimensionality.10 In his study 
                                                            
4 Philo, God's immutability 35-6 (= SVF 2.458, part). In Book 1 of his On Providence Chrysippus is also said 
to have stated that god pervades the cosmos by way of ἕξις D.L. 7.139. This may indicate that ἕξις is 
spoken of, broadly, as the foundational inward-outward motion of all bodies (belonging even to 
rational animals and god), and, exactly, as that motion which, when we introduce the notion of grades, 
is specifically of the kind that belongs to inanimate bodies like rocks and sticks.  
5 SVF 1.90, 146b, 518; 2.140, 363, 387; 3.8 
6 SVF 2.315, 319, 357, 381; 3.Apollod.6 (p.259); cf. 2.501, 502  
7 Margaret E. Reesor, “The Stoic Concept of Quality,” American Journal of Philology 75 (1954): 57. 
8 For a response to Reesor and the relevant evidence see Hahm, The Origins of Stoic Cosmology, 21 n.1. 
9 Gourinat, “The Stoics on Matter and Prime Matter: ‘Corporealism’ and the Imprint of Plato’s 
Timaeus,” 55–57, where he also notes “This is why one perhaps has to assume that this definition of 
body is misplaced in the context of the principles.”  
10 See Sextus M 10. 12 (= SVF 2.501); cf. the full argument with sources in J. Mansfeld, “Zeno of Citium. 
Critical Observations on a Recent Study,” Mnemosyne 31 (1978): 163–65. 
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on the Origins of Stoic Cosmology Hahm, whilst agreeing that the definition of body as 
capable of ποιεῖν and πάσχειν is of far greater significance to Stoic theory, states that 
it is not preserved in the form of a definition for body but is always attached to an 
argument as a “mark of a body”.11 The fact that only the latter claim, that a body is 
that which is spatially extended and has resistance, appears as a formal definition has 
led some scholars to believe that the active and passive character of bodies is an 
indication that this describes only their capacity for being active and passive (a 
property of bodies rather than a general definition) whilst the formal definition of 
body for the Stoics would be the more specific three-dimensionality and resistance.12 
However, we may adduce another two sources, neither of which are to be found in 
SVF, that present the first definition alongside the second as a theoretical definition.13  
Regardless of these technicalities, we are obliged to question what the significance of 
the two separate definitions is and if there is some sort of explanation for the Stoics 
having two very different definitions of body. It is often argued that the definition in 
terms of ποιεῖν and πάσχειν has its roots in Plato’s Sophist,14 though it is never easy 
to speak of influences with much certainty and more recently Sellars has argued that 
the connection is not as close as we might think.15 It has been aptly shown by Mansfeld 
in an excellent study with a treasure trove of information, which sadly does not seem 
to receive much attention, that there were probably two schools of thought in Stoicism 
regarding the definition of body. He also notes that we have no evidence that Zeno 
used the definition of body that involves three-dimensionality and resistance, though 
                                                            
11 Hahm, The Origins of Stoic Cosmology, 3. 
12 See e.g. Sedley, “Hellenistic Physics and Metaphysics,” 383; cf. also Sambursky, Physics of the Stoics, 
29–44; A. A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy. Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics (London: Duckworth, 1974), 152–58. 
13 Ps. Galen Hist. phil. ch. 23 and Sextus PH 3. 38-39 
14 Cf. e.g.  David N. Sedley, “The Stoic Theory of Universals,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 23, no. S1 
(1985): 87–92; Jacques Brunschwig, “La Théorie Stoïcienne Du Genre Suprême et l’ontologie 
Platonicienne,” in Matter and Metaphysics. Fourth Symposium Hellenisticum (Bibliopolis, 1988), 19–127 (an 
English translation is to be found in); Jacques Brunschwig, Papers in Hellenistic Philosophy (Cambridge ; 
New York: Cambridge University Pr., 1994); Victor Caston, “Something and Nothing : The Stoics on 
Concepts and Universals,” in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy (OSAP), ed. David N. Sedley, vol. 17 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 145–213. 
15 Sellars, “Stoic Ontology and Plato’s Sophist,” 197–203. 
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he does not exclude the possibility that he might have done so. However, the scope of 
his study does not include the possibility that the second definition developed 
alongside developments in tensional theory.16 In my view, the definition of body as 
three-dimensional with resistance is directly correlated with the introduction of the 
theory of tension into the Stoic system. The evidence also supports this claim in 
revealing that it was the preferred definition in later stages of the school’s lifetime, 
being attributed explicitly to both Apollodorus of Seleucia and Posidonius who, along 
with three-dimensionality, are said to have paid particular attention to the solidity of 
body in their definitions. In Posidonius this even advanced to accepting that limits are 
corporeal, contrary to all previous Stoics who viewed them as incorporeal.17 There is 
moreover no indication in the extant evidence that this definition existed for Zeno, 
who elaborated his ontological and physical theory based on the ποιεῖν-πάσχειν 
definition; it is more than probable that the second definition was introduced at a later 
date along with the introduction of a more elaborate use of the notion of tension and 
in order to strengthen Zeno’s ποιεῖν and πάσχειν.  
Zeno on tension 
Indeed, this view seems to be corroborated if we turn to Zeno’s usage of tension in his 
theory. The only sources that can be adduced which show that Zeno held some notion 
of tension are all rather flimsy. First there is a passage in Stobaeus18 in which the 
elements of fire and air are said to somehow “be extended” (τείνεσθαι) towards the 
centre. The use of the term in this context can equally be interpreted as “inclining” or 
“tending” towards the centre and is no guarantee of a formal tensional theory. 
Moreover, the term does not come down to us directly through the manuscript 
tradition but appears as γίνεσθαι in Stobaeus, which does not make much sense and 
was probably some scribal error. It was later altered by Diels as a correction that, no 
doubt, is more attractive than Meineke’s κινεῖσθαι in that it seems to be fitting for 
                                                            
16 Mansfeld, “Zeno of Citium. Critical Observations on a Recent Study,” 160–63. 
17 D.L. 7. 135 
18 Stob. Ecl. I, 19. 4 (= Pearson fr. 67 = SVF 1.99) 
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Stoic theory. For want of a better correction, then this is the passage which constitutes 
one of the strongest attributions of a tensional theory to Zeno. Lapidge also finds that 
that this use of τείνεσθαι in Zeno “manifestly has nothing to do with the tension 
(tonos) created by an all-pervading cosmic pneuma”. Nevertheless, he does not want to 
apply the same stringent criteria to bodily tension in Zeno, claiming that like Cleanthes 
he “clearly taught a theory of bodily tension”. The only source he adduces in support 
of this claim is our second source, the well-known SVF 1.150 which records that the 
theory of speech consisted in pneuma stretching (διατείνον) between the hegemonikon 
and the pharynx and tongue. Lapidge himself acknowledges that the source is “not 
beyond suspicion” but he nevertheless concludes that Zeno held a theory of bodily 
tension, presumably because it seems reasonable to suppose that such a fundamental 
theory in Stoicism dates back to its founder.19 However in this passage Zeno only 
refers to the voice as being the pneuma stretching from the hegemonikon to the mouth, 
whilst later Stoics apply tensional theory fully to all senses.20  
Our only other source which may refer to a Zenonian origin for Stoic tensional theory 
is to be found in Philo. This lengthy text records Theophrastus taking issue with 
certain views regarding the creation and destruction of the world where pneumatic 
tonos is mentioned as being hard to dissolve but not unbreakable.21 The passage has 
been the topic of an interesting debate in the modern literature starting with Zeller 
who argues that it preserves a genuine argument between Theophrastus and Zeno 
and hence the possible attribution of a pneumatic tonos in cosmology to Zeno. The 
early dispute between Zeller and Diels regarding this claim is well summarised by 
Pearson22 and such a remarkable discovery as a debate between Zeno and 
Theophrastus is certainly worth further examination. However, more recent 
scholarship has convincingly shown that the source should be seen as criticising some 
                                                            
19Michael Lapidge, “Stoic Cosmology,” in The Stoics, ed. John M. Rist (California: University of 
California Press, 1978), 172–73.  
20 Ps. Plut. Placita 903 B-C (= Ps. Galen de hist. philos. 102) 
21 Philo de Aet. Mund. 23. 117 – 24. 129 
22 Pearson, The Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes, 110–14, who is inclined to side with Zeller’s hypothesis. 
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Epicurean or Sceptic and not Zeno and so we should not hasten to attribute the usage 
of the term tonos here to Zeno.23  
This is the sum of our evidence for Zeno’s usage of the notion of tonos in his 
philosophy. Now, an absence of evidence is not a proof that he had no theory of 
tension. However, to my mind it seems likely that a notion which became so 
significant in the brand of Stoicism that succeeded him would certainly be commented 
upon in our evidence had he held such a theory. Discounting the lack of evidence as 
insufficient for a proof either way, with what we have argued so far concerning the 
significance of rarefaction and densification in earlier Stoicism (in the previous 
chapter) along with the stark absence of reference to resistance in his definition of a 
body, the balance of evidence shows that it is extremely unlikely that Zeno 
incorporated tension into the mechanics of his system. If this fails to convince us then 
other avenues are available to test the hypothesis and that is to refer to specific theories 
which were held by both Zeno and his successors. The difference between Zeno’s 
account of sleep and that offered by his successors offers a clear example. Zeno’s 
description of sleep is preserved by Cicero: “But Zeno thinks that sleep is nothing 
more than a contraction – a slipping and a collapse, as it were – of the human soul.”24 
Clearly Zeno is using the textural account, in terms of expansion and contraction, to 
refer to the underlying physical process of sleep and it is reasonable to suppose that 
wakefulness is characterised by a corresponding expansion. However, when we turn 
to the more well-known account of the cause of sleep in Stoicism it is recorded as 
follows: “sleep is caused, they say, by the slackening of the tension in our senses, 
which affects the hegemonikon.”25 This ‘new’ account of sleeping corresponds to the 
                                                            
23 D.N. Sedley, ‘Theophrastus and Epicurean Physics’, in ed. J.M. van Ophuijsen and M. van Raalte, 
Theophrastus: Reappraising the Sources, 1998, 331–354 and, in the same edition, A.A. Long, ‘Theophrastus 
and the Stoa’, 377–379. However, see A. A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers. Vol. 2 
Greek and Latin Texts with Notes and Bibliography (Cambridge, 1987), 275 46 J for Long and Sedley’s initial 
agreement with Zeller’s hypothesis.  
24 Cicero de Divin. 2.119 contrahi autem animum Zeno et quasi labi putat atque concidere et ipsum esse dormire. 
25 D.L. 7.158 τὸν δὲ ὕπνον γίνεσθαι ἐκλυομένου τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ τόνου περὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. 
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changes in the physical doctrine of the Stoics, which began to show a preference for 
tensional rather than textural explanations with regards to general physical process.  
Even though, as it seems, Zeno had no theory of tension himself to speak of, it is clear 
that he nevertheless had elaborated a physical theory which had some strong 
explanatory force for both individual bodies and the cosmos. Indeed, traces of the 
underlying physical processes developed by Zeno were evidently appropriated into 
the general theory of tension, especially with its inward-outward motion, and clearly 
also in aspects of the Stoic theory of emotion, with the expansions and contractions of 
the soul. It is generally assumed that Zeno was primarily concerned with ethics and 
as such had no developed theory of physics and this is often explained by the fact that 
tension, which is so important in the Stoic system of thought only appears in 
“embryonic” form in Zeno, awaiting the advances of Cleanthes and Chrysippus in the 
development of Stoic physics. Yet, the notion of philosophical system was present 
since the start and Zeno had accounted for physical integration in his own way. 
Cleanthes and Sphaerus on tension 
From the extant evidence we realise that it is with the immediate disciples of Zeno 
that the notion of tension begins to emerge. We may adduce a total of two sources 
which explicitly attribute the concept of tonos to Cleanthes and one more source may 
be adduced for Sphaerus. From a consideration of these sources it becomes clear that 
tonos has a very specific role to play for these early Stoics and it appears that the notion 
was introduced in order to explain a physical process which was absent in Zeno. At 
Plutarch Stoic. Repug. 1034 D we are told that in his Physical Treatises Cleanthes says 
that tension is impact of fire (πληγὴ πυρὸς ὁ τόνος ἑστί): 
Cleanthes in his Physical Treatises, after saying that tension is impact of 
fire and that if in the soul it becomes adequate for the accomplishment 
of what belongs to us (τα ἐπιβάλλοντα), it is called strength and 
power, continues in so many words: “This strength and power, when 
present in the case of things manifestly to be adhered to, is continence 
and, when in the case of things that are to be endured, is courage; 
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concerned with deserts it is justice, and concerned with choices and 
avoidances it is temperance.”   
This brief passage tells us a lot about Cleanthes’ theory. Firstly it tells us that tonos in 
Cleanthes is caused by fire striking something. We are not told what it is striking but 
since this precedes a discussion on the strength or power of the soul we may 
reasonably suppose that the fire in this instance is the hegemonikon of the soul and that 
it is consequently striking the soul or the soul’s substance (οὐσία). We know also that 
Cleanthes, unlike Chrysippus, conceived all action as an interaction between 
hegemonikon and soul, as Seneca informs us.26 The passage from Plutarch reveals to us 
that if the tension created from an impact of fire is strong enough it gives us the 
capacity to be virtuous. It seems reasonable to assume that the strength of the tension 
derives from the strength of the strike, which depends on the quantity of fire doing 
the striking. So, in a very real sense, virtue is a type of tension and implied within this 
account is the idea that there are degrees of tension which are strong or weak 
dependent on the fieriness of the hegemonikon.  
Moreover, from our second source we may observe that Cleanthes establishes physical 
tension also on a cosmic level: 
Cleanthes says something like the following. When the universe has 
been totally inflamed, the middle of it subsides first, and successive 
parts are quenched throughout the whole. When the universe has 
become thoroughly liquefied, the last of the fire, when the middle 
clashes with it (ἀντιτυπήσαντος), <causes it to>27 turn[s] again into its 
opposite. When this turning takes place, he says it grows upwards, 
and begins to set the whole in order (διακοσμεῖν). During the 
operation of this everlasting cosmic cycle, the tension in the substance 
of the whole does not cease.28 
                                                            
26 Cf. p.92-3 and n. 54 in ch.3 
27 The interpolation of ποιεῖν here is von Arnim’s emendation cf. note SVF 1. 497 so as to emphasise the 
subject i.e. the turning again of the liquid into its opposite does not happen on its own but it is the fire 
that makes it happen. 
28 Ar. Did. fr. 38 ap. Stob. Ecl. I, 17.3 (= SVF 1.497): Κλεάνθης δὲ οὕτω πώς φησιν· ἐκφλογισθέντος τοῦ 
παντὸς συνίζειν τὸ μέσον αὐτοῦ πρῶτον, εἶτα <κατὰ> τὰ ἐχόμενα ἀποσβέννυσθαι δι’ ὅλου. τοῦ δὲ 
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Here again we may presuppose that fire is doing the striking and that this results in 
the clash with the centre, in the same way as a swiping sword strikes a stationary 
shield. We may assume that the centre is liquefied along with the whole. The striking 
of the last of the fire is the cause of a clash with the liquefied centre that leads to a 
renewal of the cosmic cycle.29 The word Cleanthes uses is a cognate of ἀντιτυπία 
which is part of the definition of body in the later school and it may be that here we 
have our first glimpse of the notion of resistance, which would later become part of 
the Stoic definition of body. The passage brings into relief the interactive and not 
simply passive character of the notion. Cleanthes goes on to say that the tension does 
not cease throughout the whole process, so if this text is consistent with what Plutarch 
records this must mean that fire is constantly striking the substance so as to ensure the 
continual tension of the cosmos. Whether the cosmos undergoes alterations in its 
tension in the same way as its parts do is not clear but I think it is safe to assume that 
its tension remains constant; just as virtue can expand and contract but does not admit 
of tightening and slackening it is plausible that the cosmos has a stable tension whilst 
contracting and expanding.  
Lapidge who briefly considers this reference concludes that “cosmic tension did not 
result from the agency of an all-pervading cosmic pneuma”.30 Unfortunately he offers 
no further explanation for this conclusion and so it is not clear what he had in mind, 
though, as he emphasises Cleanthes’ theory of a “bodily” tension in contrast to a 
“cosmic” one, he does seem to suggest that Cleanthes had no elaborate theory of a 
cosmic tension. However, whilst tension in Cleanthes had perhaps not yet been linked 
                                                            
παντὸς ἐξυγρανθέντος, τὸ ἔσχατον τοῦ πυρός, ἀντιτυπήσαντος αὐτῷ τοῦ μέσου, τρέπεσθαι πάλιν 
<ποιεῖν> εἰς τοὐναντίον, εἶθ’ οὕτω τρεπομένου ἄνωθέν φησιν αὔξεσθαι καὶ ἄρχεσθαι διακοσμεῖν 
τὸ ὅλον· καὶ τοιαύτην περίοδον αἰεὶ καὶ διακόσμησιν ποιουμένου τὸν ἐν τῇ τῶν ὅλων οὐσίᾳ τόνον 
μὴ παύεσθαι. The passage is very dense. I follow Furley’s translation (with a minor modification) in 
Furley, “Cosmology,” 436–37. For a rather different translation see Ricardo Salles, “Two Early Stoic 
Theories of Cosmogony,” in Causation and Creation in Late Antiquity, ed. Anna Marmodoro and Brian 
D. Prince (Cambridge: Cambridge University Pr., 2015), 14–15. 
29 Perhaps this passage can elucidate aspects of the location of the hegemonikon in Cleanthes or else it 
may just be an extension of the confusion we saw in our earlier chapter.  
30 Lapidge, “Stoic Cosmology,” 1978, 173. 
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with the rarefaction and densification of the hegemonikon-soul in Zenonian terms (or 
in Chrysippean terms: the simultaneous inward-outward motion of pneuma), 
Cleanthes does seem to have had a more elaborate theory of cosmic tension than is 
commonly assumed. This can be deduced from a largely overlooked passage in 
Clement of Alexandria31: 
And plectrum (πλῆκτρον), according to some, is the sky (πόλος), 
according to others, it is the air, which strikes (πλήσσοντα) and moves 
to nature and increase, and which fills all things. But these have not 
read Cleanthes the philosopher, who expressly calls the sun plectrum; 
for darting his beams (τὰς αὐγᾶς) in the east, as if striking the world 
he leads the light (το φῶς) to its harmonious course.32  
In this passage air striking and moving toward nature and increase does sound 
suspiciously like a later Stoic conception of pneuma (specifically a Senecan conception; 
Seneca is perhaps one of the philosophers whom Clement refers to as not having read 
Cleanthes33) but we have no attribution and it does not concern us here. Our interest 
lies with the reference to Cleanthes for whom we are told that the light is led to its 
harmonious course from the striking of the world by the beams of the sun. There is 
some terminological confusion here which requires a digression in order to clarify 
Cleanthes’ theory.  
This is the only extant reference to Cleanthes’ use of αύγή, a term which is usually 
connected with the light of the sun but also refers to an extremely bright light. 
                                                            
31 Not in SVF. It should be noted that Clement may be considered as a fairly reliable source on Stoic 
doctrine not only because of his own knowledge of Stoicism but also because his teacher, who was 
much admired by Clement and formative for his intellectual development, was Saint Pantaenus the 
philosopher. Prior to converting to the Christian faith, Pantaenus was a Stoic and later was known to 
have blended his philosophical speculations and Stoic leanings with his faith see Ilaria L.E. Ramelli, 
“The Mysteries of Scripture: Allegorical Exegesis and the Heritage of Stoicism, Philo, and Pantaenus,” 
in Clement’s Biblical Exegesis: Proceedings of the Second Colloquium on Clement Of Alexandria (Olomouc, May 
29-31, 2014), ed. Veronika Cernuskova, Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, 0920-623X, VOLUME 139 
(Leiden : Boston: Brill, 2017), 107. 
32 Clement Strom. 5. 8, 48 (= Pearson Cl. 31) 
33 Seneca often alternates between the terms for air (aer) and pneuma (spiritus) in his works see e.g. Seneca 
Nat. Quaest. 2.6-11; 6.21-1 etc.  
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However, αὐγή appears to be a term that was preferred by Chrysippus in general and 
in Philo we hear that there was a difference between Cleanthes and Chrysippus 
regarding this. Cleanthes describes the world at conflagration dissolving into flame 
(φλόξ) whereas Chrysippus sees it as dissolving into bright light (αὐγή).34 The choice 
appears to be odd, for as Lapidge notes we would expect Cleanthes, who conceives of 
the sun as hegemonikon, to prefer the term αὐγή.35 The reasoning behind Chrysippus’ 
use of αὐγή has been considered by a handful of scholars with some arguing for the 
αὐγή as a type of fire (rightly in my view).36 However, not much consideration has 
been given to the distinction between the two heads and how this may be connected 
to the general development or changes from Cleanthes’ physical theory and it seems 
that Cleanthes’ usage of αὐγή in the above passage has not been noticed.  
                                                            
34 Philo On the Eternity of the World (Περὶ ἀφθαρσίας κόσμου) 90 (= SVF 1. 511 = LS 46 M) 
35 See Lapidge, “Ἀρχαί and Στοιχεῖα,” 273, who observes that this distinction between the two heads 
causes confusion; cf. Mansfeld, “Providence and the Destruction of the Universe in Early Stoic Thought, 
with Some Remarks on the Mysteries of Philosophy,” 153 n. 70, in which he provides some historical 
background to the distinction. 
36 Mansfeld, “Providence and the Destruction of the Universe in Early Stoic Thought, with Some 
Remarks on the Mysteries of Philosophy,” 176–77. He focuses solely on the coherence within 
Chrysippus’ own views without including the juxtaposition of the Chrysippean doctrine alongside that 
of Cleanthes. Gourinat also recognises Chrysippus’ need to distinguish between the fire of 
conflagration and that of diakomesis: “it may be the case that Chrysippus defined the final and 
primitive state of substance as ‘light’ or ‘flash’ [αὐγή] not to distinguish it from fire, but to explain in 
what sense of fire it was a fire” “The Stoics on Matter and Prime Matter: ‘Corporealism’ and the Imprint 
of Plato’s Timaeus,” 60–62; see also n. 70 for parallel sources. For a more laboured account see Cooper, 
“Chrysippus on the Physical Elements,” 103–5. He conceives of the αὐγή as a ‘flash’, a product of the 
fire of conflagration and presumably the only thing present (i.e. the flash which temporally would come 
after the fire) between cosmic cycles. Cooper’s explanation seems to describe Chrysippus’ ‘flash’ as 
being philosophically more developed than the accounts of Cleanthes and Zeno because it is closer to 
contemporary astronomical theory whereby we still see light from dead stars. In the same way a flash 
exists on its own after conflagration has occurred. This retrospective analysis introduces several 
problems for Stoic theories of time and what happens to time during conflagration, which Cooper does 
not address. Moreover he uses this account as proof that cosmogony according to Chrysippus’ 
elemental theory involves three very distinct stages with ‘flash’ at the first stage; the second stage 
involves some kind of proto-elements of fire, air and moisture and only at the third stage are the four 
elements generated out of proto-moisture. Whilst the sources for elemental theory are supremely 
difficult for early Stoicism, in using the ‘flash’ to claim the great advancements Chrysippus made in 
Stoic cosmogony Cooper fails to account both for continuity between Stoic heads and coherency within 
Chrysippus’ cosmic theory, fitting the evidence to the account rather than the other way round.  
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The distinction we observe between Cleanthes’ usage of αὐγή and φῶς in relation to 
his tensional theory is that he must have considered αὐγή to be fiery, for it is this and 
not the φῶς which does the striking and as we know from Plutarch, tension, for 
Cleanthes, is the impact of fire and not of light. Further to this there are several 
attributes of fire which are absent from light and which help us to understand the 
location of these terms in wider Stoic theory. Many of these attributes are observed by 
Alexander of Aphrodisias in criticising Stoic theory and are pertinent to Cleanthes’ 
distinctions.37 Alexander is one of our more useful sources for observing problems in 
Stoic physics, and his criticisms are often philosophically informative. In this passage 
he seems to be of the view that the Stoics equate fire with light. As we have just seen, 
the Stoics might do this terminologically but not conceptually, for they consider the 
bright light of αὐγή to be fiery.  
Of the observations that Alexander makes, two of them are pertinent to Cleanthes’ 
distinction. The first is that light can be more or less but fire is not more or less and the 
second that light can travel downwards from above but that such motion is contrary 
to fire’s nature. On the first point we have already shown that a pre-requisite of Stoic 
physics is that fire does not increase or decrease in substance despite having the 
capacity for a particular type of expansive growth. Thus, if we observe the 
immediately preceding context of the Clement passage above (where it is said that the 
plectrum moves to nature and increase) we may note that, for Cleanthes, αὐγή is 
viewed as the fiery beams of the sun which leads to nature and increase after it strikes 
the world. In other words fiery αὐγή does not itself increase but it is the source of 
increase, creation and διακόσμησις or nature. The second point that Alexander makes 
is significant, for it relates to an established Stoic distinction between two types of 
basic motions (πρῶται κινήσεις), from which, according to Chrysippus and 
                                                            
37 Alex. Aphr. Mantissa 138.3 ff. The whole passage is very informative concerning some very specific 
problems in Stoic physics but it would require extensive examination in order to extract them from 
Alexander’s critical account. 
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Apollodorus, all other motions derive.38 These two basic motions are described as 
being straight or curved, however, our sources for these two heads of the school do 
not explain how they intended these motions to be understood in cosmology. 
Alexander must have known more about this, since he is criticising the Stoics for 
predicating rectilinear motion on the basis of fire’s motion. In fact one source 
attributes just such a doctrine to Zeno.39  It seems, however, as though Zeno was the 
only Stoic to have held such a view regarding the motion of fire since we know that 
other Stoics describe light as having a rectilinear motion and aether as having a 
peripheral type of motion.40  
By collating this evidence we have an indication not only of why Zeno’s original 
position of fire moving in straight lines was altered but also that the likely agent of 
this alteration was Cleanthes and his tensional theory. Cleanthes altered Zeno’s 
original theory probably because of the problem that Alexander also observed in 
conceiving fire’s motion as rectilinear. In fact Cleanthes’ view is directly contrasted 
with that of Zeno’s and is preserved in Aëtius just before Zeno’s position, suggesting 
that this was a theory of his master which he altered. Cleanthes is said to have 
conceived of the shape of fire not as moving in straight lines but as cone-like.41 He 
wanted to distinguish between the fiery light (αὐγή) of the sun or hegemonikon and the 
light (φῶς) which travels in straight lines. The latter light is the expression of the 
creative force of the former fire, that is to say the creative tension formed by the impact 
of the sun’s fiery beams. In Chrysippus who prefers to view the pneuma as the 
                                                            
38 Stobaeus (Ar. Did.) I, 19.3  (= SVF 2. 492) [Chrysippus]; Stobaeus (Ar.Did.) I, 19.5 [Apollodorus] 
39 Aëtius 1. 14, 6 (= DDG p. 313 1 = SVF 1.101) 
40 Aëtius 1. 12, 4 (= DDG p. 311 7-10 = SVF 1. 101). For an intuitive account of rectilinear and curvilinear 
motion being connected to contraction and expansion cf. Johnny Christensen, An Essay on the Unity of 
Stoic Philosophy (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Pr., 1962), 32 and Watson, The Stoic Theory of 
Knowledge, 16, who follows him. I say ‘intuitive’ because they assume that the motion of light is 
rectilinear and contractive, the contraction element being assumed because light travels towards the 
earth which is both the centre and the lowest point. However, appealing though this connection is, it 
fails to explain the possibility of light travelling upwards as also how it is that expansion should be 
seen as travelling upwards in curves.  
41 Aëtius 1. 14, 4 (= DDG p. 312 22) 
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extension of the hegemonikon, the activity of αύγή was invariably extended to that of 
the light,42 replacing this somewhat unclear account of creation offered by Cleanthes 
but also causing many problems in equating light and fire that Alexander criticises the 
Stoics for. Despite this somewhat convoluted analysis we may observe from our 
sources on Cleanthes’ use of the notion of tension that he not only developed a theory 
which involved varying degrees of tensility and was on a bodily level involved in the 
fulfilment of virtuous action, but also conceived of tension on a cosmic level as being 
involved in the ordering of the world and that these were direct additions to Zeno’s 
physics.  
We may further note that fertility and the creation of life were closely connected with 
straight rather than curved motions and that the Stoics described the reason why a 
woman only sometimes becomes pregnant after intercourse is because of the curved 
shape of the penis which prevents it from shooting straight.43 So fertility derives both 
from the straightness of the motion and its tensility and so it is that Sphaerus who is 
said to have been a pupil first of Zeno and then of Cleanthes,44 conceived of the semen 
being fertile due to its tensility whilst the same fertility was absent in the female 
(liquid?) because it lacked tension and was watery.45 It is evident from these sources 
that Cleanthes and Sphaerus went to some lengths to introduce the notion of tension 
into the Stoic system.  
However, whilst tonos is added to Stoic physics by Zeno’s pupils there is no obvious 
integration of the idea into the physics of their master. At this point I would like to 
posit two possible reasons for this. First, the idea comes from outside the school as a 
genuine addition. The source of inspiration for the idea probably came from 
Heraclitus. In a passage from Arius Didymus (preserved by Eusebius) we are told that 
                                                            
42 See also Stob., Ecl., I, 17. 4 (= SVF 2. 471) where Arius Didymus has recorded Chrysippus’ doctrine of 
the aether of the cosmic hegemonikon being equated with the pneuma explicitly: “pneuma... has become 
analogous to aether, so that both are used synonymously”.   
43 Ps. Plut. Plac. Philos. 906 B 
44 Dorandi, “Chronology,” 40. 
45 D.L. 7.159 
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Cleanthes set forth “the doctrines of Zeno for comparison with other Physicists”46 and 
we may suppose that this was Cleanthes’ attempt to integrate Zeno into the 
philosophical tradition. In the same source we are told that Zeno’s definition of soul 
as a vaporous exhalation endowed with sensation is the same as that of Heraclitus. 
Moreover, Cleanthes had dedicated four books to exposition or interpretation of 
Heracleitus (Ἡρακλείτου Ἐξηγήσεις) and Sphaerus had dedicated five (Περὶ 
Ἡρακλείτου πέντε διατριβῶν).47 It seems to me no accident that the only Stoics of 
this period for whom we have a theory of tonos also happen to be the ones who wrote 
on Heraclitus and who had an interest in physics. How close the Stoic conception of 
tonos is to the Heracleitan one does not concern us beyond mentioning that the Stoics 
appropriated it for their own purposes.  
And this brings us to our second reason for the apparent lack of integration of the idea 
with Zenonian physics. Having recorded all the sources which explicitly mention 
early Stoics as holding a theory of tonos,48 viz. Cleanthes and Sphaerus, we may 
observe that there is a common idea which is manifest in each usage of tension.  This 
is that tension is fundamental in the process of creative activity, whether it be on a 
cosmic scale, at the psychological level or at the physiological level. The tension that 
the initial striking of fire creates ensures the nature of what follows in the interaction 
between individual bodies, whether it be the harmonious ordering of the world, the 
particular manifestation of virtue or vice of rational beings, or the fertility or lack 
thereof in animals. It is plausible to suggest that the physical mechanism for the 
ordering of the cosmos as well as the varied expressions of processes in its parts was 
not properly addressed in Zeno’s physics. For although Zeno could effectively explain 
the διάθεσις of the soul, his theory was lacking when it came to explaining the ἕξις of 
                                                            
46 Arius Didymus fr. 39 (= Eusebius Praep. 15.20,2 (= SVF I, 519) 
47 Cf. The catalogue of works for the two in Diogenes Laertius  
48 There are two other sources which are of interest but which make no direct connection to a Stoic 
figure. These are SVF 1. 514 (Cornutus c. 31) where Heracles is described as the tonos which provides 
strength and power and Plutarch de Iside et Osiride 367 C-E where Heracles is described as πληκτικὸν 
καὶ διαιρετικόν.  
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the soul. So it is that whilst Zeno’s theory could describe the physical foundation for 
a virtuous soul he could not explain the specific manifestation of that virtue as 
temperate, just or courageous. We may observe that virtue does not admit more or 
less but it is possible for a Stoic to be more or less courageous or temperate depending 
on specific situations. Such that a sage when moving his little finger may do so in 
accordance with virtue, but nobody (including the sage) would consider him(self) 
courageous for doing so. The capacity to explain this physically corresponds with the 
distinction between an ἕξις and a διάθεσις and is introduced into Stoic theory along 
with the introduction of the concept of tension by Cleanthes. As such, although there 
is no clear integration with Zeno’s theory we observe a genuine addition which acts 
as an extension of Zeno’s conception of a fiery soul. The more rarefied a soul is, the 
greater striking capacity it will have for creating the appropriate tension required for 
a harmonious ordering in the universe and a good flow in life. 
Chrysippus on tension 
Turning to Chrysippus’ theory of tension we see that he inherited a fairly well-
integrated idea from Cleanthes and yet that the notion was not fully incorporated with 
Zeno’s physics. Cleanthes’ and Sphaerus’ description of tension had explained how it 
emerges in individual bodies and even how it plays a role in the creation and 
continuity of the cosmos; however there was no clear description of how individual 
bodies in the world interact with each other. Whilst the definition of body as active 
and passive implied a fundamentally interactive reality there seemed to be very little 
by way of describing the solidity of bodies, with their interaction involving some form 
of assimilation and blending but in a very vague or fuzzy manner. Chrysippus seems 
to have taken it upon himself to remedy this vagueness in the physical theory and did 
so by elaborating on Cleanthes’ theory of tension and integrating it with Zeno’s active 
and passive activity of contraction and expansion. In this way we get a full-blown 
account of the inward-outward motion of the cosmos and all the individual bodies 
within it: the special motion of pneuma. It seems as though this palindromic motion 
was the contribution of Chrysippus, which he invented precisely to bring together the 
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theories of contraction and expansion in Zeno with those of tension in Cleanthes. 
Whilst the outward motion is connected to expansion the inward motion is attached 
to the contraction of the pneuma. The motion must be simultaneous, however, in order 
for tension to be created for if there were only outward motion then there would be 
nothing to contain it and if there were only inward motion then there would be 
nothing to push it outwards. This may be imagined in a similar way to an animal skin 
being inflated: the air inside pushes at the skin and the skin contains the air preventing 
it from escaping. The analogy is flawed in several respects because, in pneumatic 
motion, expanding outwards is the function of the fiery part and that which contains 
and contracts is air. Moreover, the pneuma is more elastic than an animal skin in that 
it has the capacity, with training, to expand further outwards.  
We should note that it is not immediately obvious that we may equate the outward 
motion of pneuma with both the function of fire (rarefaction and expansion) nor that 
we may equate the inward motion with the function of air (densification and 
contraction). Whilst this does seem to be implied by the evidence it is always 
dangerous to extrapolate on specific processes without some sort of explicit 
testimony.49 However, it is possible to adduce at least one piece of evidence wherein 
the connection is made explicitly. The reason it has been missed in the modern 
literature is perhaps due to the fact that very specific physical terminology rather than 
the more prevalent psychological terminology is used to describe the expansion and 
contraction. That is to say, instead of using for instance συστολή for contraction and 
ἔπαρσις or διάχυσις for expansion (which are the psychological terms used in the 
                                                            
49 Indeed it has been noted that nowhere in the evidence is this stated explicitly: see Scade, “Stoic 
Cosmological Limits and Their Platonic Background,” 156–57 n. 41. He makes the connection but notes 
that R. Sharples (in many ways rightly) cautions about the total lack of explicit evidence for it. This has 
not prevented scholars in the past from extrapolating this assumption, which is not as obvious as we 
might like to think, and take it for granted without direct evidence cf. for instance Richard Sorabji, 
Matter, Space, and Motion : Theories in Antiquity and Their Sequel (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Pr., 1988), 
88, who connects the inward motion with air and the outward with fire; also Todd, Alexander of 
Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics. A Study of the De Mixtione with Preliminary Essays, Text, Translation and 
Commentary, 38, who says that inward-outward is expansion-contraction (in particular he links this 
with extension); Todd is not keen on the motion being simultaneous. 
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Stoic theory of emotions50), the text describes a power or movement which is 
πυκνωτικήν for the inward motion and μανωτικήν for the outward motion (which 
are physical terms found in Stoic cosmological theory): 
The Stoics posit a rarefying and thickening power, or rather 
movement, the one inwards, the other outwards, and they think that 
the one is the cause of existence, the other of being qualified. 51 
Not only does this indicate for us that the emotional contractions and expansions of 
the soul are truly physical events but it also clarifies for us that we may equate the 
ideas of inward and outward motion with expansions and contractions, whilst also 
providing a clear indication of Chrysippus’ efforts to incorporate Zenonian physics, 
which I have termed textural, into a new tensional cosmic order. 
I think it is important that we take on board the significance of tension for pneumatic 
theory as it also helps to clarify something about the composition of pneuma. Whilst it 
is generally conceived that pneuma is, at least in Chrysippus, a blend of fire and air (i.e. 
of rarefying and densifying powers or motions), there have been some specialised 
studies which have claimed that sometimes pneuma is only air and sometimes only 
fire and sometimes both.52 However, if we are to argue that tension is a fundamental 
                                                            
50 A helpful table for these terms situated in the context of ὁρμαὶ λογικαί may be found in Gourinat, Οι 
Στωϊκοί για την ψυχή [Les stoiciens et l’ame], 121. 
51 Simplicius In Arist. Cat.  8. 269 (= SVF 2. 498) Οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ δύναμιν ἢ μᾶλλον κίνησιν τὴν 
μανωτικὴν καὶ πυκνωτικὴν  τίθενται, τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ ἔσω, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔξω· καὶ τὴν μὲν τοῦ εἶναι, 
τὴν δὲ τοῦ ποιὸν εἶναι νομίζουσιν αἰτίαν. 
52 For a comprehensive list of the more conventional interpretations see the forthcoming study on this 
very topic Ian Hensley, “The Function and Composition of Pneuma in Stoic Physics,” Forthcoming. 
Hensley argues that ἕξις is composed of air, φύσις of fire and ψυχή of both air and fire. If we extrapolate 
on Hensley’s model, presumably the pneuma of a rational being will be fierier than that of an animal 
and the cosmic pneuma will be aethereal. For a useful table denoting the differences between fire, air, 
pneuma and aether, along with references to sources see Jean-Joël Duhot, La Conception Stoïcienne de La 
Causalité (Paris: Vrin, 1988), 85. For some of the less obvious interpretations see Todd who argues that 
pneuma could not be composed of elemental fire or air as this does not explain its pervasive capabilities. 
He claims instead that it is constituted of aether: Todd, “Monism and Immanence: The Foundations of 
Stoic Physics,” 149; also Sorabji, Matter, Space, and Motion, 85–89, who argues that pneuma is not so 
distinct from air and fire that these should not be considered ingredients of it; indeed he argues against 
the evidence that claims that pneuma is a blend of air and fire. Instead he claims that pneuma is either 
air or fire relative to its various functions in different contexts. Unfortunately, his account is too brief to 
convincingly explain what these various functions are in relation to fire or air. Sedley concedes to 
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aspect of pneumatic motion, be it the type that is ἑκτική, φυσική, ψυχική or λογική 
then we must also accept that it must be conceived of in the vulgate way as composed 
of both fire and air for otherwise tension would simply not be present due to the 
absence of the necessary physical processes. The greatest difficulty in supporting this 
view is that we must then also make the claim that fire exists even in inanimate objects, 
for even these are said to have tension, specifically the ἑκτική type. This is an 
especially dubious claim to make if we also add the further condition that fire derives 
from the hegemonikon for we would then have to posit that even stones, which seem to 
have no real need for a hegemonikon, do indeed have one.  
As far as I know there is no source which states that an object with an ἕξις has an 
hegemonikon or that a stone or stick does and with this absence all we can do is assume 
and try to extrapolate. It is fairly evident that this is a Chrysippean problem which 
was not present in and is not applicable to early Stoics who would not have needed to 
posit a hegemonikon for stones, being content to merely say that heat or fire exists in 
everything including stones. This would mean that they need not necessarily posit a 
hegemonikon for stones and that neither would they have to face the problem of 
answering the question “from or to where?” when they speak of outward or inward 
motion. This question would only need answering for tensional theories from 
Chrysippus and onwards, since the inward-outward motion from a ruling centre is 
not evident in earlier scholarchs.53 In fact it would seem as though the issue here 
derives precisely from the fact that Chrysippus wanted to incorporate the inward-
                                                            
Sorabji that some instances may accommodate the notion that pneuma is composed of just air but 
explicitly rejects that this is the case for the type of pneuma in ensouled beings Sedley, “Chrysippus on 
Psychophysical Causality,” 326 n. 44.; cf. also David N. Sedley, “Matter in Hellenistic Philosophy,” in 
Materia: XIII Colloquio Internazionale: Roma, 7-9 gennaio 2010, ed. Delfina Giovannozzi and Marco 
Veneziani, Lessico Intellettuale Europeo 113 (Roma: L. S. Olschki, 2011), 57–58.  
53 Cf. Hahm, The Origins of Stoic Cosmology, 169, who also reaches the same conclusion: “This new 
content, including the idea of pneumatic motion,  production of unity, cohesion, dimensions, and 
qualities, is quite foreign to Cleanthes' tonos. One can imagine a path from Cleanthes'  idea that the tonos 
is strength to Chrysippus's notion that it produces cohesion and certain qualities, like hardness and 
solidity (SVF 2.449)” 
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outward motion of pneuma for all bodies in the cosmos so as to institute their tensional 
character and ensure their solidity and interactive capacities.  
There is a natural progression from Cleanthes and Sphaerus to Chrysippus’ theory of 
tension, for, as we saw, the stage before the production of tension is the striking which 
is creative. Whilst the notion of striking is absent from Chrysippus it is replaced by a 
creative aspect which is described more specifically as the outward motion of pneuma 
being productive of quantities and qualities.54 Amongst the Chrysippean additions 
and elaborations that which stands out as the most significant for the development of 
Stoic physics is the introduction of the role of air in physical processes. Air for 
Chrysippus in many ways takes on a more significant role than fire.  Air is conceived 
as that which creates coherency in the cosmos and in bodies, it is understood to be the 
inward motion of the pneuma and that which unifies and is productive of substance in 
bodies.55 Whilst tension in Chrysippus is created by the combination of the inward-
outward movement of fire and air, the air is seen as that which consolidates a body 
providing not only unity but also resistance. Galen describes the different activities of 
fire and air:  
The natural effect of air is to consolidate and thicken a substance, 
whereas fire naturally causes expansion, loosening and widening.56 
Chrysippus’ inspiration was to ensure the physical foundation for the solidity of 
bodies by counteracting the rarefaction of fire with the densification of air. With this 
updated theory the Stoics had a means for describing the corporeality of bodies via a 
theory of resistance which was absent in the earlier Stoics. This lead also to the 
development of the second definition of body that we considered earlier. Now the 
Stoics could argue for the interaction of bodies via a genuine form of touching with 
their new found tensional resistance. Air took on the role of that which whilst unifying 
                                                            
54 Nemesius de nat. hom.  70.6-71.4 (= LS 47 J) 
55 Ibid.  
56 Galen, On sustaining causes 1.1—2.4 (= LS 55 F) 
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and consolidating a body simultaneously condenses it. The disjunction with the 
previous theories of fire as the unifying and rarefying force in the cosmos is brought 
into stark relief. In this way tension gradually began to supplant texture in physical 
processes and moreover led to many confusions in the recording of Stoic terminology 
and theory. 
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Conclusion 
The Stoics took seriously their descriptions of the harmony and coherence between 
the whole and the part, the cosmos and the individual. This was no idle analogising 
either. Coherency in Stoic doctrine was valued for its capacity to correspond to the 
coherency in reality. Why then do we discover apparently contradictory evidence and 
changes in doctrine within the school? It is possible to answer such questions without 
casting them aside based on the justification that we cannot know more because of the 
lack of evidence. We have observed that these changes within the Stoic system of 
thought may be traced, as clear lines of development, guided by the principle of 
integration of theory. Zeno had not bequeathed a comprehensive nor a complete 
system of thought to his followers. When we see changes to doctrine these occur in 
such a way that they either incorporate the doctrines of Zeno or else are genuine 
additions to Zeno’s system. These many changes were made to strengthen the Stoic 
system either to defend it against attacks or, primarily, to develop it into a more 
comprehensive system of thought capable of describing more of the fundamental 
processes of reality.  
Whether the study of ethics, logic or physics also requires a study of their integration 
is not affirmed, for they can effectively be studied in isolation. What is clear is that the 
Stoics conceived and developed the system in an integrated way. More than this, 
however, for the practicing philosopher, the so-called “initiate”, to study and to have 
an understanding of the integration of reality is necessary. The Stoics conceived of this 
as the study of theology or “initiation into the mysteries”.1 It is necessary for it is only 
in this way that, as we have seen, we become aware of our responsibility to the correct 
functioning of the cosmos and the cycle of recurrence with conflagration.2 This is 
equivalent to a physical expansion of the self, in which the individual’s affinity (or 
                                                            
1 Plutarch Stoic. Repug. 1035 A & 1055 A-B; Etymologicum Magn. s. v. τελετή p. 750, 16 (= SVF 2.1008); 
Epiphanius Panarion (= Adversus Haereses) 3. 2. 9 (= SVF 1. 538). 
2 Cf. ch. 4 p. 118-9 
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oikeiôsis) is extended to the whole cosmos. There is an underlying sense here of how 
the Stoics sought to make the study of philosophy into a practice. 
The analysis of the evidence has shown that there is elaborate integration of doctrine 
in the Stoic system and that by studying the extant sources in such a way our 
understanding of Stoicism is broadened and enriched. In addition by studying the 
integration of Stoicism we are provided with a useful methodological tool for the 
study of our fragmentary evidence. This allows us to look at our evidence in new and 
exciting ways and offers us some unexplored pathways into a partial reconstruction 
of the lost Stoic system. Much more is left to be done.  
In relation to pneuma there are still many avenues to explore. In this thesis I have left 
Stoic ethics largely untouched and an examination of this part of philosophy in 
relation to pneuma has the potential to provide many interesting insights into human 
action and psychological states. Also many of the details of the theory need further 
consideration. This is particularly the case in relation to Stoic theories of causation as 
also with the different types of bodies and the interactions that take place between 
them. The conflation of vitality with sensation in our evidence requires further 
thought as also the difference between Cleanthes and Chrysippus with regards to the 
hegemonikon and pneuma, for which I have provided a comprehensive list of where this 
is examined in the contemporary literature.3 Indeed, the theory of pneuma as it is 
developed by Chrysippus needs to be re-examined in light of its relation to and 
incorporation of the original theories developed by Zeno and Cleanthes. More 
specialised studies may be required for the spermatikos logos of Zeno being 
incorporated into Chrysippus’ tensional theory as also the liquid element and its role 
in the coherence of the cosmos and as the medium for fire’s pervasion. I have tried to 
offer a brief account of what direction we may look to where research into the specific 
evidence for these aspects will be useful for further reconstruction of Stoic theory. 
                                                            
3 See Ch. 3 n. 54 
173 
 
Bibliography 
 
1. Ancient sources 
Alexander of Aphrodisias. Alexander of Aphrodisias On Fate. Translated by R. W. 
Sharples. London: Duckworth, 1983. 
———. Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics: A Study of the De Mixtione with 
Preliminary Essays, Text, Translation and Commentary. Translated by R. B. Todd. 
Leiden: Brill, 1976. 
———. On the Soul. 1, Soul as Form of the Body, Parts of the Soul, Nourishment, and 
Perception. Translated by Victor Caston. London: Bristol Classical Pr., 2012. 
———. Supplement to On the Soul. Translated by Robert W. Sharples. London: 
Duckworth, 2004. 
Aristotle. The Complete Works of Aristotle. Edited by J. Barnes. Princeton: Princeton 
Univ. Pr., 1984. 
Arnim, Hans Friedrich August von 1859-1931. Stoicorum veterum fragmenta vols. 1-3 
with Adler’s Index vol. 4 (1964). Vol. 4. Stuttgart: Teubner, 1903. 
Calcidius. On Plato’s Timaeus. Translated by John Magee. Dumbarton Oaks Medieval 
Library 41. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Dumbarton Oaks, Medieval Library, 
Harvard University Press, 2016. 
Cicero, Marcus Tullius. On Moral Ends. Edited by Julia E. Annas. Translated by 
Raphael Woolf. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Pr., 2001. 
———. On Old Age. On Friendship. On Divination. Translated by W.A. Falconer. Loeb 
Classical Library 154. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1923. 
———. On the Nature of the Gods. Academics. Translated by H. Rackham. Loeb 
Classical Library 268. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1933. 
Cleomedes. Cleomedes’ Lectures on Astronomy : A Translation of « The Heavens » with an 
Introduction and Commentary. Translated by Alan C. Bowen and Robert B. Todd. 
Berkeley (Calif.): University of California Pr., 2004. 
Dio Chrysostom. Discourses 31-36. Translated by J.W. Cohoon and H. Lamar. Loeb 
Classical Library. 358. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1940. 
Diogenes Laertius. Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Volumes I & 2. Translated by R.D. 
Hicks. Vol. 184–5. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University 
Press, 1925. 
174 
 
Epiphanius of Salamis. The Panarion of Epiphanius of Salamis. Book II and III : (Sect. 47-
80, De Fide). Translated by Frank Williams. Brill: Leiden & New York, 1994. 
———. The Panarion of Epiphanius of Salamis. Book I (Sects 1-46). Translated by Frank 
Williams. Leiden: Brill, 2009. 
Eusebius. Preparation for the Gospel (Praeparatio Evangelica). Translated by Edwin 
Hamilton Gifford. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903. 
Galen. Galen on the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato (PHP). Translated by Phillip 
Howard De Lacy. 4 vols. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1978. 
Hülser, Karlheinz. Die Fragmente Zur Dialektik Der Stoiker. Neue Sammlung Der Texte 
Mit Deutscher Übersetzung Und Kommentar, I-IV (FDS). Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: 
Frommann-Holzboog, 1987. 
Liddell, Henry George, and Robert Scott. A Greek-English Lexicon (LSJ). Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1996. 
Nemesius. On the Nature of Man. Translated by Robert W. Sharples and Philip J. Van 
der Eijk. Liverpool: Liverpool University Pr., 2008. 
Philo Judaeus (of Alexandria). The Works of Philo Complete and Unabridged : New 
Updated Version. Translated by C.D. Yonge. Peabody (Mass.): Hendrickson, 1993. 
Plato. Plato Complete Works. Edited by John M. Cooper. Indianapolis (Ind.): Hackett, 
1997. 
Plutarch. Moralia, Volume V: Isis and Osiris. The E at Delphi. The Oracles at Delphi No 
Longer Given in Verse. The Obsolescence of Oracles. Translated by Frank Cole Babbitt. 
Loeb Classical Library 306. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1936. 
———. Moralia, Volume VI: Can Virtue Be Taught? On Moral Virtue. On the Control of 
Anger. On Tranquility of Mind. On Brotherly Love. On Affection for Offspring. Whether 
Vice Be Sufficient to Cause Unhappiness. Whether the Affections of the Soul Are Worse Than 
Those of the Body. Concerning Talkativeness. On Being a Busybody. Translated by W.C. 
Helmbold. Loeb Classical Library 337. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 
1939. 
———. Moralia, Volume XII: Concerning the Face Which Appears in the Orb of the Moon. 
On the Principle of Cold. Whether Fire or Water Is More Useful. Whether Land or Sea 
Animals Are Cleverer. Beasts Are Rational. On the Eating of Flesh. Translated by Harold 
Fredrik Cherniss and W.C. Helmbold. Loeb Classical Library 406. Cambridge 
(Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1957. 
175 
 
Seneca. Epistles. Translated by Richard M. Gummere. Vol. I–III. Loeb Classical 
Library. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1917. 
Sextus Empiricus. Against the Logicians. Translated by Richard Bett. Cambridge ; 
New York: Cambridge University Pr., 2005. 
———. Outlines of Pyrrhonism. Against the Logicians. Against the Physicists. Against the 
Ethicists. Translated by R.G. Bury. Loeb Classical Library 273, 291, 311. Cambridge 
(Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1933. 
———. Outlines of Scepticism. Translated by Julia E. Annas and Jonathan Barnes. 
Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Pr., 1994. 
Simplicius. On Aristotle, Categories 9-15. Translated by Richard Gaskin. London: 
Duckworth, 2000. 
———. On Aristotle, Categories 7-8. Translated by Barrie Fleet. London: Duckworth, 
2002. 
Tertullian. Ante-Nicene Fathers: Tertullian - A Treatise on the Soul / Rev. and Edited by 
Kevin Knight. Edited by Alexander Roberts, James Donaldson, and A. Cleveland Cox. 
Translated by Peter Holmes. Vol. 3. Buffalo (NY): Christian Literature Publishing 
(Co.), 1885. 
Themistius. On Aristotle, On the Soul. Translated by Robert B. Todd. London: 
Duckworth, 1996. 
 
  
176 
 
1. Modern Sources 
 
Algra, Keimpe A. “Stoic Philosophical Theology and Graeco-Roman Religion.” In 
God and Cosmos in Stoicism, edited by Ricardo Salles, 224–51. Oxford ; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2009. 
———. “Zeno of Citium and Stoic Cosmology: Some Notes and Two Case Studies.” 
Elenchos: Rivista di studi sul pensiero antico 24, no. 1 (2003): 9–32. 
Annas, Julia. “Ethics in Stoic Philosophy.” Phronesis 52, no. 1 (2007): 58–87. 
———. Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind. Berkeley: Univ. of California Pr., 1992. 
———. “Stoic Epistemology.” In Epistemology, edited by Stephen Everson, 184–203. 
Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Pr., 1990. 
Armstrong, C. B. “The Chronology of Zeno of Citium.” Hermathena : A Trinity College 
Dublin Review, 1930. 
Aujac, Germaine. “Stoïcisme et Hypothèse Géocentrique.” Aufsteig Und Niedergang 
Der Römischen Welt 2, no. 36 (1989): 1430–53. 
Bailey, D. T. J. “The Structure of Stoic Metaphysics.” In Oxford Studies in Ancient 
Philosophy, edited by Brad Inwood, 46:253–309. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014. 
Bénatouïl, Thomas. “Cléanthe contre Aristarque : stoïcisme et astronomie à l’époque 
hellénistique.” Archives de Philosophie 68, no. 5 (2005): 207–22. 
Betegh, Gábor. “Cosmological Ethics in the « Timaeus » and Early Stoicism.” In 
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy (OSAP), edited by David N. Sedley, 24:273–302. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. 
Bonazzi, Mauro. “Towards Transcendance: Philo and the Renewal of Platonism in 
the Early Imperial Age.” In Philo of Alexandria and Post-Aristotelian Philosophy, edited 
by Francesca Alesse, 233–51. Leiden: Brill, 2008. 
Bonazzi, Mauro, and Christoph Helmig. Platonic Stoicism, Stoic Platonism : The 
Dialogue between Platonism and Stoicism in Antiquity. Leuven: Leuven University Pr., 
2007. 
Brouwer, René. “Stoic Sympathy.” In Sympathy: A History, edited by Eric Schliesser, 
15–35. Oxford Philosophical Concepts. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015. 
———. The Stoic Sage : The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates. Cambridge ; 
New York: Cambridge University Pr., 2014. 
177 
 
Brunschwig, Jacques. “La Théorie Stoïcienne Du Genre Suprême et l’ontologie 
Platonicienne.” In Matter and Metaphysics. Fourth Symposium Hellenisticum, 19–127. 
Bibliopolis, 1988. 
———. Papers in Hellenistic Philosophy. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge 
University Pr., 1994. 
———. “Stoic Metaphysics.” In The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics, edited by Brad 
Inwood, 206–32. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Pr., 2003. 
Carriker, A. J. The Library of Eusebius of Caesarea. Leiden: Brill, 2003. 
Caston, Victor. “Something and Nothing : The Stoics on Concepts and Universals.” 
In Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy (OSAP), edited by David N. Sedley, 17:145–
213. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
Caston, Victor Miles. Alexander of Aphrodisias on the Soul. Part I Soul as Form of the 
Body, Parts of the Soul, Nourishment, and Perception. London: Bristol Classical Press, 
2012. 
Catana, Leo. The Historiographical Concept “System of Philosophy”: Its Origin, Nature, 
Influence and Legitimacy. Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History 165. Brill, 2008. 
Cherniss, Harold Fredrik. Plutarch Moralia. Vol. 13 Part 2. Cambridge (Mass.): 
Harvard University Press, 1976. 
Christensen, Johnny. An Essay on the Unity of Stoic Philosophy. Copenhagen: Museum 
Tusculanum Pr., 1962. 
Cooper, John M. “Chrysippus on the Physical Elements.” In God and Cosmos in 
Stoicism, edited by Ricardo Salles, 93–117. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2009. 
———. “Eudaimonism, the Appeal to Nature, and ‘“Moral Duty”’ in Stoicism.” In 
Reason and Emotion : Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory, 427–48. 
Princeton (N.J.): Princeton University Pr., 1999. 
Dillon, John M. Alcinous: The Handbook of Platonism (Trans. with Commentary by J. M. 
Dillon). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. 
Dorandi, Tiziano. “Chronology.” In The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, 
edited by Keimpe A. Algra, Jonathan Barnes, Jaap Mansfeld, and Malcolm Schofield, 
31–54. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Pr., 1999. 
Duhot, Jean-Joël. La Conception Stoïcienne de La Causalité. Paris: Vrin, 1988. 
178 
 
Ellis, George, and Joe Silk. “Scientific Method: Defend the Integrity of Physics.” 
Nature 516, no. 7531 (2014). 
Engberg-Pedersen, T. “Discovering the Good: Oikeiosis and Kathekonta.” In The 
Norms of Nature. Studies in Hellenistic Ethics, edited by M. Schofield and G. Striker, 
145–83. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Pr., 1986. 
Frede, Dorothea. “Stoic Determinism.” In The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics, 
edited by Brad Inwood, 179–205. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Pr., 
2003. 
Frede, Michael. A Free Will : Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought. Edited by 
Anthony A. Long. Berkeley (Calif.): University of California Pr., 2011. 
———. “La Théologie Stoïcienne.” In Les Stoïciens, edited by Gilbert Romeyer 
Dherbey and Jean-Baptiste Gourinat, 213–32. Paris: Vrin, 2005. 
———. “Stoic Epistemology.” In The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, 
edited by Keimpe A. Algra, Jonathan Barnes, Jaap Mansfeld, and Malcolm Schofield, 
295–322. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Pr., 1999. 
Furley, David. “Cosmology.” In The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, edited 
by Keimpe A. Algra, Jonathan Barnes, Jaap Mansfeld, and Malcolm Schofield, 412–
51. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Pr., 1999. 
Gersh, Stephen. Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism. The Latin Tradition. Notre Dame: 
Notre Dame University Press, 1986. 
Glucker, John. “Stoics, Para-Stoics and Anti-Stoics: Methods and Sensibilities.” 
Philosophia 31, no. 1–2 (2003): 221–324. 
Gould, J. B. The Philosophy of Chrysippus. Leiden: Brill, 1970. 
Gourinat, Jean-Baptiste. “The Stoics on Matter and Prime Matter: ‘Corporealism’ and 
the Imprint of Plato’s Timaeus.” In God and Cosmos in Stoicism, edited by Ricardo 
Salles, 46–70. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
———. Οι Στωϊκοί για την ψυχή [Les stoiciens et l’ame]. Translated by Κωνσταντίνος 
Ν. Πετρόπουλος. Athens: Kardamitsa [P.U.F.], 1999. 
Graver, Margaret Robson. Stoicism and Emotion. Chicago (Ill.): University of Chicago 
Pr., 2007. 
Hadot, Ilsetraut. “L’organisation de l’enseignement Philosophique à l’époque 
Impériale.” In Arts Libéraux et Philosophie Dans La Pensée Antique, 411–29. Paris: Vrin, 
2005. 
179 
 
Hadot, Pierre. La Citadelle Intérieure : Introduction Aux Pensées de Marc Aurèle. Paris: 
Fayard, 1992. 
———. “Les Divisions Des Parties de La Philosophie Dans l’Antiquité.” Museum 
Helveticum 36, no. 4 (1979): 201–23. 
———. “Philosophie, Discours Philosophique, et Divisions de La Philosophie Chez 
Les Stoïciens.” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 45, no. 178 (1991): 205–19. 
Hager, Paul. “Chrysippus’ Theory of Pneuma.” Prudentia 14, no. 2 (1982): 97–108. 
Hahm, D. E. “The Fifth Element in Aristotle’s De Philosophia.” In Essays in Ancient 
Greek Philosophy, II, edited by J. P. Anton and Anthony Preus, 404–28. Albany (N.Y.): 
State University of New York Press, 1983. 
Hahm, David E. “Aristotle and the Stoics : A Methodological Crux.” Archiv Für 
Geschichte Der Philosophie 73 (1991): 297–311. 
———. The Origins of Stoic Cosmology. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1976. 
Hankinson, Robert James. “Explanation and Causation.” In The Cambridge History of 
Hellenistic Philosophy, edited by Keimpe A. Algra, Jonathan Barnes, Jaap Mansfeld, 
and Malcolm Schofield, 479–512. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Pr., 
1999. 
Hensley, Ian. “On the Separability and Inseparability of the Stoic Principles.” Journal 
of the History of Philosophy, Forthcoming. 
———. “The Function and Composition of Pneuma in Stoic Physics,” Forthcoming. 
Horst, P. W. van der, and J. Mansfeld. An Alexandrian Platonist against Dualism. 
Alexander of Lycopolis’ Treatise « Critique of the Doctrines of Manichaeus ». Leiden: Brill, 
1974. 
Hunt, H. A. K. A Physical Interpretation of the Universe. The Doctrines of Zeno the Stoic. 
Carlton, Australia: Melbourne Univ. Pr., 1976. 
Ierodiakonou, Katerina. “The Stoic Division of Philosophy.” Phronesis 38, no. 1 
(1993): 57–74. 
Inwood, Brad. Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism. Oxford : New York: 
Clarendon Press, 1985. 
———. “How Unified Is Stoicism Anyway?” In Virtue and Happiness: Essays in 
Honour of Julia Annas (OSAP Supplementary Volume), edited by Rachana Kamtekar, 
223–44. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
180 
 
———. “Walking and Talking: Reflections on Divisions of the Soul in Stoicism.” In 
Partitioning the Soul: Debates From Plato to Leibniz, edited by Dominik Perler and 
Klaus Corcilius, 63–84. Berlin ; New York: De Gruyter, 2014. 
———. “Why Physics?” In God and Cosmos in Stoicism, edited by Ricardo Salles, 201–
23. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
Inwood, Brad, and Lloyd P. Gerson, eds. The Stoics Reader : Selected Writings and 
Testimonia. Indianapolis (Ind.): Hackett, 2008. 
Ioppolo, Anna Maria. “Presentation and Assent : A Physical and Cognitive Problem 
in Early Stoicism.” Classical Quarterly 40 (1990): 433–49. 
Irwin, Terence. “Stoic Naturalism and Its Critics.” In The Cambridge Companion to the 
Stoics, edited by Brad Inwood, 345–64. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge 
University Pr., 2003. 
Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Edited by Allen W. Wood 
and Jerome. B. Schneewind. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002. 
Kidd, Ian G. “Philosophy and Science in Posidonius.” Antike Und Abendland 24 
(1978). 
———, ed. Posidonius. 3, The Translation of the Fragments. Cambridge ; New York: 
Cambridge University Pr., 1999. 
Kleywegt, A. J. “Cleanthes and the ‘Vital Heat.’” Mnemosyne 37, no. 1/2 (1984): 94–
102. 
Lapidge, Michael. “Stoic Cosmology.” In The Stoics, edited by John M. Rist, 161–85. 
California: University of California Press, 1978. 
———. “Ἀρχαί and Στοιχεῖα: A Problem in Stoic Cosmology.” Phronesis 18, no. 3 
(1973): 240–78. 
Lévy, Carlos. “Éthique de l’immanence, Éthique de La Transcendance : Le Problème 
de l’« Oikeiôsis » Chez Philon.” In Philon d’Alexandrie et Le Langage de La Philosophie, 
153–64. Turnhout: Brepols, 1998. 
Liu, Irene. “Nature and Knowledge in Stoicism: On the Ordinariness of the Stoic 
Sage.” Apeiron 41, no. 4 (2008): 247–76. 
Long, A. A. Hellenistic Philosophy. Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics. London: Duckworth, 
1974. 
———. “Philo On Stoic Physics.” In Philo of Alexandria and Post-Aristotelian 
Philosophy, edited by Francesca Alesse, 121–40. Leiden: Brill, 2008. 
181 
 
———. “Theophrastus and the Stoa.” In Theophrastus: Reappraising the Sources, edited 
by J. M. van Ophuijsen and Marlein van Raalte, 355–83. New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers, 1998. 
Long, A. A., and D. N. Sedley, eds. The Hellenistic Philosophers. Vol. 1 Translations of 
the Principal Sources with Philosophical Commentary. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987. 
———, eds. The Hellenistic Philosophers. Vol. 2 Greek and Latin Texts with Notes and 
Bibliography. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. 
Long, A.G. Plato and the Stoics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 
Long, Anthony A. “Dialectic and the Stoic Sage.” In Stoic Studies, 85–106. 
Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Pr., 1996. 
———. “Stoic Psychology.” In The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, edited 
by Keimpe A. Algra, Jonathan Barnes, Jaap Mansfeld, and Malcolm Schofield, 560–
84. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Pr., 1999. 
———. “The Logical Basis of Stoic Ethics.” In Stoic Studies, 134–55. Cambridge ; New 
York: Cambridge University Pr., 1996. 
Ludlam, Ivor. “Two Long-Running Stoic Myths : A Central Orthodox Stoic School 
and Stoic Scholarchs.” Elenchos 24, no. 1 (2003): 33–55. 
Mansfeld, J. “Providence and the Destruction of the Universe in Early Stoic Thought, 
with Some Remarks on the Mysteries of Philosophy.” In Studies in Hellenistic 
Religions, 129–88. Brill, 1979. 
———. “Zeno of Citium. Critical Observations on a Recent Study.” Mnemosyne 31 
(1978): 134–78. 
Mansfeld, Jaap. “Philosophy in the Service of Scripture: Philo’s Exegetical 
Strategies.” In The Question of Eclecticism : Studies in Later Greek Philosophy, edited by 
John M. Dillon and A. A. Long, 70–102. Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1988. 
———. “Resurrection Added. The Interpretatio Christiana of a Stoic Doctrine.” 
Vigiliae Christianae 37 (1983): 218–33. 
———. “Some Stoics on the Soul (SVF I 136).” Mnemosyne 37 (1984): 443–45. 
———. “Sources.” In The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, edited by 
Keimpe A. Algra, Jonathan Barnes, Jaap Mansfeld, and Malcolm Schofield, 3–30. 
Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Pr., 1999. 
182 
 
———. “The Cleanthes Fragment in Cicero, De Natura Deorum II,24.” In Actus. 
Studies in Honour of H. L. W. Nelson, 203–10. Utrecht: Inst. voor Klass. Talen, 1982. 
———. The Pseudo-Hippocratic Tract [Peri Hebdomadōn.] : Ch. 1-11 and Greek Philosophy. 
Assen: Van Gorcum, 1971. 
Mansfeld, Jaap, and David T. Runia. « Aëtiana » : The Method and Intellectual Context of 
a Doxographer. 2, The Compendium. Leiden: Brill, 2009. 
Menn, Stephen. “The Stoic Theory of Categories.” In Oxford Studies in Ancient 
Philosophy, edited by David N. Sedley, 17:215–47. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999. 
Pearson, Alfred Chilton. The Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1891. 
Ramelli, Ilaria L.E. “The Mysteries of Scripture: Allegorical Exegesis and the 
Heritage of Stoicism, Philo, and Pantaenus.” In Clement’s Biblical Exegesis: Proceedings 
of the Second Colloquium on Clement Of Alexandria (Olomouc, May 29-31, 2014), edited 
by Veronika Cernuskova, 80–110. Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, 0920-623X, 
vol. 139. Leiden : Boston: Brill, 2017. 
Reesor, Margaret E. The Nature of Man in Early Stoic Philosophy. London: Duckworth, 
1989. 
———. “The Stoic Concept of Quality.” American Journal of Philology 75 (1954): 40–58. 
Rescher, Nicholas. “Leibniz and the Concept of a System.” Studia Leibnitiana 13, no. 1 
(1981): 114–22. 
Rist, J. M. Stoic Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Pr., 1969. 
Runia, David T. “Philo of Alexandria and Ancient Philosophy.” In Greek and Roman 
Philosophy, 100 BC - 200 AD, edited by R. W. Sharples and Richard Sorabji, II:483–501. 
London: Institute of Classical Studies, School of Advanced Study, University of 
London, 2007. 
———. “The Beginnings of the End : Philo of Alexandria and Hellenistic Theology.” 
In Traditions of Theology, 281–316. Leiden: Brill, 2002. 
Russo, Lucio, and Silvio M. Medaglia. “Sulla Presunta Accusa Di Empietà Ad 
Aristarco Di Samo.” Quaderni Urbinati Di Cultura Classica 53, no. 2 (1996): 113–21. 
Salles, Ricardo. “᾽Εκπύρωσις and the Goodness of God in Cleanthes.” Phronesis 50, 
no. 1 (2005): 56–78. 
183 
 
———. “Chrysippus on Conflagration and the Indestructibility of the Cosmos.” In 
God and Cosmos in Stoicism, edited by Ricardo Salles, 119–34. Oxford ; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2009. 
———. “Two Early Stoic Theories of Cosmogony.” In Causation and Creation in Late 
Antiquity, edited by Anna Marmodoro and Brian D. Prince, 11–30. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Pr., 2015. 
Sambursky, S. Physics of the Stoics. London: Routledge, 1959. 
Sandbach, F. H. Aristotle and the Stoics. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Pr., 1985. 
———. The Stoics. New York: Norton, 1975. 
Sauvé Meyer, Susan. “Affect and Impulse in the Stoic Doctrine of the Passions.” n.d. 
http://www.sas.upenn.edu/~smeyer/documents/Affect_and_ImpulseMay2013_000.p
df. 
———. “Chain of Causes: What Is Stoic Fate?” In God and Cosmos in Stoicism, edited 
by Ricardo Salles, 71–90. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
Scade, Paul. “Stoic Cosmological Limits and Their Platonic Background.” In Aristotle 
& the Stoics Reading Plato, edited by Robert W. Sharples, and Anne Sheppard, 143–83. 
Institute of Classical Studies, University of London, 2010. 
Schofield, M. “Ariston of Chios and the Unity of Virtue.” Ancient Philosophy 4 (1984): 
83–96. 
Sedley, David N. “Chrysippus on Psychophysical Causality.” In Passions and 
Perceptions, edited by Jacques Brunschwig and Martha C. Nussbaum, 313–31. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Pr., 1993. 
———. Creationism and Its Critics in Antiquity. Berkeley (Calif.): University of 
California Pr., 2007. 
———. “Hellenistic Physics and Metaphysics.” In The Cambridge History of Hellenistic 
Philosophy, edited by Keimpe A. Algra, Jonathan Barnes, Jaap Mansfeld, and 
Malcolm Schofield, 355–411. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Pr., 
1999. 
———. “Matter in Hellenistic Philosophy.” In Materia: XIII Colloquio Internazionale: 
Roma, 7-9 gennaio 2010, edited by Delfina Giovannozzi and Marco Veneziani, 53–66. 
Lessico Intellettuale Europeo 113. Roma: L. S. Olschki, 2011. 
———. Plato’s « Cratylus ». Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Pr., 2003. 
184 
 
———. “Plato’s Theaetetus as an Ethical Dialogue.” In Ancient Models of Mind : 
Studies in Human and Divine Rationality, edited by Andrea Wilson Nightingale and 
David N. Sedley, 64–74. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Pr., 2010. 
———. “The Stoic Theory of Universals.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 23, no. S1 
(1985): 87–92. 
———. “Theophrastus and Epicurean Physics.” In Theophrastus: Reappraising the 
Sources, edited by J. M. van Ophuijsen and Marlein van Raalte, 331–54. New 
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1998. 
Sellars, John. “Stoic Ontology and Plato’s Sophist.” In Aristotle & the Stoics Reading 
Plato, edited by Robert W. Sharples, and Anne Sheppard, 185–203. London: Institute 
of Classical Studies, University of London, 2010. 
———. The Art of Living: The Stoics on the Nature and Function of Philosophy. Second 
Edition. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013. 
Sharples, Robert W. “Strato of Lampsacus: The Sources, Texts and Translations.” In 
Strato of Lampsacus : Text, Translation, and Discussion, edited by Marie-Laurence 
Desclos and William W. Fortenbaugh, 5–229. New Brunswick (N.J.): Transaction 
Publ., 2011. 
Solmsen, F. Aristotle’s System of the Physical World. A Comparison with His Predecessors. 
Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Pr., 1960. 
———. Cleanthes or Posidonius ? The Basis of Stoic Physics. Amsterdam: Noord-Holl. 
Uitg. Maats., 1961. 
Sorabji, Richard. Matter, Space, and Motion : Theories in Antiquity and Their Sequel. 
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Pr., 1988. 
Stein, Ludwig. Die Psychologie Der Stoa. Berlin: Verlag von S. Calvary & Co, 1886. 
Stevens, John A. “Preliminary Impulse in Stoic Psychology.” Ancient Philosophy 20, 
no. 1 (2000): 139–68. 
Tieleman, Teun. Chrysippus’ « On Affections » : Reconstruction and Interpretation. 
Leiden: Brill, 2003. 
———. Galen and Chrysippus on the Soul : Argument and Refutation in the « De Placitis » 
Books II-III. Leiden: Brill, 1996. 
———. “The Spirit of Stoicism.” In The Holy Spirit, Inspiration, and the Cultures of 
Antiquity: Multidisciplinary Perspectives, edited by Jörg Frey and John R. Levison, 39–
62. Ekstasis : Religious Experience from Antiquity to the Middle Ages, volume 5. 
Berlin ; Boston: De Gruyter, 2014. 
185 
 
Todd, R. B. Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics. A Study of the De Mixtione with 
Preliminary Essays, Text, Translation and Commentary. Leiden: Brill, 1976. 
———. “Monism and Immanence: The Foundations of Stoic Physics.” In The Stoics, 
edited by J. M. Rist, 137–60. Univ. of California Pr., 1978. 
———. “Συνέντασις and the Stoic Theory of Perception.” Grazer Beiträge : Zeitschrift 
Für Die Klassische Altertumswissenschaft 2 (1974): 251–61. 
Verbeke, Gerard. L’évolution de La Doctrine Du Pneuma, Du Stoicisme à s. Augustin : 
Étude Philosophique. Paris: D. de Brouwer, 1945. 
Vogt, Katja Maria. Belief and Truth : A Skeptic Reading of Plato. Oxford ; New York: 
Oxford University Pr., 2012. 
———. “Sons of the Earth: Are the Stoics Metaphysical Brutes?” Phronesis 54, no. 2 
(2009): 136–54. 
Watson, Gerard. “Discovering the Imagination : Platonists and Stoics on Phantasia.” 
In The Question of Eclectism. Studies in Later Greek Philosophy, edited by John M. Dillon 
and Anthony A. Long, 208–33. Berkeley: Univ. of California Pr., 1988. 
———. The Stoic Theory of Knowledge. Belfast: Queen’s Univ., 1966. 
White, Michael J. “Stoic Natural Philosophy (Physics and Cosmology).” In Cambridge 
Companion to the Stoics, 124–52. Cambridge: Cambridge University Pr., 2003. 
Wolff, Michael. “Hipparchus and the Stoic Theory of Motion.” In Matter and 
Metaphysics : Fourth Symposium Hellenisticum, edited by Jonathan Barnes and Mario 
Mignucci, 471–545. [Napoli]: Bibliopolis, 1988. 
 
  
186 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Engraving of Zeus as the element of fire: Johann Sadeler (1665). With thanks to the Trustees of British Museum© 
 
